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# **Classification Management**



**JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL  
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## WELCOMING ADDRESS

**Rear Admiral W. H. Groverman**  
**Commander, Western Sea Frontier, U.S. Navy**

I consider it an honor, a privilege, and a responsibility to be asked to welcome you to San Francisco for your fourth annual seminar. My qualification for this position is like your classification problems—rather unique. Needless to say, I am neither the mayor of San Francisco, who is a native son and one of the most impressive figures in public life that I have had the pleasure to meet, nor am I the protocol officer of the city, who is Mr. Magnin, another distinguished citizen the ladies in the audience may recognize by name. My choice as the welcoming speaker is that of your chairman, Fred Daigle, who felt that with San Francisco being a Navy oriented city and with the Navy Material Command staunchly supporting the NCMS, a Naval officer would be an appropriate speaker. Of course he is a little prejudiced, having served in the Navy himself.

There is no greater problem confronting the nation today than that of national security. Although the public is emotionally upset by domestic problems, and it is not my purpose to belittle these, the nation is strong enough and its people understanding enough to prevail. The real danger lies in the rapidly expanding technology of the age which can and has revolutionized concepts of industrial, economic, social, and military capabilities. Never in the history of mankind have science and technology opened such a Pandora's box.

The science fiction that I read as a child, "Tom Swift and the Diamond Makers" and "Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea," are no longer fairy tales, but realities. Will the science fiction of today remain figments of the imagination or become realities of tomorrow?

What has all this to do with classification management? It means that the Government, and all who are involved in this explosive environment of knowledge, and especially those in the industrial complex of this great nation, must work in unison to determine what must be placed in a security status and what, in the way of new developments, could be detrimental to our national security if placed under security wraps. The latter is important because our industrial and economic strength lies in our progress and this progress could be stifled by too much security.

I have been reading Vice-Admiral Rickover's testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in which he expressed serious concern about the question of selling a small oceanographic research submarine to the Russians. This single item illustrates most of the problems confronting this society today. Who establishes the guidance: The President, with advice from his Marine Science Council of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development; the Atomic Energy Commission—although the



vessel is not atomic-powered it relates to atomic submarine design; the Navy under the Department of Defense, since the release of its design might jeopardize our submarine program; or industry, with its knowledge of which parts are classified and which are not?

Let us assume that the Navy is given the task. Upon what criteria should the decision be made? As an example, I recall when I was in the Office of Naval Research back shortly after World War II, *Popular Science* issued an article on U.S. submarine development. At that time the only Top Secret document I had in my possession was our Submarine Development Program. When I compared the two, they were for all practical purposes identical. In investigating the circumstances, I learned that each part of the submarine design had been released at one time or another and the Chief of Information therefore concluded that the Top Secret document was releasable.

What has this to do with the research submarine in question? It is obvious that the new developments such as the shape, the material, the processing techniques, etc., could have been released separately at one time or another. The relation to submarine design, however, might not be so evident. Should the Navy classify the research vessel or release it to foreign purchase? Is it a military decision, an industrial decision, or an economic decision? How and when should it be classified and who should be responsible for the decision?

These are extremely challenging questions and are difficult for any

one person to answer with certainty. It is, therefore, encouraging to know that government and industry have formed the National Classification Management Society. There is no doubt that help is needed. Though the industrial people present may be primarily interested in reducing the complexity and cost of managing classification, their help is needed.

But if I may digress a moment, I am reminded of a question asked of me once while I was on duty in Washington, i.e., "Who makes national policy?" My answer, right or wrong, was that it is usually conceived and drafted at a low level, massaged and refined on its way to the top, and then accredited to the senior man. So in classification, the guidance, the method, and then the management, must be a team effort generated from within the group or groups responsible and no doubt the result will be accredited to the senior responsible person.

In reviewing some of your past papers on the subject, there is little that I can add, for you seem to be well aware of all aspects of the problems. I can, however, wish you success in your undertakings, for I strongly believe that classification and declassification are essential to our national health and well-being. So, like medicine, we must learn what is good and what is bad for the patient under varying symptoms.

Again, welcome to San Francisco, where Broadway declassifies the secrets of life, and if you are not satisfied with the weather, as Herb Caen says, "Wait a minute."

# PRESIDENTIAL WELCOME

Lorimer F. McConnell

It is a real pleasure for me to be here this morning to welcome you on behalf of the NCMS, both those of you who are members and those of you who are guests. I see so many familiar faces I am very glad to see.

Some of you have been with us before at these seminars and have decided it was worthwhile to come back again. I hope you are not disappointed. For those of you who are here for the first time, I hope that you will feel at the end of this seminar that it was very worthwhile.

Mr. Daigle has done an outstanding job in putting together what we hope to be the best one we have had. He was talked into taking the job at a cocktail party; before he knew what was happening, he had signed a paper saying he would do it. The California Chapter at that time consisted of eight members. He looked around and thought, "What did I do?"

This moment is evidence that the impossible has been made possible, and I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Fred and his committee for a really outstanding job.

Now, I am going to make the balance of my remarks very short. I believe one of the things I would want to do is talk about what our expectations are for the seminar before we go into our program proper.

I really don't think of any better words to say to you than those said to you by Don Woodbridge a couple of years ago. We are conducting a seminar—not a conference, not a de-

bate, not a discussion, but a seminar.

Don reminded us that this word means "seedbed." This is a seedbed from which we can grow. I think this is something we should keep in mind in the next few days. This is not a place to train people, but to try to plant a few seeds that will be nurtured and grow—for many of us, long after these three days are over.

Looking at our program, I think we have many seeds that can grow if they are nurtured. Basically, the program is designed to address itself to working-level people. There will be discussions of preparation of classification guidance, coordination between industry and Department of Defense, "the man in the middle"—what is the problem of the document control man, and other people who suffer, perhaps, as a result of classification decisions or lack of decisions.

Then, speakers on classification management cost studies, and the application and use of the revised Form DD 254."

These are all working-level problems discussion of which I think will help all of us learn a great deal.

Also, we are expanding our areas of interest in three rather significant areas. You will notice from the program that Dick Durham is moderating a panel on "Freedom of Information versus Classified Information." Distinguished members of the press will discuss classification problems from the standpoint of the working newspaperman and the press.

A very highly debated matter is classified research on the campus. We are going to address ourselves to this question. And you will have the opportunity to finally launch a discussion of proprietary information—something that the Society has not yet geared itself to address, but which is part of our charter.

We have some very distinguished guests for our luncheon speakers. Today we will have Mr. Charles Marshall, Director of the Division of Classification, Atomic Energy Commission. Tomorrow at our luncheon we will have Mr. George MacClain, the Director of Security Classification Management Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. The third day—this doesn't appear in the program—we will be honored by having an address by Mr. Barry Miller, who is Senior Editor and Manager of *Aviation Week and Space Technology* magazine. And please believe me when I say that we are going to have some discussion after that luncheon meeting.

One point about the seminar I would like to stress is that discussion from the floor has been a traditional part of the seminar, and I want to encourage all of you not to be bashful in standing up and making a comment or a contribution to the discussion. Time has been specifically set aside in the program for this, and I hope we will have a lot of it. It makes for a vital meeting, and we learn from the people in the audience, not just those of you on the podium.

Finally, this note: this year we have rearranged our format. The business meeting that is usually held

at this time has been held over until Thursday afternoon. The thought here is that after two and a half days of meeting, the membership and the guests who wish to attend would have ideas and thoughts to express that might not have occurred to them on the first morning.

Now, the next item on our program is a rather special one that we call our Special Recognition Program. This will be handled by the present Chairman of our Board of Directors, Mr. Richard Durham.

RICHARD DURHAM: Today gives me the greatest satisfaction I have had as a member of the Society, because today I am going to make a special presentation to a gentleman who richly deserves it. I hope this is a surprise to him. We went through a lot of shenanigans to make sure he would be present.

I am going to read this certificate:

Robert Rushing gave unstintingly of his time and talents during the Society's crucial formative period, as a principal member of the initial steering committee and then as the first President. His organizational skill, and his insight into what the essential nature of the Society should and could be, were vital. More than half of the charter members, and many other key members, joined the Society as the direct result of his personal efforts. It was he who successfully formulated and put into writing the specific scope and goals of the Society, and his President's letter of 1965 remains the Society's definitive statement of classification management. By his leadership Bob has made a notable

contribution to the Society and to the defense effort of the United States.

In recognition thereof, the Board of Directors on behalf of the National Classification Management Society hereby awards him this Certificate of Appreciation and an honorary membership for life.

Bob, if you will come up, I would like to give it to you at this time.

ROBERT RUSHING: Ladies and gentleman: I am surprised. Your success in making this a surprise is certainly a tribute to you. It proves that you can classify something and keep it a secret. I guess I would say this is the time when you appreciate taking those courses on thinking on your feet, which I wish I had studied better.

I do sincerely appreciate this honor. I am very happy that I was able to contribute in a small way to the formation and success of the Society. In these days when we hear so much of rights and so little of responsibility, I think that the aims and objectives—and achievements—of this Society certainly demonstrate the value of taking responsibility and doing a good job for the country. I am the type that when I hear the band I still get goose pimples, and I certainly subscribe to this philosophy of duty, honor, and country.

So I will certainly continue to be interested in the Society. I know that the Society can in an important way contribute to the defense of the nation, and the progress of democracy. I thank you again.

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

By Donald B. Woodbridge

It is good to be in San Francisco. As the folders Fred Daigle sent out to us kept saying, San Francisco is everybody's favorite city. San Francisco welcomes everyone and has something for everyone, whether you are a flower child or your thing is something called Classification Management.

I have been coming out here for a good many years to touch base with our friends at Livermore and I always look forward to the trips. Every now and again I think back to my first trip when I was a boy. My father was on sabbatical leave from Columbia University and had come out to

Berkeley to lecture on philosophy to the young Californians, who, I might remark, differed considerably from their successors on the campus today. It was in Berkeley that I learned to roller skate and ride a bicycle. I have vivid memories of coasting on my skates down the steep Berkeley slopes, sitting on a stick for a brake. And would you believe that I used to roller skate to school down the middle of University Avenue? My most nostalgic memory is of the ferryboat ride back across the bay on a Sunday evening surrounded by holiday makers singing to the sound of ukeleles that nonsense song that starts off, "One, two, three,

four/sometimes I wish there were more." The Age of Innocence. Before we got back to New York, Woodrow Wilson had abandoned neutrality and the United States was at war. Isolation was gone, innocence faded, and something happened to the American dream.

I was also in San Francisco on November 22, 1963. On that fatal Friday my wife and I were returning from a very pleasant week here on the coast and it was in the airport that we heard the appalling news of John Kennedy's assassination. Now fresh in all our minds, still hardly blunted, is the horror of his brother's murder in San Francisco's sister city down the coast. Any of us seeking a keynote today, whether for our personal lives or our public commitments, must find in it an echo of the death knell. "Never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

The program says this is a keynote address and I am much honored. I am not sure what the committee hoped I would choose as my theme. Perhaps because this assembly may be thought of as a fifth anniversary celebration they felt a keynote address should be delivered by a charter member.

I rather like the way Bob Donovan had it in the *C/M Bulletin*: "The keynote speaker will be delivered by Don Woodbridge." The only trouble was, he did not say delivered from what.

Perhaps I should hark back to that now legendary gathering in Kansas City in 1963. But I harked back two years ago, and Dick Durham has still further immortalized the occasion in the latest issue of the *Journal*. Dick wants you to have the record straight

and know the founding fathers. I commend his essay to your study. You will note, however, that the Society was not incorporated till March 31, 1964. Thus we can always debate which anniversary we are celebrating.

That I had the temerity to accept this assignment continues to astonish and dismay me. Faced with the responsibility, I have taken as my theme, "NCMS in the Age of Dissent." Perhaps that does not strike you as a strong enough characterization of our world today. What should we call this age? When we cast an optimistic eye beyond the last horizon to follow our astronauts on the way to the moon or when we watch the sinister growth of rocket-launched missiles, we may call it the Space Age. When we look at the fantastic and ominous development of the computer, now ready to control not only our machines, but our very lives, demolishing the last strongholds of privacy; when machines have minds and memories and the human brain is something to be programmed—then we know we are in the Cybernetic Age. If we consider the onward thrust of emerging nations and the struggles of the downtrodden, despised, and oppressed toward freedom and human dignity, we recognize that we are in an Age of Revolution. Indeed, it is tempting to say that all these movements are part of a revolution. Certainly their effect on our lives is revolutionary and will continue to be for longer than we can foresee.

But the dark side of the picture is not revolution—disturbing as that may be. The dark side of the picture is the trend toward anarchy, anarchy fostered by the best and by the worst of motives. The irony of anarchy is, of

course, that once anarchy prevails, motives are quite irrelevant. Today, in many quarters, dissent is exalted as one of the noblest attributes of man, civil disobedience has become a sacramental act, and the Bill of Rights has been expanded to include the right to make your own rules whenever conscience dictates—or whenever there is something to be gained by it. This trend is of vital importance to us as individuals and, I submit, it is important to us in NCMS as a society.

For the past few months I have followed with great interest a controversy in the American Physical Society over the role the society should play in public affairs. The issue was broached a year ago by Charles Schwartz, a physicist from across the Bay in Berkeley. Dr. Schwartz proposed an amendment to the society's constitution to allow one percent or more of the membership to initiate a vote by all members "on any matter of concern to the society." On the face of it, this proposal does not sound very alarming; but Dr. Schwartz and his supporters have made it clear that they are motivated not by concern for the advancement of physics, but by an intense concern for the direction in which public affairs are moving today. More particularly, they want APS to take a stand on the Vietnam war. The argument would appear to run that if one out of every hundred members fears a political, military or cultural catastrophe in our nation the remaining ninety-nine should be made aware of that fear and asked to vote on it. That is, they should be asked to pass or defeat a resolution relating to that fear and what should be done about it. As you grow more passionate

in your concern, you naturally tend to believe that others should be equally passionate and that all avenues should be activated in behalf of your cause regardless of consequences. Objectivity and passion seldom go hand in hand. One wonders what reactions there would be if a resolution opposing the war in Vietnam were defeated in APS or if one percent of the members offered a resolution to impeach Earl Warren.

It takes no great imagination to discover the seeds of chaos in the Schwartz amendment, and its opponents were quick to do so. Distinguished scientists like Frederick Seitz, Karl Darrow, and Edward Teller pointed out that to open the society to debate on general public issues would soon erode the high professional status and regard achieved by many years of service in the cause of physics. The articles of incorporation of the society read: "The object and purpose of the Society shall be to promote the advancement and diffusion of the knowledge of physics, to publish a periodical and other publications for that purpose, and to do such other things as may be conducive to said purpose." Adoption of the amendment could lead to plebiscites and referenda that could not be construed as conducive to that purpose and, incidentally, put the society to considerable unwarranted expense. Before a so-called matter of concern could be debated and voted there would have to be debate on whether it was indeed a matter of concern. Physicists have no special competence in questions of public policy just because they are physicists. To make the society an arena for resolutions on public issues would build an

image of the society as another pressure group, an image that would hardly advance the cause of physics. In this arena member could be pitted against member in emotion-laden struggles whose only concrete result would be to divide the membership and undermine the society. Indeed, several members have already signified their intention to resign should the Schwartz amendment be ratified.

Dr. Schwartz's opponents applaud his concern for what is happening to our country and his willingness to stand up and be counted for what he believes. Many of them share his fear of catastrophe, but they insist that weakening the American Physical Society is not the way to strengthen the country. Scientists have many avenues through which they can make themselves felt as citizen-scientists or scientist-citizens—notably the Federation of American Scientists and the Association for the Advancement of Science. The American Physical Society was founded with a simple, straightforward object and purpose. By adhering to that purpose, by acting in accordance with their obligations as professionals to the profession of physics, its members have made it a great institution. To seek now to make the society a vehicle for dissent is a step on the road to anarchy.

APS has over one hundred times as many members as NCMS, but I am not about to say that APS is one hundred times as good or one hundred times as important. Maybe settling problems in APS is one hundred times more complicated. In NCMS we don't have to talk about our membership as statistics. When we are interested in one percent we just call them by

name, like Dick and Lorry. And I think it hardly likely that Dick or Lorry or any other one percent will jolt us with a resolution on American foreign policy or the war on poverty. But it is not impossible that a militant group in our midst might disregard or fail to recognize the limitations imposed by the aims and purpose of NCMS. Such a group might feel it appropriate for the Society to express its corporate opinion on Government classification policies, that is, on what the Government chooses to classify, or on what the Government chooses to declassify. Such a group might seek to make this Society a vehicle for dissent—another step on the road to anarchy.

You and I may have very strong opinions about some of the things government agencies and departments promulgate in the field of classification (I know for a fact that some of you do). Maybe you want to sound off about them. One of the great things about NCMS is that you can—but you're on your own. You cannot expect the Society to endorse what you say, and it expects your conduct to be impeccably professional. I am sure you have all been impressed and gratified, as I have, by how ready and willing representatives of the Department of Defense and its various components have been to listen to what we have to say and the questions we ask. And I believe you share my admiration for their equanimity and poise.

The name of our society is well chosen. At one time I was dubious about it. The word "management" seemed to strike a pedestrian note that failed to do justice to the esoteric and intellectual aspects of our profession.

And you know, it certainly raises the status of a profession if it can lay claim to intellectuality and be recognized as something out of the ordinary. But of course, managing a classification program calls for a lot more than worrying about the number of miles of filing space in classified repositories or the number of dollars it takes to generate and preserve a secret document. It calls for more even than paragraph classification. The name points up the fact that our professional aim is to administer as effectively as possible those portions of the Government's classification programs that are entrusted to us. It disarms any suspicion of hidden agenda devoted to questioning whether or not certain information should be classified.

I would like to take time now to tell you about action the Board of Directors took last night amending the bylaws to define the purpose and scope of NCMS. These changes emphasize that ours is a professional society—not a lobby. Article II was amended as follows:

## ARTICLE II

### Purpose and Scope

Section 1. It is the purpose of the National Classification Management Society to advance the practice of classification management as a profession and to foster the highest qualities of professionalism and professional competence among its members. In furthering this purpose, the Society provides a forum for the free exchange of views and information on the methods, practices, and procedures for managing classification programs and it engages in activities for disseminating such information and for developing and refining the principles and techniques of classification management.

Section 2. The Society shall engage in activities for promoting the following:

- (a) Understanding of the philosophies, doctrines, standards, and criteria of the Government's programs for identifying and designating information that requires protection in the interest of national defense.

- (b) Methods for training and indoctrination of personnel in the application of classification principles, practices, techniques, procedures and requirements.
- (c) Systems and techniques for identifying and marking documents and materials requiring classification, regrading or declassification under guidance issued by the Government.
- (d) Understanding among the industrial, scientific, and technical communities of the character and significance of security classification.
- (e) Procedures, methods and practices for the management of classified inventories.
- (f) Methods, techniques and standards for identifying and designating company-private or proprietary information.

This leads me to what I consider a very important point—the difference between classification of information and classification of documents and materials. It epitomizes the difference between the Government's role in classification and our roles as classification managers. The distinction has always been more clear-cut, I believe, in the domain of the AEC because of the unique nature of Restricted Data information as defined by the Atomic Energy Act. In the latest revision of its classification handbook the Division of Classification at AEC Headquarters reemphasizes the fact that apart from the Commission the role of the classifier consists in classifying documents and materials according to the information they reveal. The classification of information itself is determined by law and by guidance issued by Government agencies. I, as a classification officer for a contractor, do not classify information. I examine information that I find revealed in one way or another to see whether I can identify or recognize



it as information already classified. If I can, I take appropriate action such as stamping or tagging. If it comes over the telephone, perhaps all I can do is hang up. I once knew a man who figured he had the problem of telephone communications solved. Whenever he got to the sensitive part of a conversation he whispered. It reminds me of the young lady appearing as a witness in a divorce hearing. She said she didn't know it was adultery in the daytime.

Our friends on the DOD side do not have life simplified for them in such a paternal fashion by the phenomenon of Restricted Data, but they recognize that classification must start with information and that the final authority resides with the Government. Let me quote Don Garrett in the latest issue of the *Journal*. "There are certain fundamentals that need to be expressed and understood at the start. First of all, it is *information* that is classified . . . . Second, things, documents, and hardware, are classified only because they contain and reveal classified information." Three years ago, addressing the American Society of Industrial Security, Don explored this same theme and described to his audience the DOD efforts and aims in developing centralized guidance and making it available. Incidentally, he took advantage of that meeting to let the security folks know about the progress of NCMS and our first seminar in Washington.

Let me repeat paragraph (c) of Section 2.

The Society shall engage in activities for promoting systems and techniques for identifying and marking documents and materials requiring classification,

regarding or declassification under guidance issued by the Government.

You will have noted also that the revised article in our bylaws provides for activities to promote understanding in the scientific community of the character and significance of security classification. In this we recognize another area of dissent—repudiation by scientists of research related to the defense of their country, particularly classified research. This will be discussed at length by the panel tomorrow and I will touch on it only briefly here. Moreover, Bob Donovan has kept up informed with his discerning summaries and provocative quotations in his *C/M Bulletin*. (Here let me interrupt for a moment to say for the record that I admire very much what Bob is doing for us in the *Bulletin* and envy his ability to keep it up.) Motives in this dissent are various and mixed and often hidden. When expressed, they are inevitably noble. The Council of the American Federation of Scientists does not say we should not defend our country; it says "The University should not enter into any contract supporting research, the specific purpose of which is the development of weapons or devices designed to destroy human life or to incapacitate human beings." Classification is not the issue here. An unclassified device for incapacitating human beings is just as wicked as a classified one. However, the Council goes on to condemn "secrecy in research as counter to the basic values and functions of the university." I have not seen the full statement and I find myself somewhat puzzled. Should one refuse a defense contract because it is wicked or because it is secret? Perhaps

the answer is that it is much more reprehensible to work on a wicked device in secret than in the open, and if you work in secret, you must be wicked. Some dwellers in the halls of ivy, humanists probably more often than scientists, take their stand on academic freedom. Classified research, they say, violates the very essence of the immemorial university spirit—the spirit of free inquiry. I find myself wanting to paraphrase Richard Lovelace's famous verse—I could not love thee, my country dear, so much/lov'd I not academic freedom more. I never cease to be astonished and dismayed how often among those we expect to be the most intelligent in the land, those to whom we send our children to be trained and made wise, there seems to be no recognition that the existence of that cherished academic freedom depends upon the existence of a strong and well-defended nation. Quite apart from the rejected virtues of patriotism and duty, there does not seem to be an intelligent sense of self-preservation. It is reassuring to hear voices on the other side pointing out that it is equally a violation of academic freedom to forbid classified research, or to condemn a colleague because he chooses to aid his country by classified research even if his true motive may be no loftier than choosing the best way to keep up with technical and scientific advances in his field.

What are we to think of the spectacle of the great universities—California, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, and Princeton—yielding to the pressure of students and faculties to eliminate classified research, yielding to something that calls itself Students for

Democratic Action? The noble sentiments notwithstanding, it is a spectacle of dissent—not of affirmation. Academic freedom is not at stake. There is malaise abroad in the land, there is guilt to be assuaged, a spectre must be exorcised, and so the cry is raised: repudiate the Pentagon; down with CIA, the DIA, and the AEC and maybe the State Department! Washington gold is tainted gold—what there is left of it. I sometimes think the State Department escapes considerable abuse because it hasn't a good nickname. Just think how vilification would pick up if that splendid building off Virginia Avenue had six sides or eight sides.

Dissent has a long and honorable history. Dissenting Hebrews were led by their God out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage into the promised land. Early Christians became martyrs to their faith because they dissented from the practice of deifying the Roman emperor. In 1517 a German dissenter, nailing his 95 theses on the door of the church at Wittenberg, changed the course of religious history. A century later, a small band of dissenters set sail from Plymouth in a boat christened Mayflower to help lay the foundation of this republic. Some years later a gang of their descendants, dressed as Indians, registered their dissent by dumping three cargoes of Bohea tea into Boston harbor, and not long afterward a Virginia gentleman sat down to write a document starting with the words, "When in the course of human events . . ."

(Do you ever stop to wonder whether you would have been a Tory or a rebel, back then?)

History shows us that without dissent man's struggle to improve his lot and his progress toward a nobler relation with his fellow man would have been stifled. But increasingly today dissent is valued and practiced for its own sake. It is becoming an end in itself and not a means to an end. Once upon a time, I seem to remember, people used to worry about our becoming a nation of conformers. Times have changed, haven't they? Nowadays, in many segments of our culture, the act of dissent, regardless of what is being repudiated, takes on a heroic quality—like Satan in "Paradise Lost" defying the Celestial Establishment. I recently browsed in Milton's great epic again and found much food for thought in his magnificent portrait of Satan. There is no escaping the fact that the only heroic and three-dimensional figure in the poem is Satan. Almighty God looks like a stuffy manager of the Celestial Enterprises and his Divine Son seems pretty much of an insufferable prig for all his illustrious power and glory. Our sympathies are with Satan and we follow his schemes to subvert the will of heaven with eager interest despite the fact that we know full well how the story comes out and that we are his victims. But there is also no gainsaying the fact that Satan's aims are thoroughly, shall we say, satanic—sin and anarchy, no less. There has always been something compelling about the powers of Satan and today we find it is a satanic figure like Che Guevara that captures the devotion—in death even more than in life—of romantic young anarchists. The rioting students of Paris paste his picture everywhere.

The lack of responsibility, the

breakdown of decency, and the failure of reason are vividly illustrated in the slogans and sayings of today's dissenters. Even so eminent a group as the Federation of American Scientists shows that it is not immune, as I pointed out earlier, when it appears to characterize work done under defense contracts by words like "designed to destroy human life or incapacitate human beings." You probably saw in a recent issue of *Time* some choice specimens of violence in language gathered by Benjamin Demott, who teaches English at my alma mater:

"The family is American Fascism."

"The white race is the cancer of history."

That second one did not come from Rap Brown, but from Susan Sontag. It's not all from one side, though. Demott gives us a quotation from Robert Welch of the John Birch Society:

"The whole country is one vast insane asylum and they are letting the worst patients run the place."

Probably the ultimate in slogans of dissent is "God is dead," promulgated by some of our most intellectual theologians and happily adopted by many people of lesser intellect. When God is dead, each man can become his own deity, owing obedience and allegiance to no one but himself, making his own rules.

In this climate those who are concerned with keeping the nation's secrets face an impalpable hazard. When will dissent seek fulfillment by exposing information vital to our security? Exposing a secret can be as satisfying as throwing a rock through

an embassy window. Will the day come when a great physicist, a man of surpassing intellect, moved by great compassion, undertakes to play God for the rest of us and decide which apples from the tree of knowledge we may eat? It raises an interesting question: Should the instinct to play God be grounds for denying security clearance like the instinct for throwing stones at glass houses?

If we are to escape the demonic urge toward anarchy we must cherish order and orderliness. We will not save the world by tearing down its institutions. But at the same time,

when all is said, we must recognize that order by itself is sterile—it is only a framework in which to work out our salvation. The world will be saved only by changing the hearts and minds of the men and women who dwell in it. You and I, in our very special ways, as keepers of secrets, are custodians of order. It is a professional responsibility we accept. But you and I, as members in the brotherhood of man, must not forget that we are not going to save mankind by keeping secrets; we dare not forget the dreadful question: Am I my brother's keeper?

## THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

by Robert Lindsey, San Jose Mercury-News

Usually, when a newspaperman gets together with a hundred or so people from government agencies and the Defense industry, he can expect to pick up at least one security leak.

But as I look out here today, I have a hunch I'm in the wrong crowd for that.

As visitors to San Francisco and as custodians of our government's information, you might be interested in a recent piece of San Francisco lore which I suppose is also sort of a warning to visitors. Although all of the details aren't available, because someone in authority decided the press shouldn't have them, it seems that about a month ago an Air Force officer who had been down at the Air Force Satellite Test Center at Sunnyvale decided to visit San Francisco. He left a briefcase containing some Air Force docu-

ments, which apparently were not classified but were of a sensitive nature, as well as his airline ticket and two paychecks in his car. The car was broken into and the briefcase disappeared. Well, it wasn't long before one of the "flower people" of San Francisco was trying to sell the Air Force documents and the checks and tickets in the Haight-Ashbury District, not too far from here.

Police intervened and concluded that the bearded hippie probably didn't come by the documents by honest means. In other words, they decided he probably did not have a proper security clearance. Eventually the stolen materials were returned to the officer.

The hippie didn't have much luck selling the Air Force data.

The task I've been assigned on your

program is to give a newspaperman's view of the classification system for which, to a large degree, the members of your Society are responsible. Unfortunately, I'm afraid much of what I'll say will be old hat to you; you've heard it before. But from the viewpoint of the press, at least, I think it deserves repetition.

I don't think hearing the other side will necessarily give you enough empathy for you to have sympathy for our point of view. But I think it might be valuable to understand at least some of the reasons why a large portion of the working press looks cynically at government classification processes, and why there is a continuing battle to penetrate the barriers you erect.

Regardless of what some of you may think, newsmen—for the most part—are not unpatriotic when they publish information which you have tried to keep from them. Most reporters who cover the Pentagon, the defense industry, and the field of public and military affairs have seen enough abuses of the system that they treat it with suspicion and, in many cases, have no moral compunction against "breaking security," as you would say.

To put it another way, some of us think you have cried wolf too much, and so the whole system suffers.

Granted, many of the things which appear in print that make you unhappy are there because a reporter writes for what you might call purely selfish reasons. Like everybody else, he is driven by certain ambitions to beat his competition, to look good to his boss, or fulfill whatever other needs he has. News gathering, like national defense, is a highly competitive business.

I would reiterate what I said

earlier—most reporters do not feel it morally wrong to break your security, because they do not respect it. They feel the public is entitled to know about affairs which upset them.

I'd like to address myself to two main points and then elaborate a little on each.

The first one is that, in my opinion, too many persons have authority to prevent defense information from reaching the public; and too many of these people are using this power for the selfish interests of themselves or their agencies.

Secondly, it seems to me many of the regulations concerning the release of defense information are unrealistic and superfluous. They not only complicate the process of informing the public, they cost taxpayers too much money. As you know better than I, classification of documents is an expensive procedure.

Turning back to the first point, that too many persons can classify information and that many of them do it for reasons other than valid questions of national security, I should say at the outset, as I'm sure you know, the Freedom of Information Law has had virtually no effect at all on the covering defense news. You have barriered yourself behind the same fence as ever—that the data is "classified," and that's that.

It would be fine if everything you classified—or, putting it another way, everything you have restricted from public consumption—were data that if it were revealed would aid and comfort potential enemies. Most newsmen are skeptical of your system because they have discovered, usually after it is too late, incidents where so-called

"security" has been used to hide mistakes or poor judgement; or to protect a program when it is in jeopardy in Congress or perhaps at the civilian DOD level; or when there is an inter-agency fight for funds or jurisdiction; or in comparable situations.

In this government, one function of the press is to report to the public on the performance of its leaders. The facts it generates flow into the national consciousness, and the people use them to pass judgement on whether they think their leaders and the agencies of government are doing a good job.

When three men died in the Apollo fire at Cape Kennedy eighteen months ago, NASA was brought to task for certain errors in judgment. Since then, as you know, there has been a sharp decline in the national image of NASA, and its budget has been cut by about \$1 billion. Part of the budget cut, of course, is due to the war, but much of it is a direct result of the Apollo fire.

Putting myself in your shoes, to reverse the empathy, I can see the Apollo incident is a pretty clear lesson for survival in the world you live in. Looking at it quite cynically, and unfairly in regard to the three men who died in the Apollo capsule, the lesson is this: Don't get caught at your mistakes, or you might go out of business.

The Apollo fire, because of its the world's eyes, and it could not have been concealed in any case.

But how about failures and poor judgement in military programs which are conducted in secrecy? To a large degree, you are immune from

cataclysmic nature, happened before the system of checks and balances. In my judgement, it is part of our system that agencies and personnel take responsibility for their performance—and now many are ducking it.

I am familiar with the argument that Congress and the GAO act as a watchdog on these classified activities and therefore the public's interest is served. Well, I have to say I don't buy that. Surely, there are bright and conscientious members of Congress and they are frequently backed up by perceptive, knowledgeable and hard-nosed committee staff members. However, as one who has covered congressional hearings on military and space appropriations and has witnessed the processes at work—it seems fairly easy to "snow" Congressmen on some issues and, on occasion, Congressmen are too much concerned with their own interests to look after things which should be scrutinized.

The public is part of our system of checks and balances, and it has a right to know what is happening, not only so it can judge the men who act as their agents in government, but to be aware of events that affect its destiny. As you know, much of the information that reaches the public about national defense comes via news releases from industry or governmental agencies. Typically, an industry public relations man or a military PIO will draft a news release and submit it up through channels for approval. In preparing for this talk, I decided to look into this process with more interest than before, and I was amazed at the intricate maze which exists to filter the information before it reaches the public.

For one typical release on an Air Force funded satellite program whose mission, incidentally, is not classified, I found fifteen points or fifteen people where someone could censor or kill the news release. Actually, I lost count at fifteen, when the release vanished into sort of a bureaucratic muddle and I couldn't trace it any more.

It's the tendency of the working press to become annoyed with their direct interface, to use an engineering term, usually a PIO or perhaps a low-level officer in a program office. However, as I looked into the system, I realized it is usually not at this level where the muzzle is most often clamped, or at your level. Most often, it is apparently some faceless man up the chain of command who has been given the information, a sign-off list, and authority to censor. Perhaps he is a middle level officer assigned to a staff job in a program office, or perhaps he is a junior officer in Security Review.

As I studied the system, it became apparent that too many people can amend, delete, or otherwise censor information as it passes up the labyrinth of industrial and government bureaucracy, without really being held responsible for the end product. Not only that, there is a built-in facet of the system which tends to reduce the flow of information to the public to its lowest possible denominator: Nobody wants to say yes, when the information lands on his desk for approval. If he says no, he has no problem. But if he says yes, he's sticking his neck out. So he takes the easy way out, and says no.

Now let's consider the motivation of the men in these jobs. As mid-career officers, they are likely to be

very concerned how they will fare on their next efficiency report. It's really not a sinister motive, perhaps. They are concerned about their promotions, their careers and, of course, the welfare of their families. A civilian in a comparable job has different considerations, but really the same basic concern of self-preservation.

Ideally, only legitimately classified data would be deleted from the information destined for the public. But it doesn't work that way, and I'd like to cite one example which sort of documents what I'm trying to say.

A month or so ago, I was at Cape Kennedy to cover the last launch of the defense communication satellite system. The night before the launch, there was a cocktail party, and as you do at cocktail parties, I began talking to a man who turned out to be a lieutenant colonel from Air Force Systems Command with a staff job, a technical management job, in this program. I don't think he realized I was a newsman, but we began talking about clearance procedures for news. One of his minor jobs, he said, was to review ostensibly for technical accuracy and security, news releases about his program. But, rather candidly I thought, he said security and accuracy were not the only things he took into consideration. He said, and I quote, "It's within the guidelines to use your blue pencil on releases for policy."

I asked him what "policy" he was referring to, and as far as I could ascertain, there was no policy written down, just the whim of the individual or the agency doing the blue penciling at the time. I asked for examples

of where he might use "policy" as a reason for censoring news and he said, in effect, in anything which might jeopardize the nation or the program or, as he put it, "anything we don't want to get out at this particular point in time."

In my judgement, this is a pretty clear violation of the intent of the Freedom of Information Law.

This incident, of course, is one minor example. I have an idea the people in this room know examples which could illustrate my point much better. Beyond the various personal motivations of the individuals, there is, of course, the collective one, the inter-agency battle, the inter-service rivalries, and the constant effort to maintain a so-called "good image."

When a program is in trouble technically or financially, suddenly the responsible people refuse to talk or they put an embargo on news which could add to the agency's troubles. Or, conversely, what was "classified" yesterday can now be leaked to an influential newspaper or magazine because it helps sell the program.

While on this subject of motivation, it's obvious that bona fide concern for the national interests guides many of the men who conceal defense information from the public, and they are right in doing so much of the time.

But aren't there some who tend to over-classify information about projects on which they are working, because it contributes to their personal egos? This type is annoyed that anyone can know about his "secret" work. As soon as it gets into the public domain, he somehow feels less important—and therefore resists legitimate efforts to report news about work he is

conducting as an employee of the public.

Still another type is the officer who has some kind of an "elite" complex which elevates him above the rest of the populace. He is motivated by an attitude that says the professionals of the Air Force, the Navy, or whoever he works for, know best, that the public couldn't understand and really shouldn't know about the defense activities affecting it.

His attitude is "Tell 'em nothing. We'll look after them." I, for one, don't trust people like that.

What I've tried to say is, the system you run regulating defense information is pocked with so many holes that the press can't respect it. I could name other examples—of how, for instance, one military service will classify a piece of information while another clears it; of how classification of new patents is used for political ambitions of military services. But you've probably heard them before. I'm not sure you have any influence in establishing policy on these matters, but it seems to me someone should clean up the present system, to control and limit who can prevent information from reaching the public, and why. Then the remaining system would be strengthened.

This brings me to my second point: that many of the regulations concerning classification of defense information are unrealistic, unworkable, and needlessly cost money.

It is a general policy of your profession not to downgrade the classification level of information merely because it has appeared in, say, the *New York Times*, *Aviation Week*, or some other publication. I think the ration-



ale for this policy goes something like this: "This guy was guessing and he guessed right. But to admit it would be to dignify his guess with stamp of authority." In other words, you don't confirm truthful information merely because it has appeared in the public domain.

Is this realistic? It seems foolish to me, not so much because you are still sitting on facts which the world knows, but because if a reasonably perceptive journalist can make a correct conclusion based on the available facts, what can a large group of professional intelligence analysts in the Soviet Union do?

I don't say you should declassify every classified item that reaches the public print. But it seems to me that a great deal of it should be, that the existing system suffers from a national egotism, an underestimation of enemy intelligence.

One example of this myopic policy is the subject of reconnaissance satellites. From 1959 until 1962, as some of you will recall, Air Force programming to develop satellites for photographic and electronic reconnaissance and similar intelligence missions was relatively open. Government officials discussed it publicly, DOD cleared news releases on the subject, and early launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base were covered by the press.

In 1962, Secretary McNamara decided that the satellites should go "underground," as it were, and today there are few programs with as much security restrictions around them—an extension, really, of the secrecy around other national intelligence activities. Now, the press and the public are

asked to forget that the satellites exist. These earlier cleared news releases are now classified, and DOD has done its best to rewrite history, to ignore they ever existed.

But again, is this realistic? Do you believe the Soviet Union is not aware of the satellites that photograph it regularly? Can you believe that leaders of other countries are not aware of them? Anybody with relatively primitive electronic tracking systems or even a powerful telescope can learn.

So if the Russians know about them, and if other nations know about them, whom are we trying to fool—ourselves?

In most major areas of advanced weapons technology, the lead time of one nation over a potential enemy is very brief. And it is, of course, essential to protect the information while we have the lead. But I think there is a tendency to ignore that the Soviet Union, Red China, and other nations also have bright young men. In most areas of weaponry, reasonably bright engineers and intelligence analysts can accurately extrapolate where a nation is going—or has gone—technologically.

To return to the question of reconnaissance satellites, for instance, DOD today refuses to declassify certain technology on cameras, side-looking radar systems, and other systems which are more than five years old. NASA could use the data for its earth resources satellite program. Isn't it likely that in many of the areas such as this foreign technology has moved ahead also, and that revealing the data would not tell them anything?

It seems that there should be more coordination between the people in your profession and those of the intelligence community—although I would speculate the intelligence people are not all that easy to work with.

In any event, this overclassification—when we are hiding facts from ourselves rather than our enemies, who already have them—is a useless and expensive deterrent to technological growth.

One last word on motivation—the motivation of the journalists who try to beat your system. This is a matter of values, and they vary among journalists as well as any group. But by and large, they feel the public should know as much as possible about their government. “As much as possible”—this, of course, is where our conflict arises. At a time in history when nuclear devices and other modern weapons have afforded the world a very short fuse, potentially a thirty-minute lead-time to annihilation, it seems to me the people deserve to know very much more about what their leaders are doing and how their decisions affect them.

FRED DAIGLE: Thank you, Bob.

Does anyone care to pose any question of Mr. Lindsey?

JOHN CONTE: If you were sitting in the classification man's place and had to make a decision whether or not to release a piece of technology, and you do not really know whether the other side knows this technology or not, which way should you be, liberal or conservative?

LINDSEY: I suppose in your shoes I would be conservative. I shouldn't

assume that perhaps the Russians already know it. That is the precise problem. Intelligence people themselves may not know it. I don't think there is any question you should release technology and tell the Russians. National security is important. But not the political information I was talking about.

ANTHONY CORREIA: Mr. Lindsey, what is your opinion—I have discussed this before with reporters and people in Barry Miller's magazine—what is your opinion of reporters' being granted access to classified information officially and given a clearance, for instance, and then agreeing not to publish certain things? Would this hamper you people in putting out your story and writing your articles?

LINDSEY: I wouldn't do that. From my point of view, I don't want to be doing it. On a few occasions where I have done this, I haven't violated the agreement, but sometimes one can get the same information through a legitimate source, or what we consider a legitimate source—you might pick it up through a cocktail party. So I don't like to be told this. During the last World War, the *New York Times*, correctly concluded that the nation was developing an atomic bomb and went to the authorities and asked if it was true. In this case the reporter agreed to not publish it and was granted privileges later. If you have a guy take action on a story that you think would be a catastrophe or would be cataclysmic I would offer some kind of arrangement and I think most re-

porters are responsible to do their part in such circumstances.

CORREIA: That is the thing I got before. They don't want to be cleared, because if they have access to information they want to be able to write about it.

FRANCIS JAHN: Your statement about the satellites flying around and the Russian scientists knowing about them is common knowledge and therefore should be admitted by our Government—how do you reconcile this with the U-2? I am sure the Russian scientists knew it was flying around and knew when it came down.

LINDSEY: This is a different set of circumstances, made different by a lot of things. One thing, they couldn't shoot it down. Number two, the Russians are doing the same thing, so it is a two-way street. I see there is a problem. I am not quite sure how I would reconcile it. Incidentally, on this question of classification policy, classification regulations of things like the U-2, you will find that a lot of journalists oppose this kind of thing—including the U-2, the Bay of Pigs business, the Pueblo incident—they feel that the public should know these things are going on, because they could lead the country into trouble. The U-2, the Bay of Pigs had bad repercussions. The Pueblo is one incident that could rock us into a nuclear war—right or wrong. We feel the public has a right to know what is going on. All of these things have tremendous impact. And so we feel the public has a right to know these things.

FRANK DILL: Where do you suggest the line be drawn in giving information?

LINDSEY: Well, first of all, it seems to me you have got to simplify your system, restrict the number of people—I am talking about news releases in this case—restrict the number of people that can handle news relations. And the person that does this should have access to information as to what is classified and what is not and that is all he should be able to do, not pencil things out for policy considerations. The line should be drawn where it is going to reveal information that would give aid and comfort to the potential enemy.

DILL: Isn't that what we are doing?

LINDSEY: No, I don't think we are. As I said before, the system is so fouled up a lot of political considerations come in.

CORREIA: On jet propulsion, of the entire amount of classified information in this country, what percentage do you feel should be released to the Russians?

LINDSEY: I don't know how much there is classified, unfortunately. I see the point of your question, and I don't have any idea, because a lot of the things are invisible to the press. So I can't say how much should be declassified, because I don't know how much there is. That is basic. Some of the older technology should be released, and some of the things that are classified for reasons other than national protection. But I have no idea what the body of classified information is.

## LUNCHEON ADDRESS

Charles Marshall, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

What I have for you is a very short history of how we came into being and what the Commission's role is in the field of classification and Restricted Data and how it got that way.

Many of you are too young to remember the Manhattan District days, because, after all, they were twenty years ago and more. There was a time when the atomic energy program was conducted solely by the military, and in a manner that was so completely classified that even its existence was unknown by a great many people until immediately after the war. However a great deal of money had been spent on the first two atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and it was felt by the general commanding the group, General Groves, that something should be done to bring to the knowledge of the public something about how their money had been spent. So the Smyth Report was written. I suppose you have read it. If you haven't, even at this late date I commend it to you.

In those days, since the war was over, pressure began to be applied—pressure with which I think we are all now quite familiar—to release information that had been developed during the years of the Manhattan District program. As a result of the response to this pressure, various security officers around the country had begun to release items of information, some of them with very undesirable effects.

General Groves recognized this very

early, and he appointed a committee to look into the orderly release of what had been classified information. The committee was to devise a method of release that would take into account the need by industry throughout the country for a great deal of information that could be used not only for their benefit but the general benefit of the country as well.

This committee was headed by Dr. Tolman, and they, meeting here in California for the first time, drew up a set of rules for the release of, or the declassification and release of, such information. The committee also set up a system to bring these rules into being and make them work.

The set of rules they brought into being, known as the declassification guide, has long since been outdated and has been replaced by a number of others that go a great deal farther than the first one did, of necessity; but the basic organization that they set up has survived, with very few changes—I think no significant ones. They set up a committee of four senior "responsible reviewers," one of whom, Dr. Warren C. Johnson, is still a member of our Committee of Senior Reviewers. The other members were Dr. W. F. Libby, a subsequent Nobel prize winner, Dr. R. L. Thornton of Berkeley, a high energy physicist, and Dr. J. H. Manley, a weapons expert who is still at Los Alamos, although he has had different positions in between.

These four were the first committee

of senior responsible reviewers. We now have eight members on the Committee of Senior Reviewers covering major aspects of the program. We have one member from the AEC laboratory at Livermore; two from the one at Los Alamos, one from the Sandia Corporation, two from universities, one for the isotope separation program and one for research. Dr. Johnson is now the chairman of the committee.

In essence, the organization set up by the Tolman Committee is still in existence. We still have responsible reviewers, a title which the Tolman Committee originated. Their function is to make technical reviews of documents submitted for declassification. We still have coordinating organization directors, who are highly placed individuals in the contract corporations that work with the AEC on our program. Their function is largely to make sure that the reports are accurate, well written, and that all patentable items are covered in appropriate patent applications.

The senior reviewers are the principal advisors to the AEC and to the Division of Classification in the drawing-up of policy classification guides. They meet quite frequently—too frequently, they sometimes think—because we call on them often to consider and to recommend what information should be released from the Restricted Data category and declassified. This is the way our policy classification guides are written. In their deliberations, the senior reviewers listen to the views of classification officers. Other opinions also are con-

sidered. All of the views presented are studied and when possible are incorporated in the draft guide which is then presented to the Commission for approval. The committee of senior reviewers also helps in the preparation of our program guides and once in a while we call upon them to review a particularly difficult case to help us *determine* whether or not some document should or should not be released. The committee has operated very effectively during the years, and will continue to play a very important role in the AEC classification program in the future.

One of the other things that the Tolman Committee did was to recognize the difference between security as such, i. e., physical security, and classification. General Groves recognized that although physical security in the organization of the Manhattan District was very good, it was not equipped to perform the function of deciding which information could be declassified. They could not adequately handle the job of declassification, which is, as you know, the function of identifying that which should be protected as contrasted with the absolute business of protecting it. The business of protecting is the security business.

General Groves recognized this difference and the Tolman Committee also recognized this difference. When they nominated the people who would administer the program of declassifying information, everyone who was selected to perform a function in the declassification program was a tech-

nically-trained individual, i. e., a person with a technical degree.

That is largely the case now. Within the Atomic Energy Commission it is the case. All our classification people have technical degrees, a recognition of the difference between the physical protection of identified information and its identification. In other agencies this may not be so necessary, simply because in other organizations what should be classified may not necessarily be technical. In our organization practically all of it is. All of our classification people are technically-trained people. Without technical training, one doesn't get to be an AEC classification officer. A mathematics degree is considered to be a technical degree. Mathematicians, therefore, would be acceptable, particularly because we are computerizing our operation as fast as we can.

During the time General Groves and the Tolman Committee were working to set up this organization, the congress was also concerned about atomic energy. The war was over. What to do with this new branch of knowledge, this terrible power that had been discovered?

It was clear to the members of congress, when they looked at the existing laws, that the existing laws would not properly take care of the problem. There were weaknesses in what was then the so-called Espionage Act. (It has since been changed.) For example, it was a crime to give a document to another individual if the document contained information the loss of which would be detrimental to the United States. But there wasn't a law

that said you couldn't talk to someone and tell him what you wanted. The law didn't actually cover that. The congress took all this into account. They decided that this new force, this new program, deserved and needed a law of its own. So they started to draft the Atomic Energy Act, an act that has a great many features not found in any other law, not even now, but which certainly were needed. For one thing, the act prescribed much stiffer penalties. In later years, they included penalties for violating it without the need to show an intent to injure the U.S.

Carelessness was punishable and still is under the new law. As far as I know, it never was under the old Espionage Act. One had to prove intent to injure. But what the congress did, and what was far more interesting from our point of view, was that it changed the basic concept of classified information. Under the Espionage Act, information or material doesn't become classified until somebody says it is. For example, if somebody invents a new rifle, a new tank, a new hand grenade, or some such, these devices are not automatically classified. Someone has to look at them and say, "This should be classified." The act of classification is necessary.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, this is not the case. The Atomic Energy Act provides that anything that has to do with the design, fabrication, or manufacture of atomic weapons or the use of these weapons, anything that has to do with the use of special material in the production of energy, is Restricted Data.

It is interesting to note the act doesn't use the word "classified." It calls the information "Restricted Data," but then goes on to describe the manner in which that Restricted Data will be handled, and this manner was far more stringent than the way classified information had previously been handled by anyone.

What this meant was that it was no longer necessary to say that this thing, or this piece of paper, or that statement, is classified. What became necessary was that if one wanted to bring about a change, one had to say specifically that this piece of information or that thing was no longer classified, was no longer Restricted Data. In other words one could declassify but could not classify.

So when the law was passed, all information pertaining to atomic energy immediately became Restricted Data.

What the Commission did, of course, was to recognize the existence of the classification guide that had been prepared by the Tolman Committee and to apply it to this Restricted Data, and to say that wherever that guide says information is unclassified, it is declassified; and wherever it doesn't say that information is unclassified, it is classified. That is still the case. Although the guide is different, the principle remains. Whatever our classification guides state that the Commission has declassified, is unclassified; and whatever our guides do not state that the Commission has declassified remains classified as Restricted Data or as another

kind of data called Formerly Restricted Data.

I will explain these terms later, but the concept I want most to impress on you is the fact that atomic energy information is born classified. It comes into existence classified under the law, and to change that state requires action by the Commission. The law went on to prescribe the ways by which information could be removed from the Restricted Data category and they are very specific.

It provides that the Commission can from time to time determine that information which may be removed from the Restricted Data category and which may be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. Note that it is the Commission that is to make this determination.

The implications of this subsection are, I think, quite clear, namely, that the Commission doesn't classify. It only declassifies. The law classifies.

The Atomic Energy Act creates the Restricted Data even to the extent that wherever an individual person is, and whoever is supporting his work (if anybody is), it is possible for him or her to generate Restricted Data. Someone working in a basement room, dreaming up a design for some new method of separating isotopes or some new kind of nuclear weapon, some new explosive device that may incorporate the principles of atomic energy, could be generating Restricted Data, in spite of the fact that he has no government support.

Does the law forbid him to do that? As long as he doesn't translate his

weapon concepts into hardware it doesn't. What it does do, though, is to forbid him to communicate any of the Restricted Data to any other person unless it is established that the other person is authorized to receive that kind of information. That means, of course, he could communicate it to the Atomic Energy Commission and to anyone who the Atomic Energy Commission will say is properly cleared and has the proper need to know.

Unless and until that individual communicates Restricted Data information to anybody else, he has not broken the law, but when he does communicate it and if that someone else is not authorized to receive the information, he *has* broken the law and he is subject to all penalties provided by other sections of the act, some of which are rather severe. As far as Restricted Data is concerned, such an individual doesn't have the right to declassify it. As to those of you who are contractor representatives for the Department of Defense or who are contractor representatives for the Atomic Energy Commission, or who are representatives of neither but are working in industry—you may generate such information but do not have the right to declassify it. It may have been wholly supported by you or by your organization, but you don't have the right to declassify the information, and neither does your organization. Only the Commission has that right.

There is a subsection of the Atomic Energy Act that describes a form of Restricted Data that requires joint

AEC-DOD declassification action. The class of Restricted Data to which this requirement applies would come into existence as a result of a determination by the AEC and the DOD that certain information concerning weapons is primarily information about the *use* of weapons rather than about their design. Once that determination has been made, declassification cannot take place unless the Commission and the Department of Defense collaborate. There is no such information in existence today.

There is, however, a somewhat different class of information that was once Restricted Data but is no longer Restricted Data. This class of information comes into existence in a manner similar to the one described above. As before, the Commission and the DOD must agree that the Restricted Data involved is primarily information about the *use* of weapons rather than about their design. In this case, however, the two agencies must make an additional determination, namely, that the information involved may also be adequately protected as Defense Information.

At this point, we meet the term "Defense Information." This tends to be somewhat confusing because the term covers Restricted Data as well as military types of information, such as the order of battle, or the design of a new non-nuclear anti-aircraft missile, or a tank, etc. All of these are Defense Information, but the label "Defense Information" has been given, at least in the popular concept, only to the non-nuclear type of military information. Restricted Data is there-



fore one form of Defense Information, but this section of the law says, for one thing, that once the Department and the Commission decide that certain kinds of information (which meet a technical criterion) can be adequately safeguarded as Defense Information (meaning ordinary Defense Information), that information is no longer Restricted Data, but remains classified as Defense Information.

The proposal that was put forth to the congress by the Department of Defense, and supported by the AEC, went just this far. But when it got to congress, the congress didn't quite accept that concept. It said that is all right; it would approve such a change if it would help, but it wanted to be sure that none of the information that would be removed from Restricted Data under that section of the act would be transmitted to a foreign country unless the information was within the scope of an existing agreement for cooperation between the United States and that foreign country, which had been set before the congress for a prescribed period of time. Accordingly, the congress added a proviso to the act to cover this point. That proviso gave classification management a problem, because it created a class of information that was no longer Restricted Data, it was Defense Information, but it wasn't the ordinary kind of Defense Information. It had somehow to be set apart so that it wouldn't be sent to a foreign country with which the U.S. didn't have an appropriate agreement for cooperation. Therefore, it needed a label to identify it, to set it apart—

and that is how the designation "Formerly Restricted Data" originated.

It is descriptive. The information was formerly Restricted Data, and now it isn't, although it isn't unclassified. The marking Formerly Restricted Data is a label that sets it apart from Restricted Data and from other kinds of Defense Information, and lets everyone know that this information is not to be sent to a foreign country without certain prerequisites.

As you can now see, we have three kinds of classified information: Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and the one that is called Defense Information with no other label.

Formerly Restricted Data cannot be declassified by the Commission alone. It is declassified jointly by the AEC and the Department of Defense. It is interesting to note that the wording the act uses in this case is slightly different from the wording used in the declassification of Restricted Data. In the case of FRD, the Commission and the DOD determine that the information can be published without *unreasonable* risk to the country's security. In the case of Restricted Data, the Commission's determination is that the information can be published without *undue* risk.

There is another subsection you ought to know about, principally because it will give you an insight into how broad a concept congress considered Restricted Data to be. This subsection provides that "The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such information concerning the atomic energy

programs of other nations as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 . . ."

I won't quote it further. It isn't necessary. The important point about this section is that it expressed the view of congress that the kind of information that we are talking about, this atomic energy information, this Restricted Data, extends beyond the borders of our own country. You may ask yourself, supposing the French or the Russians develop Restricted Data, how are we going to protect them? How are we going to keep it classified?

Well of course, as long as it remains within their country, they will do with it what they please, because their people are not citizens of the United States and are not subject to our laws while outside the U.S. But once you or I or any other citizen of the United States obtains such information, being subject to our law, he is required to protect the information that he has received, if it is classified, in the same way as he would protect Restricted Data from our own programs.

However, the Commission—and the Director of Central Intelligence—have removed all Russian and all Chinese information from the Restricted Data category. Most French information has also been removed from the Restricted Data category. British classified atomic energy information is protected by us as Restricted Data, since our agreement with them is pretty

broad. The same is true of Canadian atomic energy data, although there is very little that is classified.

These are the subsections of the Atomic Energy Act that describe the four ways by which information may be removed from the Restricted Data category.

I think that those of you who know of our program know that the Commission has from the very beginning had the strong feeling that information concerning our program should remain classified only as long as one could demonstrate that there is a reason connected with the national defense to keep it so. As a consequence of this policy, vast quantities of atomic energy information have been declassified and made available throughout the country for use by industry and by private citizens; so much so, in fact, that a great deal of it, although it is available in the libraries and elsewhere and can be had for the asking, has never been asked for and actually has never been seen.

The Freedom of Information Act, which was passed about a year ago, was one which we welcomed, although in reality, it had no effect on our classification operation, because there is no way it could have. We had long before adopted the policy that we would examine our information at frequent intervals and make certain that when the information no longer had a relation to the defense of the country we would release it. We have lived by this principle for over twenty years. We expect to continue to live by this policy.

How do we go about this? From the management point of view it is a complex and fairly difficult thing. We have classification guides. Obviously, the Commission can't see every one, though the Commission does have to approve every declassification of Restricted Data information—not every document, but all information. We present to the Commission for approval those classification guides that describe the classification policy, and recommend the areas of information that should remain classified and the areas of information that should be declassified. There are about five such basic documents which the Commission has approved. In approving them, the Commission also made the required statutory determinations that the information described in them as unclassified could be published without undue or unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. These guides are what we call policy guides, and the Commission has to approve each one of them before it can be used.

I told you a while ago that the Commission alone is responsible for declassifying Restricted Data. That is true under the law, but do they do this alone? The answer is "certainly no." All of these policy guides are provided to other agencies of the Government that may be interested. In the past, that has been principally the Department of Defense, but in later years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has also been consulted. Both the DOD and NASA, and at times other agencies as well have been and will be seeing some

of the guides that the AEC proposes to issue, not as a requirement under the law, but as a matter of common sense.

As a supplement to these policy guides, we have another set of guides, which are not as broad in coverage of information, and are therefore less subject to differing interpretation. Policy guides are of necessity very broad in their statements of what information is unclassified. They are, therefore, open to diverse interpretations.

Diverse interpretations of policy if allowed to be put into practice are death to a classification program. You cannot have one group of people interpreting a rule one way and another group of people interpreting it the other, because each in its own time and in its own way can give away one-half of the program, one-half of the information. What gets published under these circumstances is the total information with resulting damage to the national defense.

To avoid this, we limit the use of the policy guides and we produce other classification guides which describe the declassified information in greater detail, reducing the possibilities of differing interpretations. We call some of these program classification guides. Program guides are issued by the Division of Classification in Washington, although we do not write all of them, and an attempt is made in these guides to see to it that the same kinds of information will be treated the same way in different places and by different people. But even these guides are fairly broad

in their definitions of what is not classified and so they too are open to some interpretation.

To meet this problem, a third class of classification guide is adopted which we call local classification guides. A local classification guide is quite detailed in its description of unclassified information further reducing the possibility of differing interpretation of the rules. It doesn't eliminate the problem but it reduces it, we think, to manageable proportions. Local classification guides cover specific projects and are very detailed in their descriptions of what is unclassified. It is necessary that these guides be developed and produced by the people who are engaged in the work. They are sent to the Division of Classification in Washington for review before they are issued, but only so that it can be insured, as closely as one can, that they do not conflict with local guides issued by some other organization or that they do not conflict with the classification policy of the Commission. Once approved, they are sent back to the organization that

drafted them and they are put to use. The classification officers in these locations use these guides and make classification decisions from day to day based on their topics.

The decisions they must make are many and varied, and they play an extremely important role in whether or not the Atomic Energy Commission has a workable classification program and whether the protection of the atomic energy information that we are developing is assured or not.

I can't overemphasize the importance of the role of classification officers. They are all, with very few exceptions, technically trained people, very responsible, and looked up to by their organizations. This is as it should be; they are all professionals, belonging to an elite group, the community of classification officials. I hope they will always feel that they do belong to the group and that they will stay in that group until it becomes time for them to leave the active life, and go out and enjoy retirement.

## **PANEL—THE MAN IN THE MIDDLE**

**Robert Donovan, Moderator**

**DONOVAN:** Primarily what we had in mind, when we organized this panel was to bring together a group of people from disciplines outside of classification management, per se, whose work is affected—we hope not too adversely—by classification management actions.

I would like to add something to the matter that was raised this morning of how much information is being withheld. Touching on that is a passage from a document put out by the Senate Small Business Committee in April 1967 entitled "Policy Planning for Technology Transfer."

"The DOD sees no necessity for special dissemination and application efforts because its patent policy is supposed to provide the incentive for private transfer programs. However, the security and administrative restrictions on DOD reports keep about one-third of all federally controlled technology out of the conventional information retrieval system.

"Assuming roughly equivalent dollar value, this means that 68 percent of the DOD research and development effort in that period (about \$7 billion) is not available for secondary application in other industries. This amounts to almost \$5 billion or one-third of all the federally sponsored R&D in that year. Rendering such a substantial portion of technology unavailable poses a serious question for future policy planning in transfer programs."

I think, basically, what some of the panelists will touch upon today is in essence the scope of the problem that is created by classification, which far transcends just the classification of a specific report or specific item of technology that has taken place. Our first speaker is Mrs. Patricia Horn.

**PATRICIA L. HORN**  
**Itek Corporation**

As a document control/records management supervisor, my responsibility is the implementation of Section II of the *Industrial Security Manual*. In order to properly handle classified material, my work is dependent upon the general satisfaction of all requirements of the *ISM*. This dependency is based upon a need for administrative

information regarding personnel security clearances, as well as those of subcontractors and consultants. I must also have information regarding the facility clearance status of our associated contractors and activity reports of both marketing and contracts departments. Notices regarding terminations of employees, or the physical relocation of company personnel are of utmost importance to me. All correspondence relative to upgrading or downgrading any element of a contract must cross my desk. These are only a few of the areas of interest which affect decisions on proper handling and distribution of classified information. On a Security Department wheel, all spokes must feed the classified material control system h.b.

Within the management structure, I work closely with those individuals generating classified material and those considered custodians or classified material holders. Whatever the requirements imposed by DOD, the corporate security director or the division security manager, a digestible means of accomplishing new administrative requirements is the responsibility of the records management supervisor.

The extent to which trouble brews within the area of classified material control is dependent upon the ease or difficulty of handling offered by the company classified material control system. Security Department personnel may practically go blind trying to read an illegible 254 but when we present the classification check list to the engineering department, it must be discernible, straightforward in content, and easily applicable. The classified document presented to the re-

search scientist must be properly stamped, recorded, enclosed in obviously marked cover sheets, and have an X marking the line for his signature. Our guide for paragraph markings must also be easily followed. The simplification of handling procedures which we try to offer those requiring classification guidance is not intended as a reflection on their mentality; but is in recognition and respect for the scientists' position of creative responsibility within the company. We reward ourselves and our company by making it as easy as possible for classified material users to remain creative thinkers and not administrative file clerks.

While the "Good Book" is detailed in its requirements of classified material handling, the method or system of meeting its demands is a prerogative of each individual company. No inspector will be quoted as saying that our individual control system is good or bad. Apart from stamping, logging, receipting and safeguarding classified items, we have only one small problem to contend with in our control system—and that is finding everything. With only a few hundred classified items in-house, a locator file is fairly simple to maintain. When we become involved with many thousands of classified items, there appears never to be enough cross-reference files available. The more technical our end classified product, the more difficult for the non-technical document clerk to recognize by subject where she should log, record or file an item. The newly hired employee receives indoctrination in almost everything his first day on board except in pertinent company vocabulary. The senior scientist may

not require such familiarization; but his new secretary does.

My personal rule of thumb for any classified material control system is *keep it simple*. The less we confuse classified information handlers, the easier it is for them to remember one of the most important aspects of safeguarding classified items, which is *lock them up*. Over seventy-five percent of security incidents involve open containers.

Not all classified material users are concerned with the cost to their company for maintenance of a classified container; however, some who share in the firm's stock plan are impressed with a few statistics. For example, by estimate it costs yearly \$48 plus for security checks to be made by a guard during non-working hours. It costs \$14 yearly for the average two lock combination changes. The cost of an audit, investigation and report for the safe left open runs from \$20 to \$75 per occurrence.

The most ideal situation that I have encountered in handling classified information was in a small research and development facility with fewer than one hundred in-house employees and fewer than 4000 accountable classified items. In this environment, every document was figuratively within my reach. The system involved the simple and basic forms essential to required economy in the small firm. Briefly, it consisted of the log book assigning numbers in sequence, a master document control card typed with identifying information, and NCR copies cross-filed by contract, automatic-time-phased downgrading group followup, and a signature receipt filed by individual document holder. One docu-

ment clerk handled this control system.

It was in this environment of required economy that I first learned respect for the Department of Defense industrial security specialists.

When I had a problem storing classified waste material, I was advised by four different security specialists on four separate facility inspections, four ways to solve my problem.

The first advised me to obtain a galvanized garbage can, modify it by cutting an opening in the lid, attaching the lid to the can with hinge and lock; all of which would be done economically by any sheet metal shop.

Inspector number two examined the garbage can and claimed that a compromise was possible since paper might be pulled through the hole in the lid. He suggested modifying the lid with the addition of a metal plate soldered at a 45 degree angle under the opening. The can went back to the sheet metal shop.

The third inspector examined the can and claimed that it was not acceptable because it was not weighted. He suggested pouring 200 pounds of concrete into the can, or chain it to a wall. Two hundred pounds of cement would have almost filled the can, so I attached a chain to the can and secured it to a wall.

Inspector number four, nine months and \$55.41 later, claimed the wall in the leased building was not of a stationary-type construction, and suggested that I "get rid of the damn can" and store classified waste in a secured four-drawer filing cabinet. Which I did.

Despite a few unnecessary expenses some small companies grow or become

a part of a successful corporation. With company growth begins development of small aches and pains which often blossom into major headaches. As organizers organize, primary relationships are required; hence departments of specialists develop for handling services. When we extend a service in a large company, we must devise ways and means of recording our value for management. We formulate job procedures, and work instruction sheets, and last but far from least, we originate forms.

The business of practical men to provide a rational coordination of activity through simplicity seems to lose all reason and sanity in an all-out war of creating forms. If your household were run with the need for forms identifying every labor activity, you would never have a clean pair of socks. But the business world must be recorded. The *Industrial Security Manual* states that we will maintain records of our classified material history. Therefore, the specialty area of classified material control is well supplied with forms, outnumbered probably only by the Personnel Department and the Department of Defense.

Unless forms are sent, signed, returned and filed for classified material transmittal, there is no control. With the multitude of internal document transfer forms to be processed for each transaction between custodians, the finest control system in existence is vulnerable to errors, whether typographical, misfiling, or loss. In the multiple-facility organizations, the master document control center is always waiting for a transfer form to drift in for final disposition notations.

But the internal transfer problems are actually not insurmountable. Management policy and a strict facility standard operating procedure will state that the individual may not transfer a classified item without certifying the need-to-know of the recipient and his security clearance status, and receiving a signature receipt. This "no,no" in the SOP is nicely phrased, read by everyone, and the DCASR representatives approve it as the accepted internal document transfer procedure for a facility. However, some of us are familiar with a breed of professionals that are sometimes remiss with signature receipts. These genius "direct-charge" contributors to our existence may never accept our classified material handling procedures until we write them in Greek letters or equation forms.

Some of our scientists tend to generate classified paper as though the safeguarding of it were free. Since the classification system is weighted on the side of the individual who decides to classify, the employee runs no risk in assigning a security classification to information which may be unclassified. Should he fail to classify information that later is held to be sensitive, he faces a penalty. Therefore, the scientist who is uncertain regarding applicability of a security classification will choose to classify rather than not. The burden presented by overclassification falls immediately upon the classified material control system; but the usefulness of a possibly exceptional idea for a commercially salable item is delayed or lost.

As an aid for eliminating classified material from our control system, the automatic time-phased downgrading

system was devised. This method of cleaning house is a most creditable system, philosophically. In the ten years that I have been handling classified items, I recall using the system to eliminate almost *one dozen reports*. Almost all of my classified material is assigned to Group 3 and in twelve years most of that will be obsolete scientifically and end up in the pulper. Even if I had a Group 4 secret document timed for downgrading, the general use of spiral bindings makes it difficult to economically meet the demands for restamping the downgraded item.

To compile a one-inch report, a one-inch plastic spiral costs the contractor between eight and ten cents. To bind the same report with the stitched and glued binding of the permanently bound book, the contractor costs would increase to 40 or 50 cents a copy. Considering that 200 copies of a classified manual are assembled using a spiral binding, the cost would be about \$20 as compared with the professionally bound manuals which would cost about \$80. We are saving \$60 on 200 documents, or so it seems.

When the secret documents are three years old and in Group 4, they are ready for downgrading to confidential. If we do not account for confidential material, we may remove them from the control system.

DOD permits us to stamp a permanently bound document on the front and back cover, and the index page, noting the change of classification and authority. Not so with the manual with the spiral binding. The spiral bound document must be stamped on covers, index pages, each



internal page, and each paragraph that reflects a higher classification than applicable. Deferred marking is permitted by the *ISM*, which is a more practical approach to the problem than conducting a major restamping "sit-in" campaign. But if we choose to restamp only when the document floats back through the master control center, we must continue inventorying the custodian. And this is what most of us do. For one or two reports, the spiral-bound document can be hand-stamped without undue time, providing it does not have three or four hundred pages. For a substantial number of secret manuals, such as a thousand or more, the initial savings with the use of the spiral binding is eaten away by the expensive hours required to stamp them as downgraded.

While I have barely touched on all the frustrations of the middle man involved with classified material control, my time is limited today and there is one other brief point that I must mention.

Retention requirements and authorizations present an area of concern for the classified records control department. It appears to be the desire of most companies, large or small, to retain everything they generate during their performance on a classified contract, from original drawings to the final report. It also seems to be the desire of some engineers to retain every report printed which reveals their names as authors. To retain classified material, even as little as two years, requires retention approval requests, master classified material control inventories, suspense file no-

tations and continued accountability record keeping. While some contractual documentation may be essentially retained as classified archive items, I have seen the majority of retention approved material gather only dust during its retention period. Contracting officers having administrative authority to approve retention requests would do us a kindness to search more closely the advisability and practicability of classified document retention.

If you can visualize in your minds the picture of an old fashioned three-minute egg timer, which is shaped with two large glass sections divided in the middle by a small area that the sand flows through, you will see also the position of the man in the middle of classification management. The top portion of the timer represents the Department of Defense and the lower portion of the timer represents the classified information user or industry. We in the middle sift the classification system sand regardless of which way the timer is turned. As DOD develops new requirements for safeguarding their classified information, those of us in the middle strive to find practical, economical, and effective ways and means to meet their demands. We sprinkle as much informative sand as possible onto both DOD and industry. But it appears that we can never do enough for either portion of the timer.

With the *ISM* always on top of us and the demands of industry always with us, we hope for the strength to accept what we cannot change, courage to change what we cannot accept, and the wisdom to know the difference. Thank you.

**WILLIAM C. PETRU**  
**Hewlett-Packard Company**

From time to time in my profession as librarian, I feel the need to renew my energies by seeking fresh inspiration and guidance. I do this simply enough by turning to a small, precious (to me) pamphlet I have in my personal library. Entitled *The Librarian's Almanack*, it was first published in 1773, in New England by a respected bookman named Jared Bean, who had somewhat singular notions of what constituted library service. I was impressed when I turned to Mr. Bean recently and discovered to what an extent his ideas coincided with 20th century thoughts, especially the thoughts of the National Classification Management Society. I would like to share some of the more inspirational messages from the almanack to show you the wisdom of 18th century American librarianship.

"The Librarian may be justly compar'd with him who keeps an Armoury of Weapons . . . Like that other Keeper, it is his Duty to see that his Armoury (which is the Library) be well stock'd with the fittest Weapons, and that they be put into the hands of such as can use them at the proper time."

Mr. Bean continues: (I have altered the word "book" to "report" throughout.)

"The Metaphor need not stop at this, neither, for even as the Weapons of the Armoury are unfitted for the hands of all, so the Reports (the Weapons over which the Librarian is Custodian) are oftentimes dangerous & harmful if they come to the hands of persons ill-fitted to peruse them."

We can find no fault with that statement!

". . . It may be seen now-a-days, when Demagogues and others of shallow intellect seek to stir up sedition & revolt . . . that it is as Custos Librorum . . . or Guardian of the Reports, that the Librarian exercises his true function."

Ah, can there be any doubt that when I read such passages, that my flagging spirit is revived in day-to-day battles with the security of our nation's secrets? Is it any wonder that as "a person of sober and Godly life, learn'd, virtuous, chaste, moral, frugal and temperate" (Mr. Bean's characterization of a librarian), I feel worthy of my position of trust? I am sure that the gentleman who grants personal security clearances could not find fault with such a noble characterization.

There are two more short passages I want to share with you from the writings of the Old Librarian. If you have any lingering doubts as to his phenomenal foresight into the 20th century, these passages should lay such doubts to rest.

"Keep your Reports behind stout Gratings, and in no wise let any Person come at them to take them from the Shelf except yourself . . . It were better that no Person enter the Library . . . and that the Reports be kept in Safety, than that one Report be lost, or others Misplac'd. Guard well your Reports—this is always your foremost Duty."

If we librarians were permitted to follow that philosophy, I would not have to be here today. Indeed, there would not perhaps even be a National Classification Management Society.

To continue, Mr. Bean instructs me that:

"So far as your Authority will permit of it, exercise great Discrimination as to which Persons shall be admitted to the use of the Library . . . Question each applicant closely. See that he be a Person of good Reputation, scholarly Habits, sober and courteous Demeanour. Any mere Trifler, a Person that would Dally with Reports, or seek in them shallow amusement, may be Dismiss'd without delay."

With these words spurring me on, I contacted several of my sober and moral colleagues over cocktails in order to glean from them as much knowledge and experience as possible about our problems in the handling of classified material. The first reaction (besides the hiccup) I received from my colleagues was one of stony silence, when I asked them to discuss security. I gathered that it is somehow unpatriotic to discuss the handling of classified information. The system has been imposed upon us, by higher authority, with good reason, and that is that. Finally I managed to elicit some responses.

In my experience I have found that librarians tend toward excess caution when it comes to keeping secure the thousands of classified reports they are generally responsible for — with good reason. Many of the files which are constructed for the handling of classified material are dictated by the requirements of the *Industrial Security Manual*. The librarian ends up with a proliferation of files and a much more elaborate system of controls and checks than is ever found in an unclassified library.

When the Air Force security man shows up on a quarterly check with a list of document control numbers which he says represent reports charged to the library, I had better have a file of document control numbers available which readily identify the library's holdings. With this one file everything would be fine if, as Mr. Bean advocates, the reports stayed permanently on the shelves. But security men have an uncanny sense of ferreting out items which are never exactly where they ought to be. If the report is in circulation, more files are necessary in order to maintain accountability. There is a circulation card with the man's signature, filed by the library call number. There is a record of this report filed under the man's name, so that if he should terminate the employ of the company he can be cleared of all material he may have which belongs to the library. If the report is secret, there must be on file a valid need-to-know. If the man picked up the document in the library, I must have on file a card which authorizes his entry into a controlled area. If the report were sent to him through the in-plant or outside mail, there must be on file signed receipts. I will not even discuss the agonies which are gone through if a report is not on the shelf or in circulation!

But remember that the circulating report must someday come back to the library, in which case all the files must be cleared. The single act of circulating a classified report, occurring dozens of times a day, takes upwards of five minutes per item, as opposed to the few seconds for an unclassified item. I think I have made

my point that the handling of classified material is far from a simple procedure in a library. Incidentally, all of the records and circulation files should be kept in the closed area also, since they represent classified material albeit not classified themselves. Very frequently the library must then maintain separate files for books in some other area—thereby duplicating work.

We all know what a boon automatic downgrading is in reducing the growing backlog of classified literature. Speaking as a librarian, I approve the principle but reject the practice. The reason is simple: the great amount of work necessary to keep abreast of the numbers of documents caught up in an automatic downgrading system. In a library of any size, at least one clerk would be needed full time for the remarking of the reports and for the vast job of correcting all the library's records of classified material. Generally, I think you will find that librarians are not performing as you may think they should in downgrading. After all, if a downgraded unclassified report is treated as confidential we are still maintaining security, and the system for continuing to handle the document as confidential is already set up and functioning.

There is only one case I know of in which librarians *will* fight to switch a classification. When the *Technical Abstract Bulletin* of the Defense Documentation Center was made confidential in 1967, one of the most important tools we librarians and many engineers and scientists have was removed from ready access. The reasons I heard given for this reclassification were not logical, and someday I would

appreciate hearing what DOD's thinking was.

DDC personnel tell me that although individual reports may not be classified, when they appear in an index in the company of many other reports they constitute a body of research efforts which may be of some value to unauthorized personnel; hence, make it confidential. The logic of this escapes me when I think about the bodies of research efforts which are revealed in the NASA *STARs*, *Nuclear Science Abstracts*, and the *U.S. Government Research & Development Reports*, all of which contain government-contracted work and none of which are classified. I read in one of Bob Donovan's papers in *Security World* that even the super-secret CIA receives 80% of its intelligence from the open literature. I sincerely hope something can be done about declassifying the TABs.

It is safe to assume that none of us would be here unless we were interested in the overall administration of security programs. There is something I would like to bring up which has been commented upon by librarians which is at variance with the statement that we all are interested in overall security. That is, whatever agency it is that has cognizance over a facility is interested only in its own reports, and those from any other agency are of no regard. There is no agency, apparently, which is not guilty of this, because I have had discussions with librarians who represent AEC, DOD, and NASA. Does this feeling stem from old service rivalries? I wish the Old Librarian, Jared Bean, had something to say about this, but he has let me down.

Just as in our homes, one of the hazards of libraries is the mailing list. Once on a list, always on a list—including those mailing lists for classified information. Just a few months ago I received a report, fortunately unclassified, which still listed my name on its distribution list. It has been two years since I have had any interest in the subject field, but apparently my writing to the distributing agency at that time had no effect. In my present position I have given up trying to halt a duplication of reports coming from NASA, the second copy being addressed to a man who terminated three years ago. I deliberately rip up the notices this man receives from NASA which state that he will be dropped from the mailing list if he does not respond. Don't you believe it. The profusion of unwanted documents which results from these mailing lists is considerable. The destruction of this material—especially if it is controlled in any way—becomes an expensive and time-consuming chore.

I complained a minute ago about mailing lists. There is one type of list that should be encouraged. These are the subject field of interest registers which permit libraries and others to receive reports automatically as issued in subjects of continuing interest. The lists established by the Chemical Propulsion Information Agency are examples of this excellently functional method of distributing reports.

Since standardization seems to be the order of the day, librarians feel that some international cooperation may be possible for classification terms. Some libraries become more

deeply involved than others in report literature from foreign nations, but no matter the number of reports, these always constitute a problem because of the different terms used. For example, that delightful term "discrete" used by the British. I perhaps should not limit a complaint about classification terms to foreign lands, since those in the United States are far from clear. Just exactly what does "official use only" mean? A security man once told me the term means "use your discretion." I know that my discretion is infallible, but what about all the other librarians? A question arose in my experience concerning the handling of reports marked "confidential/Restricted Data." Should they be treated as confidential or secret? To be on the safe side—which I suppose is never the wrong side to be on—we handled them as secret. But think of the extra work that could be saved if these reports can be handled as confidential.

Since you people are policy makers, perhaps you are in a position to make another rule. In the publishing of proceedings, symposia and conferences, every effort should be made to keep like classifications together and in separate volumes. Time and again an unclassified paper will appear in a classified document, thereby making the unclassified classified for all practical purposes. Requiring similar classifications to be grouped would be of immense help.

You will find that because it is so difficult to get some reports, librarians tend to hoard once the reports are retrieved, even if there is no current interest. This is especially true with secret reports. Hoarding creates space

problems, creates more records in the library and in central document control, and is in fact against security regulations. But when balanced with trying to retrieve the document at some future date all over again, then hoarding does not appear so bad.

This may be the appropriate place to say that I could not have functioned without the cooperation and understanding of the company security supervisor in any library I have been in. They have bent rules if necessary to help me—not to get away from security but to aid in the handling of thousands of classified documents. I have a strong feeling that they, like librarians, are as Mr. Bean states: "sober, virtuous, moral and temperate."

I will close with an admission. *The Old Librarian's Almanack* from which I quote so freely was actually written in 1909 by a distinguished librarian named Edmund Pearson. It is a pleasant hoax. Even so you must agree with me that a librarian writing 60 years ago had uncanny insight into our problems. I still feel that Mr. Pearson, as Mr. Jared Bean, has the perfect solution to the librarian's security problems when he says:

"Be vigilant your Treasury to keep,  
In watchful care know neither rest  
nor sleep;  
All other Readers better far keep  
out  
Than put the safety of your Reports  
in doubt."

**TRAM PRITCHARD**  
**Lockheed Missiles and**  
**Space Company**

It is a pleasure to appear before a group of individuals whose function

is so important to today's industrial activity, especially that industry associated with military contracting.

I am sure your job is often unheralded, thankless, and sometimes resented because people naturally resent control and your job is control. We all, however, realize the importance of properly protecting information both from the standpoint of the nation's security and from the standpoint of protecting our company's competitive position. Information falling into the wrong hands can jeopardize our very lives. Information that gives our company an edge falling into the wrong hands can seriously jeopardize our livelihood. Adequate protection of both security and proprietary information requires careful control to be administered by knowledgeable people.

Representing the engineering side of the house, I must say that sometimes we do resent this control because our job doesn't get done as rapidly as we had hoped, when it becomes evident that it contains classified information. No matter how helpful you gentlemen are, documents bearing any level of classification just don't flow smoothly through any system in the same time that unclassified matter makes the journey.

In addition, restrictions on availability and handling of classified information after it has cleared the system become irritants. However, these are irritants we recognize must be accepted because of the importance of proper protection.

By no means am I here today to complain. If all of you here serve your company as well as the gentlemen in this activity who perform this

service in our company, you are collectively to be commended. Really, I am here today to open Pandora's box and discuss some potential problems of the future. It seems that each time we make a technological advancement in the creation and handling of data, problems arise. Problems of the past have been extremely minor compared to some we are going to face in the very near future.

An example of past problems was the advent of 35mm microfilm. When we started using it, both internally within our company and as a medium of data delivery, the legibility of security markings became a thorn in our side. We had all developed our various legends in either pre-printed or stick-on form for documents to reproduce legibly in full size. However, when we started recording these same documents on 35mm microfilm this legibility did not hold up. There was only one thing left to do and that was to increase the size of the letters in our security legends and this proportionately increased the size of the legends to the point that they now are, in some instances, encroaching severely into needed drawing area on engineering drawings. The penalty we pay for this is the use of more sheets for the drawing or larger sheets.

The technological advancements of tomorrow pose entirely different problems, both in the identification and protection of security information and proprietary information. In my further discussion, I will make reference only to security classified information. However the problem is virtually identical in both categories.

The technological advancement to which I now refer is commonly called

the Computer Aided Design Technology. This is an interactive system whereby an engineer in direct man/machine relationship with a computer creates his product design. The computer will perform his massive calculations and minor service functions to develop, finalize, and proof his design. This occurs from the level of component through system and end product. Today's powerful computers, plus the development of the cathode ray tube as an input-output device, not only make the use of the computer in this fashion feasible but an actual accomplishment. The engineer, through the use of a keyboard, will input digital information and instructions to the computer, and through the use of an electronic light pen adds pictorial information. The information thus stored will be subject to recall and display on the CRT for revising and reentry into the computer memory. This system in its fully operational phase will provide for the computer to do all of the stress, aerodynamic, thermodynamic and other considerations to which a design needs to be subjected.

Throughout the design phase the computer can evaluate the design step by step to the parameters of the end product and inform the engineer of any inconsistencies that may occur during the progress of the design. The output of the system will be, as we see it now, in comparatively conventional graphic delineations in either orthographic or perspective as requested, specifications, manuals, etc. However, in the development of a product design a very large percentage of the information developed will never be reduced to hard copy but will remain

in memory storage as backup for the finished output.

As total systems are implemented, the majority of the communication of information will be conducted through remote CRT units where a display of required information will occur simply through an inquiry to the data bank. In addition, much of the information will be utilized in digital form to drive numerically controlled manufacturing machinery.

This technology is a reality and is functioning now in relatively limited areas. Broad application—in fact application broad enough to utilize this type of system for a total product design—is not too far in the future.

The identification, handling, control and transmission of classified or proprietary information under these conditions presents an extremely serious problem that must be solved. Some of the problems are as follows:

(a) How do you establish the classification of information that is transferred directly from an engineer into a computer memory without benefit of hard copy in any form for review?

(b) How do you control a situation where two bits of information, each in themselves unclassified in nature, assume a classified category when combined, and this information exists only in a computer memory bank subject to recall by authorized people, either singly or in combination? The individual authorized to access the system may have need-to-know for certain aspects of the information and may not have need-to-know, or the proper clearance level, for the classified information when it is displayed in combination.

Degrees of these problems presently

exist. The full impact will be here when this technology is fully implemented. The identification, handling, control and transmission of classified or proprietary information under these conditions presents an extremely serious problem that must be solved.

Industry and the government cannot afford not to take full advantage of this system because of its ability to do a far superior job in designing complex products more economically and in a greatly shortened time span and also provide a higher level of reliability confidence. Friends, it's coming. How are we going to handle it?

Coupled with this and made possible by the same means, that is the powerful computers we have today and the much more powerful computers we will have in the not too distant future, will be the total "Integrated Data System" to serve as the key for managing a project, directly accessible by company management and by customer management. This is a requirement that will soon be upon those of us in the business of contracting with military organization.

The requirements will be something like this: All of the information (data, if you will) necessary for the contractor to perform to the obligations of a contract will be required to be in a central data bank and be directly accessible by customer personnel. The depth of inquiry will be restricted by agreement and the contract will specify these setback levels of access penetration.

The desirability of the integrated information or data system cannot be disputed. (1) It provides company



management a constant overview of the progress and problem areas in accomplishing a project. (2) It will eliminate the very expensive reports that we are now required to provide to a military customer that contain information that is outdated long before their delivery. The philosophy of the military in setting up the requirement is to cause the company management to do a more effective job of managing and to allow them, the military, an opportunity to receive information in time to make meaningful decisions.

The question to you gentlemen is this: How do we protect classified information and proprietary information created in this manner? Frankly, I don't have any answer. I just have a question which must be answered. Hopefully, this discussion will open the door for consideration that will provide the answers by the time they are needed.

### **JOHN A. BYRNE**

#### **Stanford Research Institute**

The phrase "man in the middle" connotes a person somehow caught between opposing forces or groups. In my case, as editor of reports documenting research and development projects, one is represented by a large band of fellow SRI employees—scientists and engineers—who wish to communicate with other scientists and engineers, with administrators, and with decision makers. On the other hand is an unseen group who must ensure that the communication takes place in controlled and protected channels so as to avoid compromising the security interests of the

United States. While I seldom see this second group, I am continually made aware of their presence by a stream of requirements, procedures, and specifications. Were this material consistent, clear, and concise, the position in the middle would not be particularly onerous. Unfortunately, the guidelines are often opaque, prolix, and inconsistent from one statement to the next, and seldom the same from one research sponsor to the next. In an operation such as Stanford Research Institute which performs hundreds of research projects for dozens of DOD agencies, poorly defined, unclearly presented, and conflicting requirements make the editor's life nightmarish.

The scientist or engineer writing an R&D report is likely to take a simplistic view of security requirements: Stamp the entire document with a single classification and downgrading group and forget it. This gets the document printed and out, which, at that moment, is the only important consideration. The resulting horrors of overclassification seldom come home to practitioners of this approach until they have need for information from a similarly classified document. There is then eloquently expressed contempt for a system wherein needed and probably unclassified data are hopelessly buried in a highly classified document.

The actual security requirements can be hard to pin down. Sometimes the position is "We don't care how you protect your classified material so long as you do it right." Other times, the requirements are spelled out in minutely detailed specifications that are totally impossible to meet with

the available time and classification criteria.

Some will argue that there is really no problem, since security requirements are ultimately set forth in DOD 5220.22-M, *Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding of Classified Information*. Let us face it: The *ISM* is not a masterpiece of either lucidity or clarity. Neither are the many report specifications now being put out by various user agencies, almost all of which call out the *ISM* and incorporate its provisions by reference. Neither, I fear, are the Standard Practice Procedure manuals prepared by contractors to meet the requirements of the *ISM*. In the last case, part of the difficulty is a tendency to echo or to copy verbatim the language and phrasing of the *ISM*—probably, I suppose, because following DOD's language leads to minimum difficulty when the SPP is up for DOD approval. Examples—when they are presented—tend to create as much confusion as they dispel.

Consider the situation surrounding the basic element of classification. For some years now, I have been haggling with scientists and engineers to mark each page with its own appropriate classification. These gentlemen, as I have noted before, would prefer just to assign a single classification to the entire document and avoid the complexities of classifying the elements one by one. Thus, what happens when the basic element of classification is shifted from page to paragraph? An argument develops over the meaning of paragraph, for if this word is loosely enough defined, the marking requirements are looser than before.

*Webster's Third New International Dictionary* neatly summarizes the two schools of thought about the word paragraph. On one hand, the paragraph is "A distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed composition that consists of from one to many sentences, forms a rhetorical unit (as by dealing with one particular point of the subject or by comprising the words of a distinct speaker), and is indicated by beginning on a new usu. indented line." On the other hand, paragraph also describes "A usu. numbered article or section of law or legal document."

Remember that the scientists and engineers who prepare reports want to minimize the time required to deal with security considerations. Thus, if one accepts that the DOD means that if a major section of a document is numbered (or otherwise uniquely identified), it is perforce a paragraph and can be disposed of with a single classification marking. All that is required is judicious christening.

On the chance that the framers of the *ISM* had come to grips with the meaning of paragraph, we turned to the section of definitions, which offers clarification of such knotty terms as "Colleges and Universities" and "United States." Unfortunately, there are no entries between "Official Information" and "Parent-Subsidiary." The *ISM* does offer one boxed example:

(S) (FRD) This is an illustration of how a paragraph containing SECRET FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA shall be marked.

Three lines below this boxed example of marking a grammatical paragraph

is a cross reference to Paragraph 3a of the ISM.

But even if we accept that the Department of Defense is thinking of the rhetorical element rather than the numbered section when the word paragraph is invoked, we are not out of the woods. As I have stated before the user agencies have their own interesting systems. The U.S. Army Electronic Command's Specification SCL-2101Q, for example, states that "The classification of a paragraph, chapter, or section of a classified report shall be indicated by inserting the appropriate classification in parentheses at the beginning of such paragraph, chapter, or section, *immediately following the numerical designation* (emphasis added). For another example, the instructions for DD form 1473, "Document Control Data—R&D," which is required in every research report prepared for every agency of DOD, gives the following instructions for marking the report abstract that is to be printed on the form: "Each paragraph of the abstract shall *end* with an indication of the military security classification of the information in the paragraph . . ." (emphasis added). The Air Force's MIL-STD-84 complicates the issue still further with its requirement: "The classification of each paragraph will be marked when there are differences in their classification. If one subparagraph is marked, then all subparagraphs in that paragraph will be marked."

Even assuming for the moment that we all know what a paragraph or subparagraph is and that we agree that we will attempt to determine the classification of each paragraph stand-

ing alone, on what basis will we form our decision? The answer, of course, is to be found on DD Form 254. I am prepared to accept the suitability of this form to describe the level of protection to be accorded to various elements of an operating hardware system, although there may be people in this room who might argue against any such acceptance. The form is certainly unsuitable to describe the level of protection to be accorded pen and paper analyses of hypothetical systems—which is often what is required in assigning a classification to a given paragraph of an R&D report.

Consider now the further complications of the downgrading group. The ISM requires that the document be marked with the group of the most highly restricted element contained within the document. There is a permissive statement: "Whenever a useful purpose will be served thereby; each separate paragraph may be marked to show the automatic downgrading and declassification group that applied to its contents." The Air Force's MIL-STD-847, however, did away with permissiveness:

"Whenever there are differences in the automatic downgrading-declassification grouping of the various paragraphs or illustrations in a report, each classified paragraph or illustration will also be marked (in addition to the classification marking) to show the automatic regrading-declassification group that applied to its content. The regrading-declassification abbreviation will be in separate parentheses and will follow the classification marking, as (C-RD) (Gp-1), for Confidential Restricted Data—Group 1."

I doubt that most contracting officers or technical monitors could meet this requirement readily and consistently. I have never, in my own experience, seen paragraphs so marked and I suspect that this requirement is seldom met.

This discussion of the mechanics of paragraph classification is illustrative of many other equally frustrating ambiguities and inconsistencies. In the millenium, of course, a single specification would cover reporting of all research conducted for all agencies of the DOD. Such a specification is no nearer than a single unified service. In the meantime, then, what is needed are well-written, well-illustrated, consistent, logical specifications, that can reasonably be met by contractors. The alternative of continuing the present hodgepodge will result in continued increase in the cost of government-sponsored research to offset the costs of compartmentalizing and identifying each snippet of information to the sponsor's own unique system, and the continued overclassification of a large part of research results. The consequences of this alternative are clearly detrimental to the economy and the scientific future of the nation.

DONOVAN: Thank you, Mr. Byrne. I will now open the discussion up for any questions from the floor.

LORRIMER McCONNELL: I have a question for Mr. Pritchard. I wonder if you know of any computer data management system of the kind you describe—the kind that describes not on paper but within the computer guts as well—which utilizes classified information. If so, what kind of controls exist?

PRITCHARD: I know of one sys-

tem that has been developed. I don't know if it has classified information incorporated at the present time. However, the special program Mr. Miller is planning to write will say all information required to manage the product and will be administratively controlled. This certainly will get into the area of classified information. Boeing Aircraft in Seattle has a system in operation, a system in contract with the Air Force.

MILTON PARKS: I address my question to Mrs. Horn.

I would like to know her feelings on the combining of document control and the library functions as one unit; or does she feel they should be segregated?

MRS. HORN: Well, I experimented with it combined as well as apart and, well, it was—actually, they disapproved of moving classified information into the library. Librarians at that time were not as familiar with all the clearance requirements as they are now. We have much the better system by having it separated.

PETRU: I would certainly like to see the two systems get together. I think, in Mrs. Horn's experience, it was unfortunate. It was one of many trials that didn't cut the mustard. But very definitely, the two systems should be together. They cooperate closely together. It is almost a shame not to have them together.

PARKS: How about archives?

PETRU: Do you mean company archives or limited material?

PARKS: Classified material and company archives. Should that be part of the library and center, or—

PETRU: I have had some experience with that. The company is re-

sponsible for the archives, and it worked out very, very well because we had the system well set up. Not only could we get the material in the system and get it out, but we used quite a bit of background information and this type of thing, with none, I suppose, of the requirements from the *Industrial Security Manual*. It states that after the library has two copies, that is it.

MRS. HORN: I don't want to argue about this, but we have to think about retaining the archives. Time was, we could keep these indefinitely. We are still keeping the stuff, but now, of course, we must request approval for retention for two years. After two years, who follows up? We are trying to follow with an official contract, or trying to get rid of them, and I feel this is something, again, that we want to keep, among the services we are performing constantly on this material.

PETRU: I think Pat and I are arguing at cross purposes. I think her argument is such that it should bring security or document control and librarians closer together. I know the situation I just described—it was United Technology Center—and they did all the paper work for getting approval for whatever is being retained after the contract. I think there are many functions within any given organizational group capable of storage or of being the custodian; but there is really only one organization that is psychologically oriented to get something out of there, and that would be your technical library.

RICHARD BOBERG: I think one of the things we ought to be interested in, in the Society and as a group of

security people, is the fact that most companies, or many companies, I should say, can anticipate that the day will come shortly when they will have a complete information retrieval system which may well include the document control and library functions. It will develop and no doubt include a computer station, which will have remote terminals and all the other things that Lorry mentioned and discussed in all these areas. I think this is the direction we are going. In other words, when I say "information retrieval" I mean the information that is at the disposal of the company, classified or unclassified. If that is going to come about—and I think we can anticipate it will come about—then all the problems we have been discussing today must be solved. This is what Mr. Pritchard was getting at.

PRITCHARD: There is nothing in existence to-day comparable to the system that I was attempting to describe. Anything that is in existence today is less sophisticated than what we are going to see in the future.

PARKS: I would like to ask Mr. Pritchard, too, if he has any federal backing in the study of safeguarding the classified information.

PRITCHARD: No, all we have done is talk about it. I might go into another facet of this. I am involved in a group that is semi-advisory to the DOD, to the Office of Standardization Policies, on the subject of computer-aided design. This is just a part of the total data system and there has been some serious concern about how that is going to happen. The situation I mentioned where one bit of information in itself is unclassified and in combination with other pieces of in-

formation is classified—I recall years ago, before I got my present level of clearance, I had to develop some information in combination. When it was finished, I was the only one that had the knowledge to put this all together. But when it was finished it was beyond my clearance to know, so I had to pass it on to somebody else—who couldn't read it!

**DONALD GARRETT:** On the security problem in which electronics are involved in the computer system and there is authorization for classified information involved, we are at-

tempting to gather information from which we can develop some standard method of approach for the classification of computer hardware and software, particularly the software. I have not heard of any reports of study which have reached any real conclusion as yet.

**DONOVAN:** Just a word of explanation. When we invited the members of the panel we instructed them that their primary function was to present the questions to us, and not necessarily the solutions.

## **PANEL--FREEDOM OF INFORMATION VERSUS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

**Richard L. Durham, Moderator**

**DURHAM:** As you will remember, at last year's meeting Congressman John E. Moss described his new Freedom of Information bill that went into effect on July 4. I talked to Congressman Moss back in 1964, to try to line him up, and we did carry him on the program for the third Seminar, and you did hear him speak last year. It has been over a year that law has been in existence. I thought it would be interesting to see the other side of the coin—what members of the press and a public information officer feel about this question.

**LARRY L. SISK**  
**San Diego Union and**  
**Evening Tribune**

Ladies and gentlemen, there isn't much about the business of this organization's members with which we of the working press can argue or

disagree. We are in strong agreement that the national defense and future of our country must be protected. We acknowledge that some secrets must be maintained to help achieve protection.

Secrecy means censorship, a dirty word in the newspaper business, but in censorship of information in the interest of national defense, we strongly support scientific principles of classification and enforcement to provide security.

At the same time, however, we don't go along with censorship if it is intended to protect the personal security of people in government, or public servants.

We of the press are concerned with and seek out information that affects the public's business, and this comes primarily in the areas of the conduct of government.

We are strong defenders of the right of privacy, both personal and commercial, when there is no public involvement, interest, or responsibility.

While recognizing the need to protect some information, we feel we have an obligation of equal importance to make other information available to satisfy the public's need for that information and to satisfy the public's right to know.

We are not interested in protecting information merely because it might be controversial, or because it might be embarrassing to an individual or group. If it pertains to the public's business, the public is entitled to have it and make whatever disposition of the matter that the public deems necessary.

I am not familiar with various gradations of classifications, such as we have heard here. From the news viewpoint, we believe that information is either classified or it isn't. Partial information or semi-secret restrictions are confusing, if not more damaging than no information at all. We can't go along with the type of partial classification that makes information available so long as the source is kept secret, or as the saying goes, is off the record. The news media, and our reporters who deal with the military and the defense manufacturing industry, are delighted that the business of classifying has been put on a professional basis and that the people who do the classifying are trained to know what is sensitive and what is not, even if your terms are likely to confuse us.

In the past, we have felt at times that the marking of a document as secret or restricted, or being told that

a subject was classified, might be a tip-off that ineptness, incompetence, or dishonesty was being hidden or protected. And under the Public Information Act, the government official must be prepared to prove that isn't so.

Over-classification, and lack of cooperation when it is possible to cooperate, discourages the press. Your company's or department's business is entitled to greater public interest, and through interest, public support. Any arrogant attitude or reluctance to cooperate when classification is not justified would be detrimental to the public's interest, because it would dull the effort by the press to make needed information available to the public.

We have very little difficulty with industry, but we can't say as much for some branches of the military services when public information officers just don't know and are reluctant to find out. It is easier for them to refuse to cooperate than to go higher for guidance. It would be a great help if all military or government information officers were schooled in the principles and techniques of classification.

One of the irritants recently was reported in the *New York Times*. A top Marine Corps officer, in speaking to a group of other officers in his branch of the service, warned that other services were undermining and threatening the future of the Marine Corps. Top brass of the Corps stamped the text of this speech as secret. Surely there was no element of the national defense being at stake.

Another example: the Air Force classified a table of ballistic missile trajectories as secret. These trajec-

ories, I was told and as you probably know, are governed by the simple laws of nature and can be determined by any student of physics.

An example of the misuse of secrecy publicized fairly recently was when a list of contributors to a party fund in Washington was marked classified. It was intended to keep secret the fact that there had been a solicitation to provide funds for liquor.

When I was working for the government in World War II, I was sent a supply of maps which were marked restricted because they showed locations of war production establishments and military bases. However, across the street from my office was a bookstore where the identical maps without the government stamp could be purchased.

In the field of war production in those days—and the same is true, even more true, in defense production today—it was disconcerting to seek information at the source, to be informed that the material was classified, and then pick up a magazine in the public domain containing that information. And today it is not too unusual for so-called classified technical information to appear in the trade press, complete with detailed explanatory drawings, or even photographs.

When we members of the press assert that the public has a right to know, we acknowledge the fact that the Constitution, which provides for freedom of the press, does not contain any guarantee that the public has any right to receive information. The right to know, and freedom of information, are implied, if not clearly stated. Knowledge and information

are needed by the people if they are to benefit from the freedom of press, freedom of speech, and right to assemble.

If justice and government are fairly administered as basic to a society that is healthy and free, so is public access to the public's business and the public's right to know how its business is being conducted. The more this government becomes secret, the less it remains free. To diminish the people's information about government is to diminish the people's participation in government.

Here in California our right to know has been enacted into law. Our government code provides, and to conclude, I quote:

"The Legislature finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every citizen of this State."

Thank you.

**HERBERT BRUCKER**  
**Stanford University**

Ladies and gentlemen, it is true I now work for Stanford University, but I speak to you as a—I was going to say reformed—but maybe I should say retired newspaper editor. I was one until two years ago, and I speak from a newspaper point of view.

I live in a simpler world than Larry Sisk, who started out by saying there is a qualification of the right to know in the interests of national defense. I have a simpler formula that I can put into the form of a classic syllogism. My syllogism goes like this:

All censorship is bad.

Classification is censorship.



Therefore—well, you can draw your own conclusion.

Perhaps that is enough. That is really all I want to say, on behalf of a point of view I think it is in danger of being lost.

The newspaper problem starts with the judges and the lawyers, in a controversy over fair trial versus free press. Obviously, both fair trial and free press are fundamental rights. Neither one should override the other. But when you get to talking with lawyers and judges, you soon find them so concerned with their own interest, which is fair trial, that they tend to lose sight of the other right, a press free to inform the public.

I was struck with the need for upholding the public's right to know this noon, when Mr. Marshall was speaking about the extraordinary labyrinth that the AEC seems to be. Its basic premise seems to be "All censorship is good," directly the opposite of mine.

Everything that happens in AEC, if it is born there—I suppose even if somebody tells a joke there—is automatically classified. This is a kind of world that is hard for the American people to get along in.

It reminded me of a Maine skipper I heard about. In the old days, one of the clipper ships was going to China or the South Seas, and ran into a hell of a storm. The skipper was hard-boiled, bound to go there and get back again. He was carrying an awful lot of sail in the storm, so the crew began to get restive. Finally, the first mate thought that the crew was right, that this was getting to be a pretty risky business. He took his courage in his hands and went up and

shouted to the skipper, "Sir, wouldn't it be all right to take in some of the sail?"

The skipper drew himself up and shouted over the storm, "Mister, all I want from you is silence—and damn little of that."

It is amazing. We all grew up in a different world from this. Ours used to be an open society, but now much that is important to a self-governing people is classified and therefore secret.

Incidentally, when newspapermen say secret, they don't mean a given level of classification. They mean secret—something the insiders don't tell anybody. Our whole way of doing things depends on information, and that means free access to information.

There is a man, a professor of political science down at Stanford, Hugh Marshall, who has an interesting thesis. He is working it up to a book. His point is that technology has changed our world so incredibly that people can no longer keep track of it.

Suppose the Corps of Engineers wants to build a dam in the San Francisco Creek, down where I live at Palo Alto. Well, when George Washington, or Thomas Jefferson had anything like that to do the ordinary citizen and the President of the United States both had a common basis of information. Each was equally competent to reach a judgment as to whether the bridge or road or dam should be built.

Nowadays, our technology has given us a world that nobody can understand. Neither the citizen, nor the President of the United States—nor the newspaper editor—really knows

enough to decide whether the TFX, or F-111, airplane should or should not be built. The experts have us all at their mercy, and with their classification they don't always tell us what it is all about. It is getting to be increasingly difficult to make the political judgments on which our system is founded.

Therefore I think it is useful that you are having this session. It enables us to air this other side, the public's right to know, which tends to be forgotten. You people are in business on the other side of the street. I think it sometimes does us good to rehearse some of the basic things that we learned in high school civics class. For example, there is the classic quotation on this subject from President Madison. "Nothing could be more irrational than to give the people power, and to withhold from them information without which power is abused. A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both."

This is why I think it is important that people in your business should always be looking over your shoulders and saying, "There is a public out there, on whose level of information we all depend. What about them?" When we get too tangled up in esoteric information and cannot make judgments because information is withheld from us, how in the world are we going to get along?

Now I will make this concession that dents my basic premise that all

censorship is bad, namely that I recognize that we live in an imperfect world. And in an imperfect world there is sometimes some basis for classification. Otherwise we wouldn't have any National Classification Management Society, and we wouldn't be here. But, given that point, we must always remember that this is not a one-way street. There is always a place for that fundamental foundation of America, which is public knowledge so that the public can govern itself.

I think one reason why we have so much uneasiness and frustration in the country now is that people don't know what is going on. This leaves them unhappy, because they don't know enough to be sure what they want, or what policies to be for.

In my experience to classify is easy, to declassify damn near impossible. I know some of you are in the business of doing it. But take the military as an example. What lieutenant or sergeant—or colonel for that matter—was ever bawled out by a superior for keeping something secret? I never heard of one. But there have been many bawled out for making things public. After all, if you keep something secret nobody is the wiser, so you cannot get into trouble. But if you publish it, you may well get into trouble.

The fact that it is difficult to get things out doesn't mean that secrecy is right. We are fortunate in having Representative John Moss's new federal Freedom of Information law, which Mr. Durham mentioned as having gone into effect on July 4, 1967. Unfortunately, I don't think that law is being used enough by the public, by lawyers and judges and

other officials. It has tremendous value as a counter-balance to the normal trend toward secrecy. One thing is that the law puts the burden of proof on anybody who would keep information secret, instead of the other way around as always before. For another thing there are teeth in the law, in that it provides for court review. For the first time this makes such legislation effective.

Now I got together with Larry Sisk this noon, and found out that he and I had both fetched up in the same place. Both of us had planned to quote to you from California's Brown Act. But Larry was generous enough to allow me to present it to you. I am glad to read this quotation to you, because it expresses well the philosophy of freedom of information, and the reason why the United States cannot live in a world of secrecy. The preamble of the Brown Act, California's Freedom of Information law, says this:

"The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed, so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created."

That really says the whole thing. But I would like to offer one more bit of philosophy, and that is that the history of the race is that you never can tell in advance what the results of publication are going to be. I think we are all censors at heart. We all fear that some evil may follow

from publication, therefore we tend instinctively to suppress.

I would like to remind you of two examples in which publication that was feared nevertheless served the public good. One example goes way back to World War I. Britain went into that war with a great navy. But as soon as the war settled down in the trenches of France, in the first few months, Britain's tiny professional army was in trouble. It turned out they needed two things badly. One was shells for their field artillery, which was vital in that war of infantry and trenches. The second need was for more soldiers—masses of them. So what happened? Lord Northcliffe, the newspaper publisher, found out about the two needs and published them. The government and the military had said that all this was classified, dangerous for the enemy to know. But Northcliffe came right out and said that the BEF in France was short of shells and men.

Everybody who was anybody reared up and shouted, "Treason!" Britain was engaged in a war for her life, and therefore the fact that she didn't have shells enough and men enough must be kept from the enemy. How could there be anything more treasonable than to let Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany know of Britain's vital weakness?

What happened? The British public was aroused, and adopted conscription. They established a Ministry of Munitions. They got their shells and their men. So they were able to hang on until in due course the United States came in and supplied the reserve power that won the war.

A more recent example is the Bay of Pigs. That is still somewhat con-

troversial, but there is already enough on the record to show that you should never make the prejudgment that publication is necessarily dangerous.

It seems that some of the CIA sleuths got together in the dark with Cuban refugees and dreamed up the idea of invading Castro's Cuba. You remember the debacle. It makes fascinating reading to trace the whole development. In the first place the newspapers were asleep. But then a few things started to come out. In the end, when publication was imminent, President Kennedy himself asked the papers and broadcasters, as a patriotic duty, not to publish. For publication would tip off Cuba that the invasion was going to take place. So the secret was kept.

The result was the Bay of Pigs disaster. And later President Kennedy himself told some newspaper people he wished they had published everything because that would have kept the United States from making a colossal mistake that still blackens its record.

So my advice to you, for all occasions, is this: please publish.

**RALPH STUART SMITH**  
**U.S. Arms Control and**  
**Disarmament Agency**

Thank you, Chairman Dick. Together with Mr. Sisk and Mr. Brucker, I have found this session altogether an eye opener. I think my reaction may be slightly different from theirs. Although I have been in the government in one position or another for many years now, and have seen many classified documents, I never realized the immense problems of classification. So I can only express wonder

and admiration that you are able to cope with this problem at all.

My distinguished fellow panelists, I think, have set forth admirably well a number of points about government information practices as seen by the professional newsman; and I suppose I should be able, as Dick suggests, to show the other side of the coin—in other words, to show the government point of view which, hopefully, would be in conflict, and therefore would be the basis of a good news story.

Well, actually, I don't think I can quite do that because my belief is that a government information officer is another case, really, of the man in the middle. I will come back to that in a moment.

I suppose there is some kind of distinction in being a PR man for one of the least known and least understood organizations in the country. I am referring, of course, to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Of course our agency is one of the smallest in government, with very limited resources. But I think the real reason the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has remained relatively unknown is not its small size but rather the fact that its work just doesn't lend itself very readily to news stories, or for that matter, to comprehension by the general public. Even the name "Arms Control and Disarmament" conspires against us. "Disarmament" has a rather utopian sound. As for "arms control," very few people know what the hell it means.

So I hope you won't mind if I say a word here about what it does mean, so as to situate the role of my

agency in this picture of classification versus information, as well as in other respects.

"Arms control" is a catch-all term referring to a variety of measures which can be taken to reduce the likelihood of war or to limit its effects if it occurs. It is by no means utopian. It calls for measures that are quite practical and in keeping with our national security interests. And indeed we have already advanced farther along this road than many people realize. We have already negotiated treaties providing for what might be called the "preventive denuclearization" of Antarctica and outer space, for example—the idea here being to rule those areas off limits *before* they become more accessible to us, as of course they will.

There is also the treaty negotiated last year by the Latin Americans, calling for Latin America to become the first nuclear-free zone in a populous area of the earth. Since 1963 we have had the limited test ban treaty, prohibiting all except underground nuclear tests. And now we have the non-proliferation treaty, the greatest step yet along the arms control road.

You will doubtless recall also that on July 1 at the White House ceremony for signing the non-proliferation treaty, the President announced another vastly important potentiality in arms control agreement: agreement by the Soviets to begin discussions "in the nearest future" on placing mutual limitations on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Though there is overlapping, I think it is convenient to make a distinction between "arms control" and

"disarmament." Clearly, if there are to be extensive measures of worldwide disarmament, every militarily significant country—including France and Mainland China—must join in the process.

Also, if there is to be extensive disarmament in the world, United Nations peace-keeping forces will have to be built up to an unchallenged position; and there must be a sufficient degree of international agreement to establish political control over them. So all of that obviously is a long way off.

In the meantime, however, there are such measures of arms control as I have mentioned which we can carry out, building as much of the edifice as we can until all significant powers are prepared to become a part of it. This arms control process can enhance our security and spare us a senseless waste of resources. At the same time, it promises valuable political by-products, in that each step in arms control involves an increased degree of international cooperation.

I mentioned that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is not very widely known or understood. But with the rather spectacular developments in arms control negotiations which have been taking place, this picture is beginning to change.

In this connection, incidentally, I personally was very pleased to note some recent suggestions in both the American and the British press that our Director, William C. Foster, might make a likely candidate for a Nobel prize, in recognition of his quiet but dogged efforts, over the years, in carrying out these arms control negotiations.

Particularly when there are such front page developments as the signing of the non-proliferation treaty, or the President's announcement about the missile talks, you can be sure that we have lots of business with the press. So now I would like to say something about this side of government work, and first of all to tell something about the rules of the game for the benefit of those who may not have played it. A lot of people have got into trouble because they weren't familiar enough with these rules.

When our Director, Mr. Foster, or another member of the agency, gives an interview to a newspaperman and says it is "on the record," that means that the reporter can quote him verbatim and by name. And of course, if a government official goes on the radio or on television, it is all automatically on the record. Particularly when you are dealing with other governments, however, and perhaps in delicate negotiations, there is something terribly explicit—and sometimes even potentially provocative—about on the record statements. Consequently, on the record statements have to be drawn up very carefully, and often they have to be submitted in advance to interagency clearance.

In a government as large as ours, there is also the problem of making it speak with one voice. For this reason, we in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency usually make our on the record statements or answers to newsmen's questions through Bob McCloskey of the State Department, who is the principal U. S. Government spokesman in foreign affairs.

Because of the pitfalls I mentioned,

and for a variety of other reasons, government spokesmen often give out information on a "background" basis. This means that the newsmen can write about the ideas expressed, but may not identify the spokesman. Information gathered in this way is usually attributed, when published, to "U. S. official sources." This might seem on the surface like a rather cowardly way of doing things, but in fact it has a number of advantages for both spokesman and reporter.

To take just one example, let's say that the newsmen wants the spokesman's opinion about the probable actions of another government. We can't arrogate the job of being spokesmen for other governments, so if he had to go on the record the U. S. official would probably have to refer the reporter to a spokesman for the other government, or perhaps give some vague reply to the effect that he was sure the other government would do the right thing.

But if he is on background, the U. S. spokesman can more readily give a relaxed and informative account of things as he sees them, without the risk of causing a big news story and a political storm in some other capital.

Another frequent reason for going on background is that the U. S. Government—unlike the Soviet Government, for example—cannot simply ignore the press and stand mute. So if there is a situation that demands some clarification by the U. S. Government but where an on the record statement would be too rigid and problematical, a background statement may offer the desired answer.

Occasionally a spokesman will go

"on deep background." This means that the newspaperman cannot attribute the information to any U. S. Government source whatever. I, for one, have very rarely resorted to deep background, but once in a while there may be some key bit of information, vital to the newsman's understanding of a situation but which must not be attributed to the U. S. Government. Then this is useful. Also, deep background has at least the advantage that the newsman can use the information. If, instead, a spokesman gives something off the record, that means that the newsman can never publish it at all and is even honor bound not to seek the same information from another source to which he can attribute it.

People in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency deal with a great deal of highly classified information about weapons design, and so on. This means, among other things, that every public speech or statement that we release has to be cleared by my friend and colleague, Dick Durham here, as Director of Classification for the agency. And needless to say, in dealing with the press we try never to reveal any classified information, whether on background or any other basis.

As it happens, in any case, our main problems have been in handling information about negotiations, for, of course, if there is anything that can louse up negotiations it is premature leakage or out of place remarks. The press sometimes puts quite a lot of heat on us, to get "one-up" on the negotiations. But, fortunately, we seem to get along pretty well all the same.

Now returning to the thought I expressed in the beginning, that the government information officer is really the man in the middle, I think this is a fair description because he deals with and, generally, he is apt to have good personal friendships among the press. He understands what the requirements are, so on the one hand, he is a kind of lawyer for his contacts; but on the other hand, he has a fundamental responsibility to the United States Government and the agency he works for.

GEORGE CHELIUS: I would like to address my question to the press and find out what responsibility the press exercises upon itself to withhold information that might affect national defense. What evaluation, before publishing information, do you do to insure that information does not become public knowledge that should be protected?

SISK: I worked in San Diego for about 20 years or so, and I would say that our experience there is exemplary. We try to understand the needs for secrecy in connection with military movements and military supplies, especially during the periods of war in Korea and the present situation, and our people on the beat, the reporters who handle that type of information, practically live with the military and they gain a certain knowledge about these things. And we in the office encourage them to adopt the same principles of protecting information of this sort as the military. Sometimes individuals in the military are not as responsible as we try to be. That would answer it from the basis of the military activities of the operation of the national defense.

Now insofar as information in the realm of public activity—industrial—Mr. Brucker referred to the TFX contracts—people on newspapers generally—there are some exceptions, but generally—have a pretty fair idea of responsibility to the country. There is not so much feeling of responsibility to individual companies or individuals, and if information about them is available to us, chances are the information is available elsewhere. We evaluate that information as it concerns the public's interest. If we get it, it is obviously in the public domain unless someone, as you would say, left it to us. Our responsibility primarily is in the field of industry. If the information pertains to public business, why, then, we apply a different equation to whether or not we shall publish it. I refer to information in the trade press. We on the daily press are just as anxious to get information about new airplanes and monetary contracts pertaining to the TFXs and other types of aircraft, and if we get it, we probably will print it. If the trade press gets it, they will print it. As you are aware, our idea of responsibility differs when it comes to industry and dealings for gadgetry or things of that sort, and we feel that if we are able to run it and if the public is interested in it, we should go ahead and print it. Otherwise, industry should keep it from getting into the public domain.

CHELIUS: I want to know where the people from the press get the most information—from the government or from the public?

SISK: As for obtaining information pertaining to industry, we get it from both sides. Now we have four major

industries in San Diego. We may receive information from a military source about the military, say at Ryan, and we may have just partial information. We act on that tip and go to Ryan or go to the company concerned and if it is important enough, if the public information officer doesn't have the answer, we will go to the top man. If he refers us to the Air Force and we can't break it through the local Air Force representative, we have a little system of going to Washington. And frequently we find information they are trying to keep out of the newspaper locally is available very freely in Washington. Most of our confirmation comes from government agencies, but we do get tips both from the companies and military in the local areas. If the subject is important enough and we run into difficulty, we normally go to Washington where they have a more sophisticated attitude toward public information and the necessity to give that information to the public.

ROBERT DONOVAN: In a recent article in *Editor and Publisher* the Freedom of Information Committee directed some criticism at their own membership and thought roughly only 52 percent of the Freedom of Information law cases had been filed by the newspapers. And the legal profession hasn't made a much greater use of this. Do you know why this is the case?

BRUCKER: No, I don't because for years we have been fighting for this kind of thing. I think it probably comes down to the fact that those who are interested, who are on the FOI Committee, will have an active interest in it. The fellow from Dubuque,



who hasn't been himself involved in trying to get legislation, he doesn't give a damn unless—and I think this is where you will find the work in the future—something happens in his town and he wants to know about it. He then is surely going to find out about that law and use it. I have an idea—I don't know why it is such a sleeper—but I have an idea that over the years, as people become familiar with it, you are going to find it used more and more. I hope so.

SISK: May I add a little to that? The fact that the law is in existence has a marvelous effect in loosening up the bonds of secrecy in the government. Our reporters and members of the press corps in Washington are finding that many agencies which heretofore had a policy of secrecy have rewritten their public information guidelines and if the information is available, there is less and less need to use the Moss Act. I think that accounts for the lack of use in taking the agency people to court to spring the information loose. And as the government officials become aware that this is the policy of the country—to make the information available—there is going to be less need for us reporters to take you into court to get the information that we think the public should have.

DONALD GARRETT: I direct my question to Mr. Brucker and Mr. Sisk. The lack of use of the Freedom of Information law might be an indication of the public's lack of desire or lack of interest in knowing, or they would be seeking the information more fully, would they not?

BRUCKER: Apathy. I think this is true. The world is so complicated,

as you know, why should I get excited about this subissue—as far as the public is concerned? But that is what the thing is for. The press is accused of having a self interest. Obviously, it has a self interest in publication, because if you didn't have information, you couldn't print it. But the thing is that the press and the public are indistinguishable, I think. I do think there is a certain amount of public apathy and I think that sometimes around the world we will find public hostility, as shown by the British in World War I. The public was outraged and shouting, even though it turned out to be in the interests of the country.

FRANK DILL: I may have misunderstood a point Mr. Sisk made in connection with the source of information. As I understand, one thing disturbed you frequently: you might be given information but they withheld the source of the information. I would like to ask a question about that—and that is, why did you differentiate between the action of the government and the newspaper which would attempt to withhold the information at the source?

SISK: I know the burden of your question—if the source has the right to withhold the information, how does that differ from the newspaper which elects to withhold its source on principle.

DILL: No, the availability of information from the source. I say I know, for example, the newspapers demand the right to reveal the source of information, in contrast—

SISK: Let me put on another hat. California is one of the states that protects newspaper people. We can-

not be forced by the courts to reveal the source of information. Now if we obtain the information from an anonymous source, or if we want to protect that source so that we can protect him or protect that source for future use, then we do elect to fall back to the newspaper's privilege. Now we think that anyone who gives us information, except in special circumstances, should stand for being identified, and that was the reason why I said that we were not in favor of receiving information off the record. I am of the school that Mr. Brucker referred to. We don't like for our reporters to obtain information off the record because if another reporter obtained it from another source, then we embarrass the first reporter by publishing that information. So, as a policy on all of our newspapers, we tell our reporters not to accept information off the record, not to attend such briefing conferences, and that sort of thing. And I hope I have talked around and not answered your question.

BRUCKER: I think there is this difference—the newspaper, in withholding its source of information, is dealing with a different problem. You have got to get the cooperation of a person that will talk against the official, or government, or the management, or whoever it is doing something crooked that you would like to get on the record. I think it is a different situation.

SPEAKER UNKNOWN: What about the timing factor? Giving news immediately brings to mind one thing that happened down south when we had the Chatsworth fire. They brought it out immediately and

caused a lot of confusion and stopped public conveyances from getting in to fight the fire. Should we talk about withholding or the timing, rather than suppression, of news?

BRUCKER: Well, you get into a difficult thing there. That kind of situation does arise. And, again, I think you can get reasonable understanding. I think this applies to broadcasting. If you have some disaster or some impending disaster, the word of that may be held up by TV. I think the newspapers are a bit slower to come into it. To me, even if you withhold the information for a while, you are still withholding it and I think the burden of proof is on you.

SISK: The broadcasting of information, whether by radio or TV is a new industry, and the television or the electronic news medium, as we of the print press like to say—they are still learning. And as a result of some of their activities, and the results have been obvious, the industry itself is trying to amend the situation. They are going more into the timing. It doesn't mean withholding the information, but delaying the use of it. It may be for a very short time, but this industry is learning the lessons that we in the newspaper business have learned since Gutenberg's day. When you delay information, from the newspaper standpoint we think this is bad because it is suppression. One of the things that we are arguing with the lawyers about right now is that they want to delay information about crimes and criminals until after the closing of the case. The case of Caryl Chessman, which you all know about, continued for eleven years. The

press won't stand for withholding or delaying, whether it is eleven hours or eleven years if it affects their busi-

ness, or, in the area of government, if it reflects on the conduct of the government.

## **THE ROLE OF THE CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION**

**By Francis W. May**

During its history, the old security requirements check list was discussed (and cussed) both formally and informally on many occasions, without definite conclusions other than "It just doesn't do the job." The question of the appropriateness of further discussion is quite apparent. However, with the recent changes in the DD Form 254, and the procedures for its use, I believe we should spend a few minutes of our time to review these changes and to grasp an understanding of the benefits that might be accrued if it is to be used as now prescribed. Accordingly, I accepted the invitation to discuss the new DD Form 254, not with delight, but with the idea of accepting the challenge to make the presentation both educational and worthwhile. Let us hope that I have met this challenge.

In my approach I wish only to discuss the role of the "Contract Security Classification Specification" (new DD Form 254) as prescribed today.

The Air Force, and I am sure the other services as well, have long recognized that the old DD Form 254 Security Requirements Check List was prepared for a general application long before the need for detailed security classification guidance was

recognized. Many of us have agreed that it has been somewhat less than a perfect way of conveying classification guidance to contractors. The very nature of the form has always lent itself to inadequacy. We, the military, have had a tendency to do the job the easy way and let the contractor classify in accordance with his interpretation. An X in the secret column for design information was not very informative, but in keeping with the principle of "commander's prerogative" the contractor could: (1) classify each item of engineering and design data as secret, (2) guess as to what should be classified or (3) apply an interpretive process and specify what design information warranted a secret classification. Although there are many exponents of this system, and we might be able to stay out of trouble by following it, we in the Air Force hope that this system is gone forever. Efforts during the past three years to provide the contractor with better guidance have met with varying degrees of success. Some of our commands have been most successful in providing supplementary guidance with the 254 whereas the supplementary guidance provided by others has been below an acceptable standard. A final effort by the Air Force culmin-

ated in the use of the DD Form 254-1 to transmit detailed system guides to industry. Regardless of the "how," the responsibility for providing better guidance to contractors cannot be by mere regulation. We have found that the "forced" use of the idea of the 254-1 was not as effective as we had hoped. Procedures were improved, and problems resolved only when personnel were enthusiastic and had the ability to visualize the effectiveness of their results. The value of the team concept to classification had to be realized. During the past year we have noted tremendous progress, and now, coming at a most opportune time for furthering the classification management program, is the big step—that of revising the DD Form 254 so that meaningful detailed guidance becomes the real objective. Because the services as well as their subordinate activities have actually accepted the principle involved, classification managers and personnel are placed in the position of requiring (rather than selling) the use of the Contract Security Classification Specification with attached guidance for other than simple procurement actions.

Our basic goal is to provide guidance to the contractor so that the necessity of interpretation will be the exception rather than the rule. The new DD Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification, cannot do the job alone, but it does provide us with a tool by which detailed, complete, and meaningful guidance can be transmitted. We must recognize that no system can be perfect. There will always be the need for some interpretation by the contractor. But

through the processes of education—discussion and conferences—we should hope that both the military classifying officials and the contractor's representatives develop such an expertise in the field as to assure a common understanding, and in reality, minimize the interpretation required.

I might point out that both the preparer of classification guidance and the user must realize that topics for which guidance for a particular program, project, operation, etc., is provided must be considered in relation to each other. For example, design information may be unclassified but if vulnerability is revealed by such information the requirements to safeguard vulnerability must be honored. We believe that it is our responsibility to discuss such matters with the contractor and thus provide him with the tools and the clarity necessary to understand Air Force philosophy and thinking as pertains to security classification matters.

I would like to back up for a moment and pursue the idea of contractor interpretation. In past years many contractors have accepted the idea that the X mark in the secret column for design information meant that secret was the highest classification that could be applied to design information. And I must admit that, based on the quality and quantity of guidance received, it was a logical conclusion. At this point the contractor's scientific and technical personnel have been queried as to the state of the art, past, current and future applications of similar equipment, etc. The contractor was actually tasked

with the responsibility of developing his own detailed guidance from the very broad guidance provided. The classification breakdown was the result of the contractor's evaluation of the importance of the item to our national defense, whether it be hardware or software. We hope that we will see the day that such procedures are not necessary. Our goal is to have the contractor's input considered before the 254 is prepared, and have the guidance transmitted by the 254 be of sufficient detail to clearly identify the specific information the Air Force wants classified.

With the acceptance of the Contract Security Classification Specification, the new DD Form 254, the Security Requirements Checklist and its running mate, the Security Classification Specification for Contracts, DD Form 254-1, the "closeout 254" and the "letter in lieu of" were discontinued. The revised and final 254 are still required, but the policies and procedures for their use have been clarified and simplified.

An original 254 will be issued with each Request for Proposal (RFP), Request for Quote (RFQ), Invitation for Bid (IFB), or other solicitation, and with an award of a contract or follow-on contract. A new 254 is not required for a follow-on contract when the procurement is of a recurring nature, or when the end item is not changed and there is no change in the security classification requirements applicable to the preceding contract. However, a copy of the currently valid 254 for the preceding contract will be furnished and distributed with the follow-on contract,

and will be annotated to show the appropriate contract number.

A final 254 will be issued upon final delivery of goods or services or upon termination of contract but only if at that time:

1. Authority is granted to retain classified material over which the project command has classification jurisdiction and responsibility, such as that classified material originated by the project command or generated by the contractor in the performance of the contract.

2. All classified material, for which retention authority would be required, is declassified.

A revised 254 will be issued when, at any time after the issuance of the original 254, additional guidance is required to be disseminated, or, at the time of any review of an outstanding original or final 254, the guidance is revised.

When the classified procurement is limited to graphic art reproduction and the security classification markings appear on the finished material to be produced, a 254 is not required. On the other hand, a guard service contract or alternate storage service contract will require a 254 to identify the specific information, and its level of security classification, with respect to which the service must be performed. To assure that adequate protection is provided, the contractor providing the service must be aware of the information to be protected. I will have more on this later.

The new 254 incorporates new thinking in that the feasibility of separating classified documentary material held by the contractor into

two distinct categories is recognized. The first category is reference material. In this sense reference material is defined as that classified documentary material over which the project command does *not* have security classification jurisdiction, and did not have such jurisdiction at the time such material was originated. Accordingly, much of the material made available by the Defense Documentation Center and other secondary distribution agencies would be in the category of reference material. The second category, of course, is all other classified documentary material furnished to the contractor or generated by the contractor in the course of contract performance.

Recognition of reference material as a separate category of classified documentary material is significant. The project command is not considered to have any security classification guidance responsibility with respect to such material.

Also, when the performance of a contract is expected to require access only to reference material an original 254 will be issued for limited purposes to identify the classification of the reference material to which access is expected to be required, and to provide appropriate security instructions. A final 254 will not be issued in connection with granting retention authority if all of the classified material authorized to be retained is reference material. Nor will the project command be required to review the 254 when only access to reference material is required in the performance of the contract.

There is nothing new in the

thought that guidance contributes little to the protection of sensitive information if it is not current. Accordingly, the requirement for the project command to review and revise the 254 as necessary still exists. A complete review is required for all classified contracts at each change of phase or more frequently if directed to be done, except when only reference material is involved, as noted above, and in any event at least once annually. A review is required also at the time of final delivery of goods or services or upon termination of the contract, if at that time a final 254 is to be issued. It should be kept in mind that a final 254 will be required only if authority is granted to retain classified material that is under the classification jurisdiction of the project command, or all such material is ordered to be declassified. A final 254, issued in connection with granting retention authority, must be reviewed at the conclusion of the retention period if at that time an extension of retention authority is granted, or if at that time all material for which retention authority would be required is declassified.

A few minutes ago I stated that the project command does not have any security classification guidance responsibilities for reference material. Consonant with basic classification management policy the responsibility remains with that DOD component having security classification jurisdiction over the information at the time it was originated, or with that component's successor when the responsibility for such information is transferred—such as takes place when

the responsibility for a system is transitioned from the systems program office in the Air Force Systems Command to the system support manager in the Air Force Logistics Command. However, appropriate procedures are established to insure that the contractor receives adequate classification guidance for the reference material. If a contractor desires classification guidance for reference material and cannot identify the responsible DOD activity, he is entitled to seek assistance by direct inquiry, in successive order, to the distribution source from which the material was received, and the project command contracting office. Speaking for the Air Force, if further assistance is needed please contact our office, Headquarters USAF, AFISPPB, in Washington, D.C. I must mention that there is a higher office to provide such assistance—the Security Classification Management Division, Directorate for Security Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administration. However, if the inquiry pertains to an Air Force contract, we would *prefer* that we be given a chance to provide the necessary information.

Let me digress from the 254 for just a minute and mention the related project command's responsibility to review the contractor's need to retain classified material. The Air Force does not consider that there is any difference between reference material and other classified material, as far as retention is concerned. The decision to authorize retention of either or both is strictly dependent on the contractor's need in relationship to future benefits to the Air Force that

could develop from such retention.

Now let us consider the 254 prepared for a subcontractor. In this situation the responsibility is placed upon the prime contractor who must rely on the adequacy of the 254 that was furnished to him by the project command. The necessity of providing detailed and complete guidance for the prime contractor is obvious when it is realized that the guidance received by the subcontractor must be extracted therefrom. The more complex the system, the more important the guidance for the prime contract. The DOD places the responsibility for reviewing the subcontract 254 on the administrative contracting officer. The Air Force, however, allows the ACO to send the guidance to the project officer for review prior to approval and distribution.

It should be recognized that if problems develop, the ACO does not have the authority to resolve the issue. Instead, the ACO is charged with referring the matter to the procurement contracting officer for consideration and resolution by the program/project/system manager. The relationship of a first-tier subcontractor to a subcontractor is essentially the same as that of a prime contractor to a first-tier subcontractor. During contract negotiations the contractor and the procurement team—contracting officer, scientist, operator, classification management officer, intelligence specialist, etc.—must reach a common understanding of the security classification requirements of the contract. Personnel concerned must be assured that the contractor knows *what* is to be protected, *who* will do the pro-

protecting and *how long* the protection will be required. Conversely, at this time, the contractor also learns the identity of the information that does not have to be safeguarded. My purpose in emphasizing this is that, very often, the contractor will think he understands, or at least will express the idea that he has an understanding, when he doesn't really understand at all. All too often, this lack of understanding results in a security violation or a leak. We hope that by providing more detailed and complete guidance through the attachments to the new 254—mainly in the form of guides—such problems can be prevented. To reach such a goal we need a free and honest interchange of ideas between contractor employees and DOD personnel. Without such interchange, communication is lost, and lack of understanding takes over.

Detailed and complete guidance, which will help erase some of the problems, requires considerable thought and judgment on the part of the responsible personnel. Some basic principles that must be understood by the recipients of the 254 as well as by the preparer are:

1. Overclassification has a detrimental effect upon the efficiency of operations which may negate any technical or operational advantage gained through classification.

2. The public release or disclosure of sensitive information may negate the technical or operational lead time accrued, and thus require a completely fresh start.

3. It is important to continue a security classification indefinitely if

the rationale is purely for technical reasons. Technological advances in research, development, and production methods continually override existing methods. Accordingly, the interface of related programs demands advance planning and modification to insure classification warranted by the ever-changing conditions.

4. Advancements in foreign state-of-the-art provide for the production of similar items, or the development of effective counter-measures and thus negate classification.

5. International governmental agreements, as well as interservice, or interagency agreements, may limit the authority of the project command to direct any changes in classification.

6. The particular phase of the life cycle of hardware is critical to classification. Certainly it must be recognized that classification increases during research and development and then, sometime after acquisition, the process of downgrading and declassification begins.

7. Upon completion of the 254 and prior to dissemination the guidance should be reviewed carefully for: (a) uniformity and consistency of classification of like items; (b) integration of the automatic downgrading-declassification system; (c) adequacy and completeness of guidance; (d) compliance with related directives; and (e) the use of notes or remarks to clarify or assist the user of the 254 in understanding the guidance.

Personnel reviewing a 254 for adequacy need only ask a few questions to determine if the guidance is adequate. For example: Does the 254 identify the specific information re-



quiring protection? Is the classification assigned practical? Feasible? Applicable? Creative thinking and imagination will lead to other worthwhile questions that will help in assuring that the 254 does its job.

A fundamental policy carried over from the old 254 is that the project command is responsible for security classification guidance for a classified contract. The policy of original classifications emanating from the project office is valid for this is the source of the technical knowledge so necessary in preparing guidance. Within the project command the appropriate program, project, or system manager is responsible for the guidance. However, as we all recognize, there are other areas to consider. The technical determination must be tempered by operation, intelligence, and security factors. Within the Air Force, the focal point for policy and coordination of all security classification guidance and regrading and declassification actions is the classification management office. Therefore, the commander for whom the classified contract is negotiated requires the project office to work with classification management personnel to provide and monitor all guidance. Guidance is provided to the contractor by the team representing the project office, classification management, and the contracting officer. Classification management personnel in the project command are responsible for establishing the monitoring system to assure that all security classification guidance in contracts is reviewed for consistency, accuracy, and currency. It has been noted that whenever

commands enjoy close liaison between security and technical personnel the task of providing timely and adequate guidance in the early stages of the contract is more feasible.

As an aid to assure that guidance is complete, whether prepared as a 254 or as a separate guide, we are hoping to develop the idea of having check lists for the various type systems, programs, etc., common to the particular subcommand. The intended purpose of these check lists is to assure that guidance is provided for all aspects of the particular system or program. The check lists could be in the form of one-word or possibly "short phrase" reminders as to what should be considered for classification.

Certainly we recognize that remarks made in the past such as "the DD Forms 254 received are ambiguous, incorrect, and conflict with other security classification directions" have been too numerous. We also are most cognizant of the fact that complete guidance has not always been available at the beginning of the life cycle of a program. We hope these deficiencies are being corrected. The new 254 is one step that has been taken by the DOD to help the people in classification management to reach their objectives. In the words of George MacClain:

"The fundamental objective of the new plan of providing security classification guidance for the defense industry is to assure that the user agencies will assume and fulfill their responsibility in providing classification guidance in the form of an itemized list of specific areas of information, with comprehensive

narrative comment to fill out the individual aspects of each of those areas; to assure the currency of this guidance; and to motivate and facilitate candid, orderly, and objective intercommunication between the parties on both sides of the contract. It is believed that the new plan has significantly clarified the relationship of the parties to a 254, and has reduced the overall administrative burden of preparing, issuing, distributing, and reviewing these documents."

Whether or not the new 254 will become an effective instrument with which to transmit complete and detailed guidance remains to be seen. Certainly the objective of the DOD to provide only meaningful and useful guidance can only be accomplished with the full cooperation of all parties concerned, and a willingness on their part to take a reasonable and objective look at the guidance provided. It certainly is not the intent of the DOD to embarrass the contractor when he wishes to question the project command because of a lack of understanding. Let it be completely understood that questions and discussions to assure intent and understanding are encouraged, and we certainly are not above considering the contractor's

recommendations to improve our guidance. I am sure that you will find all of the DOD components with the same attitude. In this connection, item 11 of the 254 establishes the procedure by which the appropriate personnel in the project command and the contractor or subcontractor may communicate directly. Certainly this communication between industry and DOD is essential to the success of classification management and its endeavors. And we feel very strongly about the role of the team concept in developing improved 254s. The procedures are established, and now it is the responsibility of each of us to work towards the elimination of useless security classification guidance.

Again, I wish to express my appreciation of having an opportunity to convey to you our ideas about the 254 and the progress that the DOD has made in providing better guidance. Although in the past many efforts appeared to be of little value at the time, I believe that the present efforts have been fruitful and that our common goal will be achieved.

*(The stenographic transcription of the question and answer period following Mr. May's presentation was inadequate for use.—Editor.)*

# CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT COST STUDY

By Robert D. Donovan†

This paper describes the results of an intermittent work measurement study made of classified document handling practices in one company over a five-year period. It does not purport to be a definitive study or has it been possible to correlate any of the findings with the experiences of other companies since there is no uniform method for collecting such information. The methods and forms utilized to collect the data contained in this study are only briefly described since the purpose of this paper is to discuss the findings and their implications for the future rather than the mechanics for conducting such a study.

In October 1963, the Air Force Systems Command initiated a security cost survey with a number of defense contractors. The cost survey attempted to encompass a number of security areas including classified document handling practices, hardware, personnel clearances, indoctrination briefing/debriefing sessions, area controls, and the handling of DOD-sponsored meetings, among others, that were applicable to AFSC classified contracts. Identifiable costs were to be expressed in dollar and cent terms.

Since the results of this particular survey were never officially made known to the participating companies, it is presumed that it proved impractical to break out the security

costs on such a wide assortment of topics.

United Technology Center participated in that survey and, on the basis of our own internal study, concluded that the survey questions pertaining to non-document-handling topics could not be answered by us in any meaningful way, particularly since the survey was limited only to AFSC contracts. We did attempt to identify the costs of classified document handling and were somewhat more successful in this area. Standard clerical costs-measuring techniques were applied to our operations and we discovered that by utilizing this method the number of minutes required for some of the different clerical actions could be established. For example, our master document control clerks spend an average of 24 minutes processing an incoming confidential document and 42 minutes for processing a secret document. This includes all of the varied clerical operations, from receipting for the registered or certified mail, assigning control numbers, documenting, and logging to receipt by addressee or classified mail courier. The 18-minute difference in time between a secret and a confidential is caused by the necessity of a secret page count (although not specifically required by the *ISM*) and the preparation of a document receipt form, obtaining signatures, and cross-filing the signed forms by document number and holder. The cited figures are for single documents only. When multi-

†Peter H. Morley, a colleague of Mr. Donovan's at United Technology Center, was co-author of this paper.

ple copies are received or internally reproduced upon receipt the clerical time for documenting each multiple copy is 6 minutes whether the document is secret or confidential. Our experience has been that a secret document will average three internal transfers after receipt before it is forwarded for destruction. This means that each secret document will change hands a total of five times in its life span when you count the initial receipt prepared by master document control and the final receipt transmitting the document back to master document control for destruction. The preparation of a single document receipt, including its signing and cross-filing in a manual system takes an average of 12 minutes. Therefore, each secret document in our collection will consume one hour of clerical time during its lifetime in order to meet the accountability requirements of *ISM*.

In reproducing internally generated classified documents our experience has been that it requires 18 minutes to document the first copy and less than a minute for each multiple copy reproduced. It requires 30 minutes to document a secret document because of the page count and individual receipt requirements, and 6 minutes for each multiple copy. By June 1964 we had even carried our internal work measurement study into the document subcontrol areas and established a number of set "time charges" that could be made for classified document transactions such as generation, reproduction, distribution within the subcontrol station area, between subcontrols, external

transmission and destruction. Each month the subcontrol station custodian would simply total up the number of transactions in each category and multiply it by the predetermined "time charge" and submit a report on the number of hours devoted to handling classified documents.

Note that the emphasis has been on discussing minutes or hours rather than dollars and cents. Quite early in the study we concluded that it would be impractical to try to convert the clerical man hours into dollar figures because it would be an arbitrary figure at best and a gross distortion of the actual situation at worst. Every company differs on what constitutes its labor costs and such figures often vary even within a single company, depending on the number of personnel, number of documents handled, salary level of the clerical personnel assigned to such details, sales volume, salary increases, overhead, season of the year, and other factors that tend to influence the overall financial picture of any company. Therefore, not only would our own dollar cost figures contain inaccuracies, but they would be absolutely meaningless to anyone else dealing with the same problems. However, when translated into measurable units of work it then becomes possible, for the first time, to apply the same standard to many other companies in order to obtain a basis for comparison.

We were still not satisfied with our work because the handling of classified material is only one aspect of the problem. It can be safely said

that if classified document handling is the mother of security costs then storage is the father and the marriage is not necessarily a happy one.

In July 1965, we decided to broaden the base of our cost study by conducting a security container survey. One of the main purposes of the survey was to attempt to establish a standard whereby an employee's claimed need for a security container could be objectively measured. I would like to report that we succeeded in this endeavor, but our findings were somewhat inconclusive. I still find it hard to believe that anyone could get emotionally attached to a security filing cabinet, but we have documented cases to prove this phenomenon is not as uncommon as you might believe. The whole concept of possessing a security container is somehow mixed up with job status, anticipated needs and/or deep-seated anxieties that were beyond the scope of the survey to resolve. However, the container survey did disclose that we could easily accommodate all of our classified documents in less than one-quarter of the security files we have in use at the time. In addition, we found less than 10% of the surveyed files were in use for more than 4 hours a week based upon a total of 40 random checks per container made a 4-week period. We also discovered that over 25% of the classified documents in those files had been in the possession of the holder for 2 years or longer.

It was at this time that we began to realize the impact of our findings upon conventional approaches to establishing security cost standards.

For example, in a standard facility operation the cost of producing a nut or bolt can be determined to a fraction of a mill, and woe betide the production foreman who fails to meet this standard. Such factors as job status, personal convenience, intangible needs or anticipated use have no place in such operations. The inescapable conclusion is that there are very definite limitations on the degree of cost efficiency that can be achieved in the document handling and storage areas of the industrial security program because of the tendency of technical personnel to somehow equate job status with classified document storage capability. Until such time that a cost standard can be developed in which established minimum inventories of current documents and frequency of utilization ratios are recognized there can be no accurate measurement made of the security cost factors. Therefore the only costs that can be measured at the present time are those of "personal convenience," plus security. In other words we can analyze existing practices, but we cannot introduce significant changes based upon those findings at the present time.

This situation is not confined only to classified problems by any means, or is it unique to any one company. The literature is full of various paper work studies that cover everything from the proper length of a letter, the number of copies made, how many are filed and how long they should be retained. A recent authoritative study reported there are now 1.5 quadrillion pieces of paper filed in this country attended by two million

clerks and the inventory is growing at the rate of 62 million file drawers a year. Incidentally, this same study disclosed that the government actually has a better paperwork control record than industry. The government only has 24,000 pieces of paper per employee while industry ranges from 34,000 to 64,000 per employee. However, in this speaker's opinion most of the 64,000 papers on file are there in order to meet existing or anticipated government requirements, such as classified document retention requests.

We are now considering the third phase of our study which will extend into the area of report writing itself because of the classification by paragraph requirement. It may well turn out to be a lifetime study. A cursory examination of the available literature on business and technical writing indicates that again the problem is far larger than that attributable to *JSM* requirements. Recently a consultant on business writing discovered that reports to the president of a major oil company in just one year constituted reading matter three times as long as the King James version of the Bible. Boiled down to essential data these reports lost 60% of their words. Another study pointed to an excess verbiage of 38% in the half million letters a year rolling from the typewriters of a railroad—at an estimated additional \$60,000 in typing costs alone.

The relationship of these studies to technical report writing and classification by paragraph is obvious. There is no reason to believe that science and engineering writers are any less

guilty of using excess verbiage, and there is some reason to believe they are unnecessarily compounding the security classification problem because of it. In actual practice, security classifications are assigned as an *ex post facto* decision. That is to say the report draft is organized and written without regard to the security classification of its contents. All too often the security classification problem is left up to the technical editor to cope with as best he can. However, by that time the report is replete with borderline "association" problems that are difficult or impossible to resolve. It is as if you cut out all of the dirty words and sexual innuendoes in a Norman Mailer novel—there wouldn't be enough paper left to hold the book covers together.

This contemplated survey will attempt to develop a set of ground rules that can be utilized by authors as a guide to better classification. This is no small task since it will involve a basic relearning of report writing techniques as well as the development of more clearly defined classification guidance.

The initial stage of the survey will be to analyze all of the classified paragraphs in a given set of documents and attempt to determine if the material could have been organized in such a manner as to reduce the total number of classified paragraphs and include the classified information in a separate appendix. Based upon our findings internal guidance will then be written specifically for the contract report writing requirements with a view towards encouraging technical personnel to organize their material

with the level of security classification taken into consideration at the outset. This will not solve all of the security classification problems we encounter in our daily work today, but it will help to reduce future inventories.

Declassification of existing documents will always be a slow and pain-

ful process. The only foreseeable hope is to redirect our method of presenting technical data into a more sensible format. This is necessary both from a standpoint of what our requirements are today, and the changes that are being made in the whole concept of information and retrieval by modern computer systems.

## **PANEL—CLASSIFIED RESEARCH IN THE UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT**

**Robert D. Simmons, Stanford University, Moderator**

SIMMONS: This morning's panel is concerned with the problem of classified research within the academic environment. I must admit at the outset that our panel is somewhat loaded inasmuch as all of the institutions here represented accept, within certain parameters, classified research contracts on their campuses. Not all universities are so persuaded. The National Academy of Sciences, also here represented, has been a long-time sponsor of classified programs involving members of the academic community. I believe that our four panelists are uniquely qualified to discuss not only the philosophical question of the appropriateness of such research but to report on some of the problems associated with classified programs and perhaps to suggest some possible solutions to the problems stated. I must include the usual disclaimer that the opinions here expressed do not necessarily reflect the policy positions on these

matters of our participants' parent organizations.

The issue of the propriety of university performance of classified research has been extensively reported in the public press and professional literature over the last several years. I will leave the presentation of the arguments for and against such research to our panelists. I can tell you, however, that the trend against secret research has been spurred to a large degree by opposition to the Vietnam war and war-related research. Discussions relating to the Vietnam conflict have resulted in Michigan State dropping CIA-sponsored research after an expose by *Ramparts* magazine; the University of Pennsylvania canceling projects relating to chemical and biological warfare, after professors threatened to wear gas masks to commencement exercises; and what amounted to the closing of Columbia University over, in part, the question of defense-sponsored re-

search on the campus. Within recent months, my own institution, Stanford University, has had a dollar loss in excess of \$100,000 in the burning of our President's office and NROTC buildings. The arson has been attributed to the anti-war activists. Many colleges and universities have recently reexamined the general question of classified research on the campus.

**W. M. SANDSTROM**  
**University of Washington**

The laboratory I represent, like many similar establishments, is a creature of World War II of a sort never seen before then, set up in haste for the purpose of solving a pressing wartime problem. This problem was the abysmal performance of the Navy's torpedoes in the Pacific theater, a problem that plagued the Pacific submarine fleet until nearly the end of the war, and which without a doubt prolonged the war by many months and caused many needless losses. It is now a matter of record that the reasons why the Navy's torpedoes performed so poorly all relate more or less directly to the isolation that existed between the main stream of physical and engineering research carried on for the most part in the nation's universities, and the Navy's own weapon development program, which before the war was in the hands of well-intentioned, righteous, but quite incompetent people at both the technical and administrative levels. Furthermore, the Navy's development programs were the victims of an emasculating pre-war economy

policy which prevented adequate testing, and finally was larded over by such thick layers of secrecy that the torpedo's inadequacy was quite effectively concealed even from the Navy's own commanders.

Unfortunately, this isolation continued well into the war, with the highest priorities for scientific attention going to the atom bomb effort, to radar, and to the proximity fuse. All the while the Navy's torpedoes were failing to explode, or were prematurely exploding, or running erratically, to the point where the submarine fleet was actually forced to develop its own instrumentation and start its own experimental program in the war zone to the great consternation and embarrassment of Navy headquarters. Out of this situation was born the Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington, 25 years ago, and it has been to prevent a repetition of that situation that the Navy has supported us to this day.

Out of similar situations, a vast program of federally supported research at universities has sprung up, academia and government have embraced each other with the zeal of true believers all across the country. But times change and faces change and attitudes change and it appears that the lessons learned in World War II are being lost as new problems, new perspectives and new priorities tend to obscure the old realities. These factors, combined with a scattering of publicized incongruities have tended to discredit classified activities at universities, a tendency which in my opinion must be resist-



ed if history is not to be repeated.

Now this is, of course, not a problem to be disposed of in a 15-minute paper. An effective rebuttal to the critics of university classified research is a long term project, so what I intend to do here is to outline the ideas which I think should be developed for this rebuttal and give a few suggestions as to how.

My point in recalling to you this vignette of wartime history is to reintroduce the idea that in doing classified research, university laboratories, as institutions, have provided the nation a unique and necessary service, which government laboratories and private industry cannot be depended on to provide, a function that is consistent with the principle that a university's purpose is to serve the public.

The basic argument should be, that however large the program of research in government laboratories or in private industry may become, a policy which separates universities from classified research will expose the nation to the historical dangers of the past. The government is always in danger of unintentionally insisting on a research program which leads its laboratories in the wrong direction. History records this very event only 25 years ago. Private industry on the other hand cannot be expected to suppress its commercial competitive instinct, and will deliberately build a road to nowhere if that is what the government specifies. The university as an institution can provide the check on this tendency.

This is the first basic idea which I

think should be developed into the argument. The argument must not be carried to extremes however; neither the university nor any non-profit institution should attempt to compete with the legitimate and efficient functions of private industry.

However, this idea alone I doubt will be sufficient. It would also be most desirable to be able to show that the conduct of classified research actually benefits the university in its traditional educational role, that the advantages of doing such research outweigh the disadvantages, and that the university would be worse off without the classified research. Here I think my laboratory may be in a better position to make a case than many others, my principal reason being that so far, really serious confrontations have been avoided. I would like to take a minute to review the circumstances which I think must at least be partly responsible for our past lack of difficulty. I would also express the pious hope that these circumstances will keep us out of further trouble, but I'll refrain from making that a prediction.

Not that we avoided criticism altogether. On the contrary, the conduct of classified research by the University of Washington has been criticized by members of both the faculty and the student body, with charges ranging in intensity from outright immorality to mere inappropriateness. But these criticisms have been sporadic and usually couched in generalities, and have not yet brought on the confrontation.

I'd like now to list the circumstances that so far have apparently

prevented any interference with APL's classified work.

1. Being entirely concerned with undersea warfare, APL work has had no connection with Viet Nam. Although we take no pride in this almost accidental circumstance, this I believe has tended to minimize the more impassioned public outbursts. We have not suffered the shock of having our motives publicly impugned.

2. APL has throughout its history practiced academic apartheid, in that no APL classified programs are the subject of student or faculty research and there has been no interaction with normal departmental activity on classified topics. On the other hand, consultation with and occasional employment of the faculty has been readily available, and is an important part of the laboratory's policy.

3. A sizable fraction of the APL programs, although Navy-supported and weapon-related, is not classified, and by happenstance, much of this work is in the field of underwater acoustics, which is neglected at most universities—including our own—so that any faculty fear of encroachment into classified areas has had no reason to exist.

4. There has been voluntary restraint on size and on publicity. We have never had more than 200 employees, and the APL contract is small compared to the total of federal funds at the University of Washington. By the same token, APL does not often splash the academic puddle, so that classified research has never been conspicuous.

There are not many university lab-

oratories that share all of these attributes and we are very glad to be able to claim them.

But none of these circumstances can be used to justify classified research at universities in an affirmative way. They are all disclaimers. Arguments should be forthcoming which support the idea that classified research, properly administered, is not merely an obligation, but is appropriate at universities, and instead of stultifying the academic climate, actually benefits it. This is a more difficult task, but there are some circumstances which make it possible to develop such an argument at the University of Washington, in a non-trivial way, and, I believe, without the appearance of simple defensive reaction.

1. Classified research brings new fields of competence to the university. This idea has particular relevance at UW because of the emergence of ocean science as an essential national program. UW has had great strength in oceanography and other earth sciences, but has been weak in underwater acoustics and in ocean engineering. With the appearance of the multi-disciplinary sea grant college program, with its emphasis on applications, the UW was far better able to respond, by capitalizing the special talents at APL. There are other examples.

2. Classified research brings unique facilities.

Again I mention our underwater acoustic program, which requires and has generated very specialized instrumentation in the form of floating platforms (barges, buoys, "vertical

ships"), underwater tracking ranges, navigation systems and the like. All these facilities are directly applicable to a university fisheries program, for example.

### 3. Sharpening faculty skills.

We employ faculty members in the summer time for the help they can bring our projects, but the reverse is also true. Faculty members have often joined us so as to catch up in fields which classified research emphasizes, particularly the revolutionary ones such as the transistorization and computerization of complex electronic systems, or those with a military-industrial orientation, such as reliability engineering or systems engineering. These are subjects which an engineering faculty must be familiar with.

### 4. The enhancement of the university's reputation for public service.

This is an important as any, but right now for many well-known reasons universities must adopt a defensive attitude when classified research is discussed. The time will come, however, when the present hysteria will focus elsewhere, and the universities will again be anxious to bring their classified contributions to good account.

These are a few ways then that classified research may benefit a university. It is my hope that such arguments will increase in number and in their power to convince with further refinement. Any large scale university isolation from classified research would be bad for the nation. I believe we can also demonstrate that it would be bad for the universities.

## JOHN P. GILLIS

### National Academy of Sciences

From the topic of this panel, Classified Research in the University Environment, one may question the relationship of the National Academy of Sciences to the university environment. While the Academy is a well known national institute in the scientific community, its affiliation with the university environment, particularly in the field of classified research, might be better appreciated if I were to explain its organization and relationship with government and the universities.

The National Academy of Sciences was created in 1863 as a private organization with a federal charter. It has two principal objectives, (1) to foster the orderly development of science and its uses for human welfare, and (2) to advise the federal government, on request and without fee, on matters relating to science and engineering. In addition, it is also called upon frequently to nominate qualified individuals to important federal positions involving science and engineering.

The membership of the Academy is presently comprised of 750 distinguished scientists and engineers. Starting with an original membership of fifty, advisory groups and committees organized by the Academy were primarily drawn from its limited memberships.

In 1916, however, in response to President Wilson's request for help in dealing with the scientific and technical problems created by World War I, the Academy created the National Research Council as part of its struc-

ture. The National Research Council served a double purpose of encouraging a broader participation by American scientists and engineers in the Academy's service to the nation, and to assist a more pressing problem of the time—mobilizing scientific talent to aid the Government in its war effort.

The members of the National Research Council are divided into eight divisions—behavioral sciences, biology and agriculture, chemistry and chemical technology, earth sciences, engineering, mathematical sciences, medical sciences, and physical sciences.

Nominations for membership are made by affiliated scientific and engineering societies, by heads of departments or agencies of the federal government or by the Chairman of one of the divisions of the council. Appointments are normally for three year terms and are made by the President of the Academy in his capacity as chairman of the National Research Council.

Although members of the National Research Council are nominated by scientific and technical societies or agencies they are not considered as instructed delegates of their societies or agency. Rather, they are expected to contribute to the work of their respective divisions in such a way as their individual scientific, technical or other competencies may suggest.

The 450 active boards, committees and panels of the Council now involve a membership of about 5000 scientists and engineers. Since its membership embraces all the natural sciences, engineering, medical sciences

and agriculture, the Academy enjoys a unique opportunity to participate on most problems of national interest. Of those committees now involved in DOD classified research a recent survey revealed that approximately seventy percent of the participants are faculty members of major universities. The Academy has on its rolls over 750 scientists and engineers cleared for classified work who give their services without financial compensation.

The National Academy of Sciences' history is replete with examples of activities involving national defense. Some of its earlier programs include anti-submarine measures, optical measures for secret signaling, elimination of balloon explosion, pressure wave phenomena about the muzzle of a large gun, development of anti-aircraft fire control devices and many others leading up to present day problems of space, undersea warfare, and nuclear science.

For the most part, the activities of the Academy are initiated as a result of its statutory role as an official yet independent advisor to the government. At present, the Academy is conducting a variety of services at the request and/or support of most of the major branches of the government.

While most of the Academy's programs are government-sponsored, a substantial number of activities are supported by private funds. The principal asset of the Academy, though, is the devoted effort of the several thousand scientists and engineers. The significant role they play is exemplified by the 3000-odd meetings

and studies conducted during the past year.

It is hoped that this sketch has given you some appreciation of the Academy's close affiliation and relationship with our government and the academic community.

There are two particular areas of interest involving security I would like to discuss. The first involves security classification. In a majority of our classified projects, classification guidance via the DD Form 254, etc., evolves in much the same procedure as it does for other institutions. Occasionally, though, in its role as advisor to other than DOD activities the Academy is requested to participate in research areas that involve classified technology which offers great national promise in many non-military activities.

One of the most recent and probably most publicized cases in which the Academy became involved was a classification review of "Airborne Passive Scanning Infrared Imaging Systems." The problems confronting non-military agencies were that remote sensing equipment using infrared and radar, and the great bulk of the imagery taken with such equipment, was classified. This made it very difficult to find out just how this equipment could be used and how effective it might be in many non-military activities such as forest fire detection, water pollution, crop disease surveys, and petroleum exploration to name a few. For those of you interested in the details of this case, it has been well documented by Mr. Don Garrett in the September 1967 issue of *Defense Indus-*

*trial Bulletin*. More important than the details of this particular case is an understanding of the Academy's participation in this classification review. First it is important to dispel any misconception that the Academy, as a national scientific institution, is not sympathetic to the government's security classification program. The history of the Academy's role and leadership in some of our most highly classified programs has more than demonstrated its firm belief and acknowledgement of the needs for sound security programs to protect scientific and technological advancements.

Classification, though, is a two-way street, and we all recognize that restrictions applied to a militarily useful technological advancement tend to slow further progress in that particular area. More important though, needless delays in dissemination of technical knowledge deprives other segments of our society of important advances as they strive to contribute to the national strength and the welfare of our citizens. An example of this concern was recently expressed by D. S. Simonett, Associate Professor of Geography of the University of Kansas. In a discussion on the economy of surveys by use of new scanning techniques, he stated, "for broad scale resource studies, it would be possible for the island of Puerto Rico to be imaged with a modern synthetic aperture system in a day or so, almost independent of weather. To obtain adequate photography would take at least several months and possibly as long as a year." The obvious cost benefits in terms of dol-

lars are readily recognized but other benefits as great or probably greater to our national interest are not quite as obvious to the uninitiated and need to be fully explored. This is particularly necessary if we are to consider a possible trade-off for some acceptable degree of declassification.

Another area that is of particular concern to persons involved in non-military national programs is the exclusive right that DOD has taken in the final determination to classify or to declassify. As might be expected, difficulties arise when an official of DOD is placed in a position of weighing the pros and cons of secrecy concerning the vital interests of non-military agencies. If these fears can be dispelled by the creation of a wider forum to evaluate the merits of each case, it may reduce the possibility of important national decisions being made in isolation rather than in an atmosphere of enlightened dialogue. It has been the goal of the Academy to assist, when requested, in this dialogue.

These problems are not only vitally important to non-military activities, but are also understood and appreciated to a degree by the DOD as illustrated in their Directive 5210.4, dated 31 December 1964, which states:

"In certain circumstances, it may be necessary to weigh the benefits which would accrue to the United States generally from the unclassified use by other government agencies or commercial interest of information which is classified or otherwise classifiable under Executive Order 10501, against the mili-

tary or technological advantage which would be gained or retained by classification or continued classification of the information. Where a net advantage to the United States distinctly can be ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt, that factor should be considered in reaching the classification determination. In such a case final determination to withhold classification or to declassify shall be made only by the Secretary of Defense.

It is within the context of this policy and these problems that the Academy, serving as scientific advisor and in some cases as a member of working committees, has attempted to contribute.

The second topic involving security that I wish to discuss concerns classified research in the academic or university environment. As we are all aware there has been considerable publicity from some elements of the academic community regarding their displeasure and doubts concerning classified research on campus, and in some cases, participation in such programs off campus.

Since a large percentage of the members on the classified committees within the Academy come from university faculties, one might wonder if there has been a reaction from this group. To the best of my knowledge no reaction has resulted. The number of cleared consultants has remained approximately the same with an actual slight increase during the past twelve months. Another indicator is the status of the individual consultant. As you may be aware,

consultants are designated in three different types—A, B, and C. Each of these letters indicates a different relationship in the handling of classified research material. Type A may only have access to classified material on the premises of the Academy. Types B and C may be permitted access off the premises of the Academy. The basic difference between types B and C is that Type B is individually responsible for the complete handling of classified material—receiving, logging, storing, etc.—whereas Type C may use the facility of their university or company. When a member of the academic community becomes affiliated with the Academy in connection with a classified project for obvious reasons we attempt to establish a Type C consultant relationship with his university. During the past year the number of consultant agreements with approximately forty-five major universities throughout the country has not been noticeably influenced.

There are probably two basic reasons for this continued support by the academic community. First, all participants are volunteers and after being officially nominated serve at their own personal pleasure. The second reason is more complex and in my opinion relates to the motivation for public service.

Recently Dr. Seitz, President of the National Academy of Sciences, addressed the members on this sensitive subject. His statement is published in the June-July *News Report* of the Academy and is entitled "The Individual and Public Service." I would like to quote some pertinent excerpts

that express his opinion on the role of the Academy and the individual's right to dissent.

"The most fundamental source of our strength rests upon our Congressional Charter of 1863, which places upon us the responsibility to advise our government upon request . . . Although the Charter underscores our free and private nature it seems to me personally that it inevitably places constraints upon us which we cannot fail to recognize if we are to remain effective in this partnership. As individuals we will inevitably have private views of the actions and policies of our government on countless issues, big and small. Indeed our personal views may, from time to time, make it difficult, or even impossible, for us as individuals to work in full cooperation with one or more parts of our government. This is natural and understandable and is perhaps an essential feature of the democratic process since it may permit an individual to express dissident views more freely. I believe, however, that if the Academy is to retain its effectiveness in the long run, it would be disastrous if we were to permit personal views to impede the Academy's response to responsible government officers when they turn to us for help."

From my personal association with many members of the academic community participating in classified projects I firmly believe their motivation for public service will prevail and they will continue to support the

classified research needs of their government.

In most cases I believe this support will continue in the environment of their universities. For those caught in the current turmoil and denied this privilege, I believe the goal should be to provide them the facilities and resources needed to insure that the country continues to benefit from the efforts of these dedicated academicians.

**JAMES T. WILSON**  
**The University of Michigan**

The last two years have seen a painful reexamination by many universities of their position regarding classified research. Unquestionably the deep concern of the academic community with the involvement of our country in Southeast Asia has initiated this examination. However, in the twenty-plus years that have passed since World War II, concern with the increasing involvement of universities in "action programs," a small but not insignificant rise of anti-science sentiment, and, perhaps, even the tightening of research money from Washington, have set the stage.

The University of Michigan has just completed such a reexamination involving the full dress of demonstrations, public meetings, long deliberation by a committee of the academic senate, student referenda, faculty resolutions, and final action by the assembly of the academic senate and the board of regents. This procedure, more orderly than might be inferred from the listing above, has reaffirmed the appropriateness of some classified

research in the university environment.

This morning I intend to review briefly a little of the history of classified research at The University of Michigan, and particularly the re-examination that we have just gone through, and discuss the arguments that I think were most convincing in the faculty committee that came out with a rather lengthy report that then was the subject of academic senate and regental action.

Like all other universities, The University of Michigan first became involved with classified research during World War II. However, unlike many other universities, there were not very many active laboratories at Ann Arbor and many of us that were on the faculty went off to government laboratories or to other universities.

It was not really until after the end of World War II that Michigan became definitely involved. The first real involvement was with the establishment of the Willow Run Laboratories at the close of the war. The Laboratories have gone through a long list of large programs—Bomarc, Wizard (which was one of the earlier air defense systems), and Project Michigan.

The main bulk of classified research at the university has always been at these laboratories, although there has always been a considerable amount of classified research within the regular teaching departments; and in some cases, projects have moved back and forth between the research laboratories and the teaching departments, as people have moved back



and forth from faculty to research positions.

About five or six years ago, the Willow Run Laboratories began shifting from support by one or two large contracts to support by a rather large number of smaller contracts centered around the general areas of radar, infrared, geophysics, and things that primarily relate to remote sensing of the environment—a field that in the last few years has become of tremendous interest to many of the civilian agencies. These laboratories are an integral part of the university, not separate entities like Lincoln Laboratories or AJPL.

I think perhaps the growth at Ann Arbor of a rather large university laboratory system was, in part, because of lack of local consulting opportunities for the engineering and science faculties. However, as usual, as a result of research activity in the university, a large number of research-based companies have appeared in Ann Arbor. Just the other day we were compiling the development of the spin-off companies, and were able to count down the third level of spin-offs in some fifteen years.

Now for many years the university faculty has had some concerns about this activity. The first concerns, which came about 1956, were not related to the classified research aspect, particularly, but more to the research that was being done—the quality that a university should have—and classification entered into the discussion only as a source of potential difficulty in making sure that the research was worthy. It was decided that it

was worthy and the university would continue the activity, and my first involvement with classified research at The University of Michigan came as a member of the faculty committee that went through that examination in 1956 and 1957.

But in the last two years, classified research at The University of Michigan has been subject to the same scrutiny that it has at many other universities. This started originally with concern on the part of some of the members of the student body, obviously inspired by their concerns about Vietnam. The concern then became a major concern of many of the faculty and resolutions began to appear in the faculty meetings of various schools and colleges.

The University of Michigan has a rather well organized faculty legislative structure that starts out with an academic senate, which includes all the faculty members that have the rank of assistant professor or higher. Then there is an elected body from the Senate of 60 or so members, apportioned through the various schools and colleges with some members at large. And finally, there is a small body, I think of 17 members, the Senate Advisory Committee, which meets weekly and enacts various resolutions and serves as a sounding board for the administration.

There is a well established committee structure within this assembly, senate, and the senate committee hierarchy, and there is an active committee on research policy.

This committee immediately took up the problem and went into long

deliberations. They probably met for a total of some two hundred hours over a period of some six months. It is a broad-based committee with actually a little smaller representation from science than those of us in the science field might desire, because I sometimes think we forget that research goes to history, sociology, and Romance languages as well. This isn't solely a science committee.

The committee came out with a report. The report was a unanimous report. There was no minority opinion filed. The report came out with a series of conclusions and guidelines for classified research. Many of you, I think, have seen the report. I neglected to pick up a copy to bring with me, so I can't read the precise wording of their recommendations, but they concluded that indeed there was a good deal of classified research that was appropriate and desirable in universities.

They did rule out research that dealt with what one might call immediate weapon systems, and they did rule out classified work overseas that involved anything that might be called operational or have contact with the military of other countries; and they did rule out contracts where the university could not publicly name the agency that was sponsoring the work. As a matter of fact, this has always been a university requirement, but we had the unfortunate experience of entering into a contract that started out unclassified and ended up classified, with even the name of the agency classified, too

late for us to turn it down because we had the work half done.

They did make a strong recommendation that universities take a firmer stand in making sure that the classification was really necessary. In many cases contracts and reports could probably be unclassified, with the same work done; and in the case of reports, perhaps most could be unclassified but there would be a classified appendix.

Fortunately, a number of us involved in classified research at The University of Michigan had taken stands of this sort in the recent past and, in fact, it is rather significant that the report quotes at length from a statement of this sort that originated at the Willow Run Laboratories.

Now, the committee, I am sure, went through all the usual arguments in coming to their conclusions, and I think there are basically three arguments that come up in discussions of this sort.

There is the argument of academic freedom. Amongst many other things academic freedom means that a faculty man has the right to work on what he wants to. I think, in discussing this argument, the committee did not take the same approach that we would take, or perhaps the faculty of an engineering school would take. The way they turned the arguments in their deliberations, I am fairly sure, was that faculty members in many fields are going to be involved in classified research, whether the university actually has contracts that are classified or not. I always find it

rather interesting to meet, in the halls of the Pentagon, faculty friends of mine from the so-called "pure" universities that have no classified contracts. I don't know how they got there, but I still find them wandering up and down the halls.

So, faculties are clearly going to be involved in many of these areas and I think the committee concluded that in many cases it was better for the man to have a contract and to do the work at the university—thus getting some support money for graduate students and some facilities for the university—rather than be gone two days a week consulting with some government committee or sitting on a chair in Washington.

There are some rather strong words in the committee report about some of the schools that pretend they don't have classified research when they really do.

Another argument is one that I think most of us would put in terms of duty—public duty, patriotic duty. The committee spoke mainly in terms of how the academic community must stay involved with the government; that it must not isolate itself from the government; and that if, indeed, the university faculties are suspicious of what they call the military establishment, one way to at least feel more comfortable is to have more involvement with it. I think a rather appealing argument with the committee was the fact that universities, as public institutions and representing, in our opinion, an important segment of our society, should have an appropriate

involvement with all parts of the government.

I don't think that the argument that classified research furnishes facilities, student support, and the opportunity for faculty members to keep in the forefront of many of the engineering and science developments weighed heavily with the committee. It had weight with them, but I think the two other arguments perhaps had more weight because of their philosophical nature.

It was rather interesting to watch the self-education of the committee. There were only, I think, two people on the committee that had ever had very much to do with classified research. In fact, a number of the members of the committee had never had anything to do with any grant or contract research and they started out with a lot of misconceptions. However, they educated themselves very rapidly.

One of the things they discovered early was that classification was not quite as restrictive as they had thought initially. I had them coming back to me two or three times to verify the information that at an annual classified radar symposium we have been conducting there is usually a registered attendance of over 700 people. They started out with the feeling that classified reports were read by only three or four people and that no one else would ever see them. By and large, quite a good part of the classified research that comes out of university laboratories is widely read and there is a peer judgement.

They started out not knowing that

in many cases a contract will be classified only because of one piece of equipment, or because the principal investigator and some of his colleagues must have access to classified reports even though they don't intend to produce any of their own.

The laboratory I am most involved in professionally has had continuing support for about ten years in the nuclear test detection field. The contracts have always been classified because of the need for access to classified information. However, despite the fact that a large number of reports have been produced by the lab, not a single one has been classified in all those years.

This sort of education was very illuminating to the faculty and I think by the time they had educated themselves in some of these respects, many of their initial concerns about the secrecy aspect of research went out.

There are still many concerns in the faculty of The University of Michigan. Some of their concerns, those that relate to classified projects that get involved right in the bosom of a department or share a laboratory used for teaching, I share with them. This is difficult. You want your research laboratories close to the campus so that the students can work at them and use the equipment. On the other hand, if you have them right in the university building in the central campus, you do raise quite a few problems of propriety. We are hoping to move much of the work from our Willow Run Laboratories, which are about fifteen miles from campus, closer in. But I doubt that we will move them

right into the teaching buildings. In other words, it is an option on the part of the faculty members and students as to whether they wish to work in a classified laboratory or not, and they should not, I think, have to be bothered by having to go to labs in a building where a lot of doors are closed to them.

The report and recommendations of the committee were passed, not unanimously, but by a very large vote of the senate assembly. The committee which was recommended in the research policy committee report to screen classified proposals, not for technical desirability but for university propriety, has been appointed. This has just happened. The committee has not yet assembled, and I have not taken my first proposal to them. I think this committee will have a lot of self-education to do, although it does contain a few members of the research policy committee.

It is my expectation that this faculty committee will very quickly establish a body of common law, and those of us who have to worry about taking proposals to them will really know in advance with considerable certainty what their action is going to be. Maybe they will get into difficulty and we will get into a lot of delays, but I rather doubt it. I think this will probably be a fairly orderly process.

We are continuing to try to work with the Department of Defense agencies to avoid classification where it is not necessary because I think it saves all of us time and money when we can do that.

I am a little disappointed, I might

say, that some other of our sister universities dropped classified research quite as precipitously as they did. I think if they had gone through the orderly review procedure, they might come out with the same conclusions we did at The University of Michigan. Thank you.

**C. J. SHOENS**  
**Stanford University**

I would like to add my comments to those of the other members of the panel on a subject which is of concern to me—the difficulty in continued participation in classified research in the university.

The Systems Techniques Laboratory at Stanford, of which I am a member, has been engaged in a program of electronics research including classified defense electronics since around 1953. It has been an effective program, I believe, one that has supported the professional interests of faculty members, has trained many students, and, at the same time, has been important to the national defense effort. The necessity for such a program has seemed clear for many years.

Times have changed, however. The nature of international conflict has changed and the immediate, dramatic threat of the cold war does not seem as real to many today as it once did. Not too long ago, families were preparing their own bomb shelters, stockpiling food, and keeping bags packed and automobile gas tanks filled against the possibility of a nuclear attack. That sense of urgency is no longer with us—whether because the threat has subsided or because we have become accustomed to it, I don't

know. At any rate, this change in attitude, coupled with the dissension over the Viet Nam conflict, have prompted reexamination of the role of classified research in the university.

As discussions have taken place there have emerged three separate parties, each with its own goals and motivations: the university, the sponsor, and the security program.

The university has always been concerned *primarily* with scholarly research and the training of students. In classified research, the sponsor is an agency of the government. The motivation of government agencies in supporting research in the university is to extend the limits of knowledge essential to their particular role—in the case of the Department of Defense, national defense. The third party, the security organization, represents a multiplicity of offices that reside in each of the services, plus DCASR, a DOD agency outside the purview of each of the military branches. All of the security organizations are concerned with protecting information whose indiscriminate release would be detrimental to the welfare of the country.

The goals of each of these organizations are *not* identical and in fact are to some extent conflicting. I see these three goals as partially overlapping circles, like the Ballantine Beer trademark. The overlapping area, that is those elements of the goals of the three organizations which is common, represents the reason-for-being for classified research at the university.

We can all see an increasing polarization in our society, and certainly the universities have had their share. Dr. Wilson has spoken of the strong

differences of opinion that have been found at the University of Michigan in which members of the Academic Senate have argued strongly for an examination of the conflict between certain of the university's goals and the constraints imposed by classification. Similar discussions have taken place at Stanford, and, so far, the sense of the discussions has been that classified research at Stanford is appropriate, subject to certain guidelines. These have been set forth by the subcommittee on classified research in the following five general rules:

(1) No research on a thesis or dissertation should be undertaken if, at the time the topic is set, there is any substantial possibility that it will lead to a classified thesis or dissertation.

(2) No classified thesis or dissertation should be accepted as the basis for a degree unless the imposition of classification could not reasonably have been foreseen until the work was so far advanced that modification of the thesis topic would have resulted in substantial inequity to the student.

(These first two discourage classified theses and dissertations.)

(3) Scholarly activities not accessible for scrutiny by the entire advisory board should not be considered in connection with appointments, reappointments, or promotions of the academic staff.

(4) The university should enter no contract and accept no grant that involves the collection of social or behavioral data in a foreign country and requires the security

clearance of any person involved in the project.

(5) The university should enter into no contract and accept no grant to carry out research under circumstances that restrain the freedom of the university to disclose (a) the existence of the contract or grant or (b) the general nature of the inquiry to be conducted or (c) the identity of the outside contracting or granting entity.

These rules, and the underlying press for open research, exert a force tending to pull the ring which represents the university's goals in a direction that reduces the common area supporting classified research in the university.

Turning to the second ring which represents the interests of the research sponsor, there are differences of opinion between the technical contracting officer and the researcher as to the tasks to be undertaken. We have been successful in finding matches between these two interests which result in a research program appropriate to the university. It's not automatic—we refuse *many* requests from the sponsor on the basis that the tasks they have in mind are not appropriate to the university—that they can better be done by industry. But there *is* a mechanism for examining the nature of these research tasks and arriving at a mutually beneficial program.

Turning to the third ring, representing security's interests, I would like to suggest that there are forces that pull on the ring representing security goals that tend to further reduce this area of commonality. It is this particular aspect with which members of NCMS are likely to be

strongly concerned—questions of policy, procedures, and practice that will have a lasting and important effect on the continuing involvement of universities in classified research.

The possibility of a strong force being exerted by security organizations has been increased by the comparatively recent formation of a separate organization of the government whose sole mission or charter is security. In previous times, security was taken care of by offices of the sponsor as perhaps a sort of auxiliary function to the research carried out for the sponsor. Problems, as they arose, were handled in an informal and flexible but effective manner. It's no longer clear that this duality of interest still exists, and in fact it's more likely that an organization dedicated *primarily* to security will institute increasingly stronger control over release of information and the manner in which we carry out our research. It would be difficult to do otherwise when this organization is staffed with conscientious and industrious members.

One of the fundamental problems that we face in engineering is measuring or judging the effectiveness of some course of action. Security organizations face a similar problem—that of measuring the effectiveness of security procedures. It might seem that if one wished to do a good job in security, then increasingly restrictive constraints should be applied to the handling of classified material and the dissemination of information, to make it unlikely that unauthorized disclosure can take place. But how can one know when adequate measures have been imposed? How can one grade a system to tell whether it's

doing well or poorly? I am afraid that there are no absolute measures available, and one is tempted to press for increasingly stronger controls. Unfortunately these same controls that improve security also tend to be in conflict with many of the long standing policies of the university, and, indeed, with some of the needs and desires of the sponsor. Further, they represent an increasing source of irritation to the individual researcher.

Note that this is quite different from the relationship between industrial organizations and their sponsors. It's easier for industry to find large areas of overlap in which classified activities represent an appropriate and profitable part of the company's business.

Free dissemination of information has always been a tradition of the university, and with good reason. The reputation of a university research program is founded in no small part on the quality of the research, as evidenced primarily by reports. This quality is *assured* through critical review of results by the researcher's peers. To the extent that the dissemination of reports is restricted, this university goal is thwarted.

Another aspect of increasingly numerous security constraints is the accumulation of many, sometimes small, individual effects which together make it increasingly difficult to pursue classified topics. Now, this is a difficult thing to document, and attempts to do so appear to be nit-picking concern with trivial details. They do add up, however, and the resulting effect can be a gentle but continued force that pushes the university researcher more and more toward un-

classified topics. This is not an abstract argument, it is not a hypothetical concern with something which could conceivably happen, it is an effect that we have already observed in our own research program in electronics at Stanford. In some ways it might be better if this were a more cataclysmic event, whose consequence one could point to and make a strong case for opposing. But that is not the case, and it's more likely that one day we shall suddenly discover that the amount of our classified research is negligibly small, *not* as a result of some conscious decision but rather because of a conglomeration of several small effects over a long period of time.

At the risk of appearing to present a list of trivia, let me mention some examples of conflicts between university goals and security demands.

There has been a recent statement from the DOD that classification should be held to the lowest possible level, and the university certainly applauds this. However, we have seen the adoption of distribution statements which, allegedly for reasons other than security, restrict the distribution of reports. We have had experience with some of our sponsors in which the security levels have been kept as low as is reasonable, but the use of overly restrictive distribution statements has resulted in the same limited distribution of reports.

We have encountered problems with cumulative classification in which, for example, lists of our unclassified report titles are considered to be classified. This is seen also in the recent classification of the TABs which include only unclassified titles

and abstracts. I think that it would be useful to have a classification level below confidential which recognizes that some material should be put away when not in use and should not be indiscriminately distributed but is otherwise not accountable.

Discussions with others engaged in similar research is essential to our program. There is a continuing tendency toward compartmentalization of projects and programs, and restrictions on need-to-know that make it difficult to have these discussions.

Attention is being given to the processing of data on digital computers in unclassified computation centers with the concern that classified information may be revealed. One proposal that has been made—a flat prohibition—is unreasonable. The use of properly coded labels and parameter identifiers can make it *extremely* difficult for someone unfamiliar with the computer program to deduce the nature of the computations. Anyone who has had to take over a program coded by another programmer is well aware of the difficulties in trying to understand someone else's program. Requirements for electromagnetic shielding of the machine and auxiliary equipment and security clearances for the operators are not necessary to safeguard the security of the project. The use of good judgment in writing the program can safeguard security and still let us get the processing done.

The Department of Defense has recommended downgrading of reports where the material need no longer be protected, and this again would seem to be in agreement with university goals. However, once more the pro-



cedures required to do so are time consuming when cases must be made to the government agency for a decision. I notice that just recently an attempt is being made to place authorization for such decisions in the hands of the researcher and his organization, and this seems to me to be a laudable development. It is not widespread as yet, however, and this trial case may effect a change of policy in the future.

We have noticed an increasing practice of making accountable working papers, memoranda, calculations, etc., which are an important part of the researcher's file. This is a natural consequence of a desire to tighten up security practices, but it does represent a pressure on the researcher either to stretch a point in declaring the papers unclassified, or to destroy many portions of his file which are important in the development of his work. It represents a reliance on book-keeping and records that used to reside in the good judgment of the researcher, and that many of us felt was adequate.

Another problem that the researcher faces is in determining the classification of his work. This has become increasingly difficult and time consuming with the requirement for paragraph marking of reports, memoranda, letters, etc. The guidelines set forth in the industrial security manual and the DD254 form are really inadequate when it comes to making decisions on such details. In general, we need better guidelines for determining the classification of both written material and equipment.

The possibility that concerns all of us, I believe, is that, as these continu-

ing polarizing forces act, the justification or even motivation for continuing university involvement could decrease to the point where this involvement would be terminated. I personally feel that this would be an unfortunate development since, like many others in the applied sciences and engineering fields, I feel that the university should be strongly involved in those problems that affect our society.

This, of course, is not a universal feeling and Clark Kerr in his book "The Uses of a University" traces two divergent opinions as to the purpose of the university and the extent to which it should be caught up in society's activities. On the one side, there are those who see the university as a sanctuary where scholarly activities can be pursued without the turmoil associated with pressing problems of the day. Others see the university as being strongly involved with our society, molding opinion, and providing leadership in national affairs. This latter viewpoint is subscribed to by many in applied sciences and engineering, but it is interesting to see a stronger emergence of this viewpoint in the political, social and economics areas also.

To continue classified research in the university, it is essential that the polarizing forces that tend to pull apart the common interests of the university, the sponsor, and the security organizations, be kept in check or in balance. To some extent, there does exist a counterforce within the university, in that those researchers who wish to follow activities that fall within the classified realm, do represent their case to others in the uni-

versity. It is not clear, however, that there is provision for a counterforce with respect to security matters. I feel that it is essential that the consequences of restrictive security procedures be recognized, and that we assure that *unnecessarily* strict constraints are not placed upon the researcher. There must be some way for the universities to make known to the security organizations the effect that procedures and practices will have on research programs. One method of accomplishing this would be for the security organizations to make known to the universities, in advance, procedures that are under consideration, and to allow the universities to respond with comments, pro or con, regarding the effect these procedures would have in carrying out research. This is somewhat similar to the practice observed by the Federal Communications Commission in making rules which affect many organizations. Those who set security policies need inputs from all sides to make sound decisions.

I suggested to our moderator, Bob Simmons, that the university researcher was in many aspects the man in the middle, but as the theme of one of the other sessions suggests, the classification management specialists are the ones who will be at the boundary between the university research and security organizations. Continued discussions and reflection on the part of both the classification specialists and the research staff will be necessary to see that a continuing examination of these problems takes place, and that we do not some morning awaken to discover that our classified research programs have

quietly disappeared from the university.

JAMES BAGLEY: My first question is, can a university really afford to get out of government research? My second question is, other than the student opposition, where is the opposition to government research coming from, within the faculty? Is it the ins versus the outs, the humanities versus the non-humanities — just where is it? And a third question: Should—in view of the controversy in the economy that exists—should all government research be managed by a single agency rather than the several that do it now?

WILSON: In answer to the first question, I think the answer is that the universities cannot do without federal support. But the issue is classification, not federal support. On the question of whether there is opposition to classified government research from other than students, there is, indeed—from quite a large number of faculty. It is polarized somewhat in the humanities and the social sciences, but is not particularly a case of the ins versus the outs. Some of the strongest opposition from the older faculty at Ann Arbor comes from people who are very well supported by the federal government in the social sciences. These were people, for example, who in some cases themselves have security clearance and are perfectly competent to work as consultants for a government agency but don't feel that classified research should go on and on in the campus. This represents one type. Their concern about classified research on the campus is obviously fairly genuine because they, themselves, partake on

and off the campus. On the single agency business, I think this would be fairly difficult. It would cut the university off from the agencies actually concerned.

SHOENS: I would like to add one comment to Dr. Wilson's remarks. I believe you suggested that the alternative to no classified research at the university is no research, or research at an extremely low level. I don't think that is the case.

SANDSTROM: I would like to

answer the first question also. I think many universities can very well do without classified research but they cannot get along without federal funds. This is going to be more true of the future than the past, because congress has taken an interest in funding universities to attack serious public problems. They involve more than just the military. I speak of the exploitation of the ocean, water pollution, the problem of disease, and things of this kind.

## LUNCHEON ADDRESS

George MacClain, Department of Defense

I have a few remarks to make and then I am going to try to change the format, if you want it to be changed. Of course I am glad to be here. We always are. And we are lucky to be here because money is tight and travel is short and hard to get.

I want to convey to all of you the fact that Joe Liebling sent you his very best wishes. He is Director of Security Policy, Department of Defense. Joe, through the year, has frequently spoken of the NCMS. I can say, from his comments, that he has a feeling of respect for the NCMS; and of course, I am glad he does have.

I have a few things to say in the nature of compliments which I think are well deserved.

I think Fred Daigle and his committee have done a tremendous job up to now in these arrangements and in this program; and I think it is wonderful that we can have the services of people who can be brought together like that.

I want to say thanks to Bob Donovan for the fact that he writes as he does for the NCMS Bulletin. Very few — not I — could contribute to our professional standards the way he does.

And too, I think we should say thanks to all our chapter presidents. They are contributing to all our services by what they do. There are now six. That is something, isn't it?

And Virgil Herald — how would you like to stand up, Virgil? I asked him to stand for two reasons. First of all, he is Chairman of the Classification Management Committee, ASIS. He is constantly in touch with us at the Department of Defense, for one good reason or another. I particularly commend to you his article in the current issue of the ASIS. In that article Virgil did a great job of walking the tight rope, because he throws criticism around very capably; and isn't wrong about anything as far as I can see. It is a fine article

and I hope you will read it. He made some points that are certainly worthy of our consideration.

I think each of you should be commended for being here. The committee has done a professional and productive and commendable job of bringing people together who have common interests; and they may never have known of that commonality of interest until and unless they got here.

I would like to express also Don Garrett's and my appreciation for the fact that you take us seriously when we suggest, as we do, that you accept the idea that you are our colleagues and we are yours.

Well, I wanted to say that. I hope I didn't forget anybody.

Consider briefly our past. By concentrating on the development of a sound conceptual base for classification management, we believe we have reached, and published through DOD regulations, a proper, logical, and reasonable approach to security classification by DOD under Executive Order 10501. We believe that the official DOD family, and also its colleagues and associates elsewhere in government and in the industrial community, have come to have an awareness of classification management as an effective force and as a useful tool. There is a new and fresh awareness, first, that correct security classification is essential and, secondly, that it is an attainable objective.

As a practical expression of this growing and expanding force, we accomplished the revision of the DD Form 254 and of the policies and procedures that govern its use. To reach

this goal, we relied much upon the help and cooperation of industry, the other government agencies that use the DOD industrial program, and the various elements of the DOD itself, like the military components and the industrial security organization administered so effectively by the Office of Industrial Security of the Defense Contract Administrative Services.

Our immediate and long range challenge is to understand the system, to improve it, and to assure its effective operation through our diligence and our common and collective hard work.

I have a lot of notes here that I can go on with, but I'd like to stop right now and ask you to make a choice. Would you like, in the next ten or fifteen minutes, which is all the time there is, to ask me specific questions?

Well, I am going to talk a while and answer questions for a while. It looks as if that is the way it should go.

What do we have to do to make classification management work? We have some policies and some procedures; and now we have to apply them. We don't know, perhaps, as an established fact in our office, that they are being applied in all respects. In some respects they are not.

It is very, very difficult to determine the extent of the application unless you go out and make visits, unless you constantly have inspections, and unless you get some reports. Not any one of these three things has taken place on a regular basis up to now.

So it is certainly true that our of-

fice, on whom this responsibility rests primarily, must get out and make sure the policies and procedures we have established are working.

As I just mentioned, we have to start with ourselves; then with the components in the DOD, with the non-DOD user agencies, with the industry. And at each one of these points of contact, there lies something that should be done which to some degree isn't being done.

We certainly have to start an active systematic program of observation and appraisal.

Another thing we have to do is to determine fully and factually whether the user agencies who make the direct contact with the industrial community are living up to their own regulations they have adopted.

What does this mean for us? It certainly means, first and foremost, that they are producing the program, project, and system classification guides on which everything else depends for classification.

We say, as a matter of legislative policy, that every program will have, right at the start, a classification guide. We know this is being done, to a degree.

Also we know that the DOD, acting as a top level action element, is promulgating some classification guides that are applicable throughout all of the DOD. But we must be sure these are being adequately handled; and furthermore, we must be sure of some other things. We have to have an index of classification guides, because if the guide writers always start from ground zero, they are going to repeat an action already taken. In so doing,

they may make the guide larger, or smaller, or different from the one already written, and then all of us will have problems of inconsistency.

We are going to have a DOD index of classification guides as broad in coverage as possible and in such a format that it is a really practical and useful reference list. There are a number of different formats. You can have an index by titles, or by subject matter, or by program areas, or by author. We will have to find out the best way to do this and have everybody do it the same way. The Air Force has an index now. The Navy has one, too. I am not quite sure whether the Army does.

Are the 254's we heard about this morning being written based upon these guides, and at the proper time? And are they reaching the proper people? Indeed, are the underlying programs and project classification guides themselves reaching the proper people? We have to be sure the answers to all of these questions are "Yes."

I am told that you people are not receiving the Revised DD Form 254 and the new DD Form 254c. That is a breakdown in distribution, because these forms have been printed. They should be reaching you now.

How about paragraph marking? Are the documents of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and all the subordinate echelons thereof being marked by paragraph? I would like to be able to make a flat statement that they are. Certainly, we in our office mark by paragraph. We are working on it. We are sincere about it. Unless we have everybody trying

to do it, we are not going to get a real test on whether or not it is as practical and worthwhile as we think it is. I know it will work. Some of the people who didn't think it would work are finding it does. This is true, too, within industry.

Some of our DCASR friends are here. Just where are the DCASRs involved? DCASRs are involved as the eyes and ears of the classification management program. They are not classification guidance writers or interpreters. They are capable of, and are intending to serve as observers to see whether or not classification guidance is being written and published in the 254, and whether it is serving its purpose by finding out whether the people who need it are pleased with it. The DCASRs are going to report on this. We couldn't do without them.

Sometimes the DCASRs are critical of what they find. This hurts some of you in industry, I am sure. Nevertheless, the DCASRs are doing the best they can in understanding the 254 system and in administering it fairly. And they can be tough about it. I am told — and I appreciate the fact — that they are tougher with industry than we in DOD are with ourselves. Some way or other we have to find a way to become tough with ourselves.

One thing that Virgil Herald recommended in his paper is to consider a system whereby we more effectively carry on DOD in-house inspections and impose penalties for failure to observe our own house rules. We don't penalize ourselves for our own failures, he says, but nevertheless,

through the DCASR you people in industry get penalized. This isn't right; I know it.

Another thing we have to do is to try to strengthen the classification management structure within industry. By this time I think that you probably all agree that classification management is a meaningful thing in being, a force for good. It has awakened in the mind of government and industry the need for good classification standards, criteria, procedure — and this is a new environment. It would never have been created as an environment if we hadn't started out to have a classification management program — and this is not to run down in any sense the programs that existed before we came into life. They simply didn't get publicity, and they certainly didn't get the uniformity of emphasis that we are getting with classification management now.

So within the user agencies, both DOD and non-DOD, it is very probable that we will have to find a way to compel the contract elements of these user agencies to make real and effective use of a classification management element in their midst. We have to do something to give the classification elements greater resources of their own so that they can directly respond to this kind of thing.

Another suggestion we have received is that it might be desirable to establish as a part of the industrial security program a requirement that there be a duly appointed classification management officer just as there now is a duly appointed security officer in each cleared industry facility.

I believe it is up to us in government to tell industry to identify an official to be responsible for the program. We haven't done this yet. However, industry management is recognizing the values of classification management. I think they would not be opposed to a recommendation of this kind. In fact, I think they might welcome it.

We at the government agency and department level are engaging in a greater and greater amount of interdepartmental and interagency coordination and collaboration in classification management than we used to do.

I have here a document that was the product of over a year of cooperative effort. It was published September 7, 1967, having been previously accepted and signed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It is an unclassified document on the subject of Security Classification of Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion Information. It is a good document. It is a readable document. It represents a lot of hard-headed, difficult, labor of three agencies working together. It is a significant achievement. It is now for the first time being used, because some of the things that it dealt with as a matter of opinion are now having to be dealt with in specific terms.

Recently, it was suggested by Howard Maines of NASA, and highly recommended by Dick Durham of ACDA, that we ought to have a high level intergovernment working group

on security classification policy so that, as a matter of regularity, we would be assured of keeping each other informed, and would be avoiding gaps in the communication channel.

The first meeting of this informal group has taken place, and others are scheduled for the near future. So you can be assured that classification management is spreading through the government toward a uniform approach to these problems.

Well, speaking for our office, we appreciate the NCMS so very much because it is doing a good job and is helping us to do our job. I think we in the NCMS and in classification management will have a great future, all working together.

I want to comment on a question that came up on the floor regarding the 254. The question is, "Would the 254 for a potential subcontractor have to be signed when a potential contractor wants to find out from a potential subcontractor how much the potential subcontractor would have to charge for his effort?"

There was some discussion as to whether or not there is such a thing as a potential prime contractor. Well, there is. I would say a potential contractor is not a prime contractor until he is identified. I would say a potential subcontractor is not a subcontractor until he has received the contract. I would drop the "potential" and call the prime what he is. Now, if performance of the contract requires the help of a subcontractor, the prime will know when he writes a 254 for a prospective sub, that he will have to go to his own ACO to

get the 254 signed for the prospective sub.

Now, if we are going to insist that a potential prime send a 254 to an ACO to be signed for a potential sub, we will have to be able to identify an

appropriate ACO or else abandon the requirement that the 254 for a potential subcontractor be signed by a government official.

I guess my time is up. Thank you, very much.

## **PANEL—PREPARATION OF CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE**

**C. Donald Garrett, Department of Defense, Moderator**

**JAMES J. BAGLEY**

**U.S. Naval Research Laboratory**

One of the most difficult problems facing a classifier is the definition of a project, program or system for the purpose of generating classification guidance. Definition is difficult for many reasons: imprecise knowledge of the purpose of the project, ambiguous project definition from the people who directed it be established, lack of communication between the people who ordered the project in the first place and the project director, and lack of communication between the technical officers, contracting officers and classification officers. At this point it would be reasonable to ask, is there any communication? I suppose the best answer is that communication generally is down, not up or horizontal. It must be changed.

What is here being proposed is not a solution, obviously, but methodology—an approach that can work with a minimum of cooperation from the other members of the triangle. As classification is the problem, it is obvious that the classifier must assume the responsibility. Who else can? After all, it is the classifier who must span the spectrum of interests to pull

together divergent opinions and to arrive at realistic guidance. What then are the cerebrations involved in developing guidance? As this theme is developed, you will note some specific omissions—which are deliberate. I will not discuss the national objectives, the DOD objectives or the service objectives which lead to the program. The reason is that classification assigned to these objectives is not relevant to this problem; classification assigned to national, DOD or service objectives is not truly related to classification developed for the program itself. Although this point is arguable, I believe it is a classic case of mixing apples and oranges.

What are the elements involved in analyzing a program which will finally result in classification guidance? The following form a series of questions and sub-questions which can provide a rational base for classification.

### **SYSTEM X**

First, the overall system:

a. What is the requirement for System X?

(1) Is it to provide a new or updated military advantage? (2) What is the time frame from R&D to operational deployment? (3)



What priority has been assigned?  
(4) Is is needed to counter a new threat?

b. What is the purpose of System X?

(1) What is it supposed to do?  
(2) Is is an updating of an existing system based on existing technology? Or is it a radical change of an existing system which of itself will create new technologies? (3) Is the new system actually a combination of existing but separate systems, which because of advances in technology can now be unified?

c. What is the relation of System X to other systems approved for development?

(1) Is it in competition with other systems—planned duplication? (2) Are the objectives of these systems compatible? (3) Should the systems be compatible?

d. What are the major sub-systems of System X?

e. Who will produce the System?

(1) In-house? (2) Contractors?  
(3) Other government agencies?  
(4) Combinations?

f. Who will manage System X?

(1) Single service? (2) Multi-service? (3) DOD and non-DOD?

g. Who will be the User?

(1) What service or agencies will actually operate the system?

h. Where will the system be installed?

(1) CONUS? (2) Overseas? (3) Both?

It should be obvious that these questions cut across policy, management, technical and contracting lines, and that the classifier must have clear communication channels to the people involved.

The second step is an analysis of the system itself. In this stage, it is necessary to dissect the system to break it into manageable and identifiable parts. The important point is to identify the largest pieces possible. Obviously, any system is a conglomeration of individual pieces which are joined to make a single unit.

a. Identify each major sub-system.

b. Determine the relation of each sub-system to the system.

c. Identify each sub-system which is itself a system; e.g., radar, command system, missile, etc.

d. Determine whether an identified sub-system is classified. If so, is the classification guidance current? Does guidance exist?

e. Should the relation of the classified sub-system to the system be classified?

f. Should the relation of an unclassified sub-system to the system be classified?

g. Identify critical elements of information for each sub-system which warrant protection.

h. Total these critical elements of information for all the sub-systems and determine the effect on the system to establish: (1) Whether classification is necessary, (2) whether classification is feasible, (3) the lowest level of classification necessary.

Having established the relationship of the major sub-systems to the system, it is necessary to determine any special characteristics of each sub-system. Even though some of the steps are repetitive, the following questions are important:

a. Identification.

b. Operational characteristics—how does it relate in an operational mode?

c. Time frame—how much time is available for manufacture, test, installation?

d. Physical characteristics—is it so big that classification is impractical?

e. Identify critical elements of information.

f. Is classification necessary to protect critical elements of information?

g. Is classification practical?

As with each sub-system, it is necessary to analyze each component to determine relation to the sub-system and relation to the system. Component analysis is difficult because any component may be multi-purpose, i.e., commercially available, off-the-shelf, or used in other unrelated sub-systems or systems. It also may be required specifically and solely for the end use of the system.

a. What is the relationship of the component to the sub-system?

b. Is there commonality—use in more than one sub-system?

c. What are the physical characteristics?

d. What are the technical characteristics? (1) Is it new or novel? (2) Is research and development necessary? (3) Where will it be produced—in-house or contract?

e. Identify critical elements of information.

f. Is it now classified? If so, is the classification current?

We have examined the system and are arriving at a tentative conclusion. There are, however, additional considerations that can affect any clas-

sification decision. While it can be debated that sensitive information must be protected, classification will not protect information which can not be protected. The following are some of the questions which should now be asked:

a. Is the system concept new or evolutionary?

b. How much disclosure is necessary?

In this regard it is well to have an idea of the amount of contracts that will be necessary, small or large. And how much will be small business set aside; whether off-shore procurement will be required; and whether the system is allied to foreign policy considerations. Any or all of these questions are relevant to a classification decision:

c. Can the information be protected?

d. Should the information be protected?

e. What is the classification and duration of classification?

As may be seen, this paper takes a systematic approach to the problem of determining classification. This approach assumes that classification is susceptible to systems analysis. It also assumes that classification is an integral part of the analysis of any system. It should not be the tail wagging the dog. Classification is often a necessary part of a system but as we all know it is costly. Because of this the classifier, who actually performs a major management function, should be considered as part of the management team. His judgments are not only important to our national security but are equally important to

the efficient management of any organization, public or private.

**ROBERT H. COBBS**  
**U.S. Air Force**

I must of necessity be brief in my efforts to develop a team concept of writing classification guidance if the panel members to follow are to have an opportunity to develop their areas of expertise.

My experience shows that a formal classification management team may be as small as one individual or as large as eighteen — and that there are no criteria for limiting the number of team members. Experience further shows that the informal classification management team always consists of at least two members and usually three.

It could reasonably be asked: a, What are the bases for the variations in the number of team members? b, What constitutes a formal team and an informal team?

We'll talk about the variations first. There are many reasons for the variety in numbers of team members. I will briefly discuss only three: a, the user agency managing project, program, or system; b, the complexity of project, program, or system; and c, within the U.S. Air Force, the experience and expertise of the responsible classification management office.

Each user agency has its approach to classification management. Approaches range from the well defined and all encompassing written classification guidance provided by the Division of Classification at the Atomic Energy Commission headquarters level, to the uninitiated proj-

ect officer at an Air Force Systems Command division, range or center, who may develop and forward classification guidance via a DD 254 without the necessary coordination or review by his Classification Management office.

The AEC classification guidance is without doubt a team effort. It begins with congress which wrote the law, and by so doing established requirements for the protection of certain types of information. The Commission's legal counsel must necessarily be part of the team. He interprets the law and thereby establishes specifically what congress intended to have protected. The classification division, with the guidance and assistance of physicists, chemists, engineers, etc., develops and publishes classification guidance that sets forth varying degrees of protection for a variety of types of information under numerous circumstances and situations for varying periods of time. This team is surely of the informal variety. However, it is no less real or any less effective than if it were a legally constituted body, formally organized for the specific purpose of writing AEC classification guidance.

The complexity of the project, program, or system determines to a great extent the composition of the classification management team. Let's suppose that Lieutenant Jones has been designated project officer for "Operation Spy Glass." His mission is to determine the feasibility of using a new solid fuel (recently developed and still classified) in the Minuteman II missile. The complexity of the project is such that specific classifica-

tion guidance requires a minimum of team effort. Probably no more than the project office and the classification management office. As contracts are let, each contractor security office should be added to the team.

Now let's look at Major Joe D. Kilroy, Hq Space & Missile Systems Organization (AFSC), project officer for Mark XXXIII Reentry System. The Mark XXXIII is the latest concept of a reentry vehicle and components and is to be flown on all DOD operational ballistic missiles and on the next generation DOD ballistic missiles. Major Kilroy's job: to build and test prototype Mark XXXIIIs.

Immediately, the complexity of the classification guidance changes. We are now involved in no less than three separate classification decision-making jurisdictions, each of which is vitally concerned with the protection of the information that will be developed as it will relate to its exclusive area of responsibility. These jurisdictions are the AEC, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Air Force. The AEC has exclusive jurisdiction over information relating to the design of atomic weapons. The Air Force, as the responsible department for the design and development of the reentry system, has overall classification management responsibility for the reentry vehicle and its component systems. The Navy has exclusive jurisdiction of reentry technology as it may affect the operational capability of the Navy, including state of the art for Naval ballistic missiles. As a minimum then, the classification management team for such a project

should be *formal* and should consist of security and technically competent personnel from all interested jurisdictions.

Lastly, as an example of experience and expertise by an Air Force responsible security office, I will present the team concept as applied by the Classification Management Branch, Security Police Division, Hq Space and Missile Systems Organization, Air Force Systems Command.

The Classification Management Branch, Hq SAMSO, provides security classification guidance for all aspects of the Minuteman Ballistic Missile Weapons System except its operational activity. The operational activity connected with this complex weapons system is the exclusive responsibility of the Strategic Air Command. The complexity of the Minuteman weapons system defies the use of a team concept and forces the concept of *teams*. To be responsive to the numerous user agencies and contractor classification guidance needs, the Minuteman system has had to be subdivided into manageable component parts, and classification management teams have had to be developed based on each component. The most diverse and complex whole is the reentry system. Since each operational reentry system may be the product of a different integrating contractor, in-being formal classification management teams have one common distinction—different contractor security personnel. Guidance, propulsion, air frame, penetration aids are other component areas where the team concept is in use. Practically all reentry system teams are formal and practically

all other teams in being are informal.

The one single integrating force for all of these activities is the classification management office. Classification management personnel are appointed as chairmen of the classification sub-working groups when formal teams are needed and the classification management expert is focal point of all informal classification management teams throughout the headquarters.

In all cases the team concept includes the classification management office, project, program, or system office, contracting officer, and specialist, as necessary to establish and maintain the state of the art equation. Formal teams are inherently the result of a need for a tool to overcome the jurisdictional problems. Additionally, all teams should include the contractor security and technical specialist as soon as it is feasible to do so.

An innovation that we hope to try is to informally incorporate contractor expertise in writing initial classification guidance for a major program prior to having awarded the contract for performance. If approved by higher headquarters and by contractor personnel it should go a long way toward advancing the industry-government team concept in classification management, and greatly improve the protection of information deemed essential to the national security at a greatly reduced cost.

I have purposely refrained from delving into the industry team concept or operation because of my limited knowledge of industry's management techniques now in use. What

may be true in one contractor facility may vary greatly within another facility of the same contractor organization; therefore, to be really knowledgeable of the techniques used in different companies requires more experience than I possess. There is one observation that I have made, however, regarding the industry component of the government-industry classification management team that I think is worthy of mention. I have noticed that on occasion some industry representatives take an unfair advantage of the formal/informal classification management team relationship. This has occurred to the detriment of the protection of information known by industry to be classified but inadvertently or otherwise mistakenly unclassified by government directive. When three of five industrial organizations informally advise that items x, y, and z should be reviewed for accuracy, and the other two companies without hesitation proceed to declassify or otherwise fail to protect this information, it indicates a lack of either personal concern and responsibility, or a serious lack of understanding of the classification concept and process. In each case that I have observed I would consider it an individual trait as opposed to company policy. And, of course, the conflict of loyalty between country and company may unconsciously be the root of the problem. Let me suggest, however, that there really is no conflict. If adequate rapport has been established within the industry/government classification management team the informal phone call or personal "Dear Bob"

note usually solves the problem. When costs require adjustment based on government goofs, the prompt notification and protection of the classified information produces prompt recommendations for approval of the necessary funds. Conversely, when there seems to be a hesitancy to adequately protect information generally known to require protection, the retribution is usually in the form of requesting compliance through the unpleasant but necessary formal channel.

In summary then, we can conclude the following about the team concept of classification management:

Writing classification guidance is a team concept within the Space and Missile Systems Organization.

These teams are both formal and informal, and formal teams are usually constituted as a means to overcome jurisdictional problems.

The classification management office is or should be the focal point in managing all classification guidance, whether there is or is not a classification management team in being.

The team composition, whether formal or informal, is dependent on the experience and expertise of the classification management office.

And lastly, members of formal and informal government/industry classification management teams should make the effort to establish that rapport necessary to insure that all information requiring protection is adequately protected and appropriately classified, regardless of the circumstances of receipt of

the information, and industry is promptly and appropriately rewarded for security cost which legitimately results from the protection of appropriately classified information.

## **JACK R. COTTON**

### **Atomic Energy Commission**

I think all of you have probably heard the currently popular song, "If I Could Talk To The Animals." On some occasions, the words to this tune reflect the sentiment of guide users toward guide writers. The framework and wording of classification topics can be so nebulous that the topics may well sound like animal talk to the guide user who is not a classification specialist. How can we organize the guide and its topics so that we speak a language the user will understand?

Although a classification guide is an entirely different type of vehicle than the automobile, it is analogous to it in many ways. It serves to take use from a starting point to the desired destination. We start with the origination of information in a program. Our destination is the correct identification and protection of this information for national defense and security.

The propelling force or engine of a classification guide is the topical guidance. The engine of the guide will get more mileage if the topics are written so that the user can understand exactly what information is classified — including the required level — and what information is unclassified. Unnecessary classification

of information is a waste of fuel. The horsepower of the engine will depend upon clear and concise wording of topics. A topic that has a range of classification levels assigned to it is not guidance unless the criteria for the application of the levels within the range are fully explained. Topic wording which is not explicit, e.g., "use of the ipswitch," will be difficult to implement. Does it mean fact of use, manner of use, or something else? Also, a topic may not be informative if its specific applicability is reduced to a generality for the purpose of making a guide unclassified.

Like the automobile, a guide may not be a very useful vehicle without a steering mechanism to guide and control its use. The organization of a classification guide is its steering mechanism. With a well designed steering mechanism, the user of the guide will be able to navigate the defined course and arrive at the desired destination. Without a steering mechanism to take the user through all of the applicable topics, policies, and procedures, he may founder along the way.

How do we design the steering mechanism for maximum utility and safety? First, we need to examine the factors that will influence its design. They are:

1. *The kind of vehicle.* What kinds of vehicles do we have in classification? Some guides are simple and some are complex. The variation in design might be compared to the difference in design of automobiles such as that for a Volkswagen and a Cadillac. The most simple guide is

one consisting of a single topic. For example, the topic may take the form of a statement that *all* information in a particular research program is classified at one specific level of classification. A complex guide is one covering a major program which consists of a large body of information of varying classification levels, and also unclassified information. Complexity is increased in direct ratio to the number of situations where the classified information may occur, e.g., in operations, in research and development, in production, in procurement of materials, by nomenclature, by associations, etc. The steering mechanisms required for the simple versus the complex guide will vary significantly.

2. *The type of driver.* What type of driver will use the vehicle? Is the driver a race car expert or a little old lady who can't turn the wheel very well? A classification specialist may require less in a steering mechanism than a user who spends little of his time on the subject of classification. The user who has a technical background may find the vehicle easier to drive than would a procurement specialist. The type of driver of our vehicle is an important factor in the design of the steering mechanism.

3. *The driving course and the destination.* What is the nature of the driving course and what is the destination? If the driving course is a smoothly paved and straight run, the vehicle may glide along almost completely on automatic controls. However, we may find that our driving course includes obstacles and unfamiliar terrain which require difficult

maneuvers and finesse. For example, the course can involve the procurement of unique materials, specially designed equipment and tools, and parts for components. Our interest in large quantities of a certain material might reveal a classified endeavor to the adversary as readily as would an explicit statement on the subject. A single term used in the program may be just as informative and helpful to the theoretical physicist on the other side as would a complete design layout of a particular design concept. The steering mechanism must be designed so as to provide optimum assistance to the user in the application of the correct classification to information irrespective of the form in which it occurs. The destination of the classification vehicle is to assure the correct identification of classified information as to level and category, i.e., Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, or other Defense Information, and to indicate the unclassified information.

After an analysis of the kind of vehicle, the type of driver, and the driving course, we are then ready to design the steering mechanism of organization to suit our particular vehicle. What are the components which may be useful in the steering mechanism? They are:

a. A *foreword* or introduction to explain the vehicle operating procedures such as the authority for use of the guide, its applicability, and the legal and administrative ground rules upon which it is based.

b. *Definitions of terms* used in the guide for the purpose of clarifying topics and to preclude different in-

terpretations concerning the operation of the engine.

c. *Table of contents* to show location of major components of the vehicle.

d. The division of the topics into *specific subject areas* such as nomenclature, design, and materials. This is the part of the steering mechanism that aids in smoother and safer performance of the vehicle.

e. A simplified *numbering system and outline*, for the topics, to aid in better understanding of the vehicle operation. If possible, topics should be completely self explanatory without the need for cross references or dependence upon headings and sub-headings. If a reference back to the heading or to other topics is required in the writing of a topic, the decimal outline and numbering system for topic organization is preferable because of its simplicity. To refer back to headings such as 4 or 4.5 is much preferred to the more cumbersome outline system where the reference may be something like topic IV a. 3. f. (1) b. Additionally, headings and sub-headings should be constructed so that their relationship to topics is apparent and explicit. This is our "fail-safe" component of the steering mechanism.

f. A *rationale* introducing each major section to explain the technical basis for the classifications assigned and to emphasize and outline the sensitive concepts which the topics are designed to protect. This helps the user better understand the road signs and accept the detours — such as arbitrary classifications which are sometimes necessary.



g. An *illustration* or diagram of the components within the system to provide a visual assist to the user in understanding relationships between the components of the vehicle.

h. A *complete index* identifying all parts of the vehicle. A computer-produced "key word in context" system has proved to be a very useful technique for indexing classification guides.

i. A *list of references* of other guides and policies for use as accessories to the vehicle.

j. A *change system* incorporated into the guide that is simple and clear so that all drivers can readily replace obsolete parts. Unless the system and instruction provide for posting the change so that it is readily seen in the guide, it may never be implemented by many users and the vehicle soon fails to function properly.

Some of the components of organization will be needed in all guides. All of them will be indispensable in some guides. Irrespective of the number of components that are used, organization can be an effective tool for the classification manager. It would be profitable to ask ourselves the following two questions when we write a new guide.

1. How can good organization help me achieve the objectives and goals for this guide?

2. How should I organize the guide to get the most gain?

The design and the refinement in design of the steering mechanism of organization will depend on the kind of vehicle, the type of driver, the driving course and the destination. By including a well designed steering

mechanism of organization in our classification vehicle, we will assist the user in reaching the chartered destination — correct identification and protection of information for national defense and security.

**LYLE DUNWOODY**  
**Lockheed Missiles and Space**  
**Company**

Today I will address myself only to doing classified work for the Department of Defense.

I am sure that all of you are quite aware of the fact that the DOD contracting officer is required to furnish classification guidance to the contractor. For the purpose of this meeting, we will assume that we in industry have received a contract from the DOD agency that involves information classified due to the Atomic Energy Act. The DD 254 has been well prepared and has a classified attachment that identifies the information to be classified.

If you are lucky enough to receive such a DD 254, you must evaluate it and its attachment in light of the work you are to perform. Such evaluation must consider the following, which is an excerpt from Appendix E., Change 1 of DOD 5220.22-R, *Industrial Security Regulation*:

"A document, hardware and other material is classified only by reason of the classified information which is contained in or on it, and can be revealed by observation, study, analysis, dismantling, operation or use of it."

To my knowledge this is the first such DOD direction to the DCASRs and you who are interested should

become familiar with it. If DOD really implements this statement—and I believe it will, and I am in complete agreement with it—it will create a very challenging problem for industry to solve. This means that we must not only know what the words in the DD 254 say, but since it is written in the English language, we must determine the intent as set forth in these words as to what information must be classified so that it may be protected. To illustrate, we will use the following example:

Let's assume that we are building a fuzing transmitter for a weapon system, the frequency of which is classified. The design utilizes a standard "off the shelf" crystal tuned to the classified frequency.

Now the intent of the DOD is to keep potential enemies from knowing the transmitting frequency that this specific weapon will use to operate the fuze. If they knew it they could dud the weapon. This is the real problem we must solve in classification management, and we must do so in the most economical manner. No one yet within DOD or AEC has, to my knowledge, been able to identify specifically at the inception of a program the specific links in the chain of information to be classified. To define the link we will assume that it is that bit of information required to assemble the information that is classified. *You* must identify that link in the chain of information. To do so, you must not only know how your organization does business, including management, engineering, procurement, manufacturing, product assurance, but also how the other indus-

trial and government organizations utilize this information. It does no good for you to decide to classify a link in the chain of information if your organization does not control the link. If it goes beyond your control, all organizations involved must be in agreement. This requires expeditious coordination and dissemination to all concerned in the use of this information.

Getting back to the problem, one can decide between the two following courses of action:

1. Buy the crystal from a cleared facility as a classified item.
2. Buy the crystal from an uncleared source as unclassified, utilizing procurement receiving and accounting documentation which will not identify the crystal to the weapon system.

Some of you will ask why not classify the assembly and forget about the crystal? As you all know, the Department of Commerce publishes lists of government contracts. The unclassified basic contract you received and/or the company public information releases will reveal that your contract, by number, is to produce a fuzing transmitter for a specific weapon system. Since your purchase order will tie the crystal to this contract, the transmitting frequency is revealed. This is the information that DOD is trying to deny a possible enemy.

The example cited is simple, but not so for many of the programs from DOD. The more complex the program, the more people and organizations involved, the more difficult it becomes to identify the link. To

coordinate and disseminate the specific information to be classified adds to the difficulties. Unless this is done as soon as possible, and continually as the program progresses, there is no need to classify the information. This is due to the fact that anyone, knowing the DOD contractual controls placed on industry can obtain from unclassified sources the information needed to compromise the program. This then creates the simple situation where all the monies and time spent protecting the information are wasted, and many citizens are unnecessarily harassed.

The more information that is classified, the more difficult it is to write guidance that enables the user to understand the "why" and to apply the guidance to what should be classified. This is primarily due to the fact that the user evaluates the guide and the information being reviewed in light of his own experience and knowledge. Inasmuch as most users do not know how the information is utilized outside of their own spheres of influence, guidance prepared for use within industry must identify the specific link in the chain of information that should be classified. Otherwise the user who evaluates a compilation of information will classify the link that impacts his operation the least. Another user evaluating the same or similar compilation of information will classify a different link. The end result may be that the compilation of the unclassified information disclosed by the two users reveals the information that is classified.

In the preparation of classification

guidance to be issued to the user, there are as many ideas relative to format, content, etc., as there are writers of classification guidance. Therefore a classification guide must convey to the user *what* information is classified and *why*. You must generate a document the user can understand and apply. This sounds simple, and it is, for programs involving one or two classified items of classified information.

To prepare such a guide requires that you have the knowledge of how your company does business so that you can determine the link or links to be classified. This generally requires contact with the organizations needing access to the classified information to establish which is the most economical link to be classified. Again, I must stress that the guidance must be written so that the "what" and "why" are understood by all users. Further, I have found that indexing of large guides assists in the use of the guides. Needless to say, this must be accomplished promptly; it does no good to issue classification guidance to the user after a program has been in progress for some time. Once a guide is written, criticism and suggestions should be solicited from the users to improve the guidance. Changes should be issued as new topics or links are developed. Classification guidance in the hands of the user must be current to be effective. It does no good to lock the barn door after the horse has been stolen.

After you have identified the information to be classified, your in-house problem is to disseminate the information to the individuals work-

ing the program. In a small organization, communication is easy but in a large complex organization it is difficult. As you can see from the chart (Figure 1) Lockheed Missiles and Space Company is split into four basic groups: two product divisions, Research and Development, and Operations Services. Needless to say, the method utilized by Mr. Daigle of Space Systems Divisions and Mr. Stobie of Research and Development are not the means illustrated on the chart, but rather that utilized by Missile Systems Division. We have seven classification management representatives who write classification guidance, act as sources of contact for the organization's 209 authorized classifiers, review documents, examine hardware, and solve problems and perform many other duties. Periodically, I distribute to all managers a letter setting forth the location and duties of all MSD classification management personnel. In the Missile Systems Division, classification management disseminates the classification guidance to the authorized classifiers involved in the program. It is then the responsibility of each authorized classifier to brief members of his organization on the classified aspects of the program. The authorized classifiers know the intent of classification guidance and can interpret such guidance in the language of the engineer. We in the Missile Systems Division have found this to be very effective.

The same process applies to the furnishing of classification guidance to subcontractors.

In conclusion, I would like to point

out that there is a need within DOD for more positive support from industry. Most DOD contracting agencies want your recommendations as well as constructive criticism. Also, if you become proficient in the identifying of the links to be classified, knowledgeable in classification policy and the preparation of classification guidance, DOD will welcome your assistance. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company has a contract for an eight-man-year effort for classification support including the writing of classification guides.

**LYNWOOD G. SATTERFIELD**  
**Westinghouse Defense and**  
**Space Center**

The "family tree" approach to application of classification guidance which I have been asked to present is one classification management tool which has been used to good advantage at the Westinghouse Defense and Space Center in Baltimore.

We have been successful to a degree with this approach, but the success can only be measured in terms of the cooperation we have received from our security counterparts in the government.

Specific guidance is a continuing requirement to a contract even if, from the user agency point of view, the original DD 254 is complete in detail. Clarification and amplification are always necessary. To fulfill our security responsibilities, industry must supplement and interpret the security guidance furnished by the user agency. On complex contracts detailed classification guidance is necessary.

When a classified contract is awarded to Westinghouse, the DD 254 goes to our contract administration department which has the responsibility for the distribution of the form. When the project and/or program manager receives his copy, it is his responsibility to educate his staff and personnel with respect to classification, that is, those who will be affected by the DD 254. If a complex contract is involved, he normally assigns an engineer familiar with the technical aspects of the program to coordinate the preparation of a classification guide. Our engineering managers have found the security guide (the family tree approach) to be one of the most effective tools that can be used to explain what is classified. On most of our large contracts we have generated security guides.

The family tree approach to classification management truly starts at the time the hardware breakdown of components is listed. Most of you are familiar with the Military Standardization Handbook (MIL-HDBK-140). It is the standardization handbook developed by the Department of Defense and provides the official security classification and cognizant data of Air Force, Army, and Navy equipment. The handbook provides data concerning military electronic equipment. All items listed in the book carry an official nomenclature number, its current security classification, the name of the cognizant engineering agency and department, and automatic time-phased downgrading information.

Our family tree approach to clas-

sification management is patterned so as to be in consonance with this handbook. When components, black boxes, subsystems, test equipment, etc., are designed and manufactured, we are obliged to request official nomenclature from the Government by the use of DD Form 61, Request for Nomenclature. We have excerpted a copy of the Form DD 61 from the AFSCM/AFLCM 310-1J Manual. This form requires that the contractor specifically state: (1) the security classification of the equipment, and (2) the security classification of the technical data involved. By taking advantage of the engineering efforts we have to expend in preparing the Form DD 61, the effort required to prepare a program security guide can be materially reduced. Also, the pertinent drawings, specifications, etc., are close at hand and can be used to assist in determining when the hardware becomes classified.

We at Westinghouse have evolved a system that informs our employees not only of the security classification of hardware items, but also of the point of assembly during the manufacturing cycle where the material becomes classified. This is one of the solid accomplishments of the classification management program at Westinghouse.

Recently, with the assistance of our engineering and drafting departments, we discovered this new and valuable classification management capability. This resulted from the use of a program security guide combined with the assembly drawings for a system. Security guides have been used at our facility for several years,

but it has only been within the last year that our assembly drawings have been used as the media to disseminate classification guidance concerning hardware.

To protect our nation's secrets, decisions must be made as to what hardware, as well as data, requires protection. Once the hardware classification decision is made, the additional effort to document the stage at which it becomes classified is warranted. This technique assures guidance will be given to the handlers. We are gambling when we only generate memoranda to manufacturing, product reliability, shipping, and others who will be required to handle the hardware. Good security guides are a must, but to be certain that handlers of hardware are properly informed, security annotation of drawings appears to be appropriate.

Assembly drawings in our programs are marked to alert personnel to the hardware's security classification. Classification is shown for each classified assembly and a note says, for example, "The hardware shown on this drawing is classified Confidential." As a result we do not anticipate misunderstanding concerning the security classification of hardware shown. An attachment to the security guide for a contract will list all of the major components with their security classification. In end-item and external-view columns there are references to "Notes." If you read the notes you will see they are very specific as to when each component becomes classified. An attachment is made to the prime DD 254 for a contract. Detailed guidance, which can be de-

veloped as a result of team effort, is included.

Good classification management requires joint effort. Team effort between the technicians, the project office, and security officers of both government and industry is essential for developing meaningful security guidance and particularly for developing specific statements.

We should determine in advance which classified components will be made in the plant and which classified components will be procured from outside vendors. A considerable amount of valuable engineering time is saved when preprinted multilith DD 254 mats are prepared for use in the procurement of classified hardware or of unclassified components requiring access to classified data.

On one missile control system for which cross reference of the DD 254s to drawing numbers was prepared, there were 30,000 electrical and electromagnetic parts. There are 200 end items or "black boxes" which make up the system and its special support equipment. As a result of the use of preprinted DD 254s, time consuming procedures are avoided when a DD 254 has to be furnished to a subcontractor. When the manufacturing department needs a part, the appropriate multilith DD 254 for the applicable drawing is pulled and sent with a purchase requisition to the purchasing department. The preprinted DD 254 mat technique has proven to be a real dollar saver. On the missile control system contract alone, the multilith DD 254 mat procedure resulted in a cost reduction

of over \$40,000 in a twelve-month period.

Last year at the NCMS seminar in Washington, the Defense and Space Center President, Mr. N. V. Petrou, quoted portions of a letter to Westinghouse from one of the user agencies expressing appreciation and congratulations for Westinghouse's effort and cooperation in effecting realistic classification guidance for vital programs. In the customers' own words: "The joint classification effort is an outstanding example of cooperation between industry and the Department of Defense and should result in substantial monetary savings to the Government as well as more effective production." The letter was generated as a result of over a hundred components' being declassified in answer to inquiries made by Westinghouse. On one contract, all components were declassified. On two radar contracts 19 of the 35 major components were declassified on one, and 47 of 77 major components were declassified on the other. On one of our torpedo contracts, 29 of the 42 major components were declassified. Most of the items were declassified as a result of engineering changes made in the classified systems. These results were due largely to our family tree approach.

To summarize, the following steps are taken when a classified contract is awarded to the Westinghouse Defense and Space Center in Baltimore:

- (1) The contracts administration department distributes the prime DD 254.

- (2) The project manager assigns an engineer familiar with the tech-

nical aspects of the program to coordinate the preparation of a security guide.

- (3) The engineering department prepares the "family tree" (the preliminary drawings and tentative component breakdown).

- (4) The engineering department prepares and submits the DD Form 61, Request for Nomenclature.

- (5) The security classification management supervisor acts as liaison between Westinghouse project personnel and the user agency to resolve classification problems. The project security guide is furnished to the administrative contracting officer and the procurement contracting officer for their information and comment.

- (6) After receipt of the approved DD Form 61, the security classification manager and project manager submit an expanded DD 254 for approval and release.

Before closing, one caution is in order. We may devise detailed guides to identify classified information on our program; mark drawings to indicate when hardware becomes classified; and educate engineers and scientists as to what is classified. But the most difficult part of the information protection problem lies with the behavior of individuals who generate or have knowledge of sensitive information in the performance of their normal duties. Here is where the industrial security professional comes to grips with his greatest challenge: that is, the protection of classified information that exists informally in the mind, speech, and writings of individuals. Much of this informa-

tion is as important and much more difficult to protect than formally classified information and equipment.

As a result of emphasis on the classification management approach to security at Westinghouse, our program has been officially and repeatedly acknowledged as having proved its worth. Even though we have had considerable success in the classification management field, we sincerely believe now, more than ever, that there are many more classification management tools that need to be developed and applied. The family tree approach is just one of them.

WAYNE WILCOX: I noticed one expression you keep using in this discussion — and Bob Cobbs used it, too, when he was talking about his team concept — and that is when they bring in the “security officers.” I would like to ask each member of the panel his definition as to what the contract security officer’s responsibilities and duties are, particularly in the light of Mr. Marshall’s talk yesterday where he defined security as the protection of classified information, and classification as the identification of it.

GARRETT: Let me make a few remarks and then ask the panel to express their own thoughts from their own points of view on the role of the contractor security officer. The role of the contractor security officer is different from the security officer’s role that Mr. Marshall described. At least I believe that the contractor security officer who has the classification management function has the job of taking the classification guid-

ance received from the user agency, interpreting it, elaborating on it, and directing how it should be applied to the specific program or project involved in the contract. That is my own idea.

DUNWOODY: It depends on the function of the agency involved. We in our Missiles Division are not responsible to the security officer. We are actually responsible to the vice president in charge of general management. The role that I play is to represent the Missiles Division on joint government-industry teams and we do develop guides. It allows us to define better what information is to be classified and make clear the intent. In other words, in our organization people look to us to tell them what is classified. Basically, we operate as Mr. Marshall suggested yesterday. Regarding the team concept of preparing classification guidance, on major programs I am in agreement with it. We have participated in such things and it does allow us to better understand and to define what information is to be classified.

COTTON: In Albuquerque Operations Office we have for a number of years encouraged our contractor organizations to separate the function of classification and security and I think this was for two reasons, basically. First there are essentially two different disciplines involved in the two functions. And second — well, this might be controversial — I think maybe there might be conflicts between the responsibilities or motives of the two functions. If I were a security officer and a classification officer, I conceivably might be inclined



to make a different decision in classification because of the pressures from the security end than I would otherwise. So, ideally, I think the functions should be separate. Realistically, we recognize this is not always possible.

**SATTERFIELD:** I am sure our security department never makes any decisions as to whether something is classified or unclassified. This is within the authority of the program manager. This is where the responsibility rests. As to any question with respect to interpretation, most of our program managers have gone along with the recommendation of the security officer. They normally assign a security representative from their program. When you have a complex program, you would be surprised by the questions asked by the different engineers who go to the administrative representative for interpretation. These questions are routed through this security representative who, in turn, has the responsibility of forwarding them through our offices, to the user agency and the project people.

**GARRETT:** Do any of you industry people have anything you wish to say?

**FRFD DAIGLE:** Two thoughts: I have been listening to all the comments to the responsibility of security officers. First, I think Bob Cobbs put the problem most directly. It is the responsibility of the contractor. Then, within the contractor's organization, it is the contractor's responsibility to decide whether he wants to establish a classification management program and where he

wants to house it, but in any event he is providing classification management to a degree. The thing that bothers me most here is that we continually refer to all our problems as being those of the security officer. In some companies this may be true. These problems may be all or part of the security officer's responsibility. But other companies consider it to be administrative or contractual in nature. What I want to emphasize is that they are wearing their classification management hats when they handle these problems and make decisions. Yes, we make classification decisions, hundreds of them a week, within the framework of the sparse guidance we necessarily receive. Like Dunwoody, we separate the functions of classification and security. Classification follows the administrative channel while security follows another. It gives us a greater freedom of motion and an ability to deal with the technical and management personnel on their own ground and terms without the "police" label on us. We don't have to investigate violations, etc. When we see flagrant disregard we turn the information over to security. And believe me we work well together. Classification interprets the degree of protection required on all activities in the division as determined by analysis of the DD 254, and security does an outstanding job of enforcing what they know to be the required protection of that degree of classification. In plain language, gentlemen, we are trying to become a professional organization. This seminar proves it. So when we are referring to problems of classifica-

tion management, say *classification* management. When we are referring to problems of security, say *security*.

ROBERT DONOVAN: Specifically, Lyle, by your own background and experience, you are also a security man, and I am trying to see--what Charlie Marshall was describing, in the AEC concept, was that this is a technical matter and he is making a technical evaluation. Now, I don't consider myself a technical man and I don't think you do, and neither does Fred. I think you are in a different boat.

DUNWOODY: The work may involve technical problems. And the classification man should be able to cope with them.

DONOVAN: But my point is that it is interdisciplinary. It is your contract management group, if you will, that has directly a responsibility to the customer. How they delegate the responsibility within a company, as to who is going to go out and massage the engineers and gather in the details and perform this function, is somewhat immaterial. But whether or not, ipso facto, this must be a brand new specialty or a brand new profession, exclusive of all others, is a question.

GARRETT: If I understood the intent of Wilcox's question, that is probably what you are referring to. I wanted to clarify that in people's minds. I think classification management is open. As Bob asks, is it a profession, as such, or is it something that we pick up along with the other things we are doing in our activity?

DUNWOODY: Well, it is just like being a manager or an engineer.

That's a good question.

DONOVAN: Yes, but can you imagine cutting loose some of these college graduates, with all their technical degrees, and saying they are management engineers?

DUNWOODY: Ed Calvert, in the NCMS magazine, came out with an article a while ago that pretty well defines the qualifications of the classification man.

GEORGE CHELIUS: I think before classification management becomes a profession, we have to become involved with engineering to the extent that we can handle our employee classification guidance through engineering principles, thereby implying that we have to know some detailed engineering in order to be able to do this. I don't believe we will become a profession, as such, until we take this action. If we assume that we don't have to be technically knowledgeable in security guidance, too, we are merely monitoring the implementation of security guidance and do not stand in the position of making decisions of whether or not information is classifiable. I think also, going on with this, that before any management can recognize a program for industrial organization of classification management, there will have to be some way to break out the classification management function into a direct charge to a contract, primarily under government DOD directive, usually in accordance with contractual requirements. And I would think, with classification management a profession, at that time any work done in classification management directly

related to a contract could be a direct charge.

DUNWOODY: This is being done now, for U.S. Navy Special Projects. I have an eight-man effort which is direct. My function that I am performing for them is direct. When you go back to the first part of your question, I don't believe really that anybody can ever be technically competent completely across the board, but you do have to have the ability to communicate, not only with the engineers, but with the accountants and be able to cope with all ramifications of doing business today.

GARRETT: I think there is a very definite difference of opinion as to whether the classification management should be a part of the security function, whether it should be all by itself, or part of some other function. I don't think it matters very much. At least it doesn't matter so long as it is geared toward the assistance of the technical people and others in the development of appropriate guidance and the application of guidance in the most accurate manner.

WILLIAM FLORENCE: Mr. Garrett, would you consider that the placement of your own security classification management division is appropriate for the Department of De-

fense, or would you consider its removal from the security office to be a good move in your own interests?

GARRETT: I don't think there is any question as to how the office feels about it. Classification management is a direct function of the Director for Security Policy.

TONY CORREIA: Somebody mentioned that Charlie Marshall commented yesterday that his people were all technical men. Then I think that he changed it. He said they were technically trained. Now, you can be technically trained and not be a technical man. I think the point was brought up this afternoon that if the classification management man is associated with a program—sits in on a program of technical interchange—he can be pretty well technically oriented and he doesn't get lost in the verbiage that the engineer uses.

COTTON: Mr. Marshall said, I think, and I might reiterate, that AEC policy is to require a technical degree, a B. A. degree or a B. S. degree in a technical field, including mathematics. Of course, contractors may not have such requirements. However, it is recognized in AEC policy and by our general management that classification is a technical field.

# SECURITY CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT COORDINATION BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND DOD

Willard N. Thompson, SAMSO, U.S. Air Force

Classification management's greatest contribution to the U. S. security program is more accurate, realistic, and timely security classification guidance to all concerned. In addition, we save money. Based on experience we have learned that each security classification specialist saves a lot of money each year in security costs. Later, I will give documented examples. During World War II, General George Patton, Third Army Commander, made a statement to me, a company commander, to the effect that the operating level in the Army was the company or battery. He further stated that decisions were made at theater and army level with all levels of command between interpreting and staffing the directions as they pertained to their areas of interest. We have a parallel here in that the classification management specialist at the user agency and at the contractor facility are the operating personnel of the security classification program.

Let's discuss this morning the operation and responsibilities of a classification management office at the level of a user agency and contractor facility and our association, what we do, how we operate and some of the problems that evolve from this association. The greatest problem is the indiscriminate classification direction that is put out by unqualified individuals to individuals.

I believe that classification guidance must be coordinated and controlled by a central office. The most important function of a classification management office is the control of classification guidance. There must be one central place where all guidance funnels through for a command or a contractor. This is true going and coming. Guidance classification decisions and resultant actions that are made between individuals leave the rest of the world in the dark. The result is the use of different classifications for the same information.

Initial classification determination, what needs protection and at what level, to me is the most important single factor in the security of all projects and programs. Classification of information generated during the life of the program is based on this original determination. The part security plays as to time, costs, etc., for the life of the program is based on the original classification decisions. Who makes these original classification determinations? For a specific project or program, the system program office, the user agency classification management office, and the classification management personnel at the contractor or contractors involved develop the necessary requirements. These requirements are approved by the secretary of the service involved and/or the Department of

Defense but the spadework is done at the user agency level. Classification determinations are required that will create security classification guidance that gives full protection to all aspects of a program but does not impede the free exchange of information in the scientific community or programs. It is a fact of life that national security is not only dependent on the national security program but on the advancement of the state-of-the-art by the scientific community. We are in my opinion, in the age of secure scientists. The way the scientists of today have adapted themselves to working within the security requirements is certainly of great credit to the scientific community. The hows and whys of the end product must be protected, but bottlenecks in production leading to excessive manufacturing costs and delays cannot be caused by unnecessary security requirements. The cost of protection can never be used as the deciding factor, but it is a factor and must be realistic. A survey made at SAMSO revealed some interesting figures in amount of money saved by the efforts of the classification management office during the period 1 July 1965 through 30 June 1967: \$1,476,962.00 in monies that would have been spent was documented as being saved. Further, this money was saved with no loss in security as a result. Cost, we see, is a factor if not the deciding one. In the process of gathering information even greater savings at some contractors were discovered as the result of classification management's efforts at the particular contractors. One company reported

that their classification management personnel working with the classification management personnel at the user agency have prevented the spending of over nine million dollars during the past four years. Let's examine some specific actions taken that have saved money and illustrate how government and industry classification management personnel working together accomplish their mission. One company saved \$52,416 on classified contracts through the timely regrading actions based on timely security classification guides and regrading instructions provided through the efforts of classification management. One company questioned the necessity to classify the grain structure of solid propellants. Upon investigation by both government and industry classification personnel, it was determined the item did not warrant a classification of confidential. Regrading actions were taken which resulted in a savings of \$125,050 on two contracts. Subsequent savings on later contracts to other companies manufacturing solid propellants were even greater. A smaller but more typical case was when rocket engine injector plates were declassified. However, the engines containing the plates were being delivered classified because the engine log book was shipped with the engine. Classification management personnel caused a revised DD Form 254 to be issued, authorizing the classified engine log book to be delivered under separate cover. Shipment of fifty seven engines resulted in a savings of \$1,700. Classification management provided that the classification of the asso-

ciation of certain program numbers with the Agena vehicle was not warranted. This regrading action prevented the classification of a tremendous volume of shop order type documents and the establishment of additional security areas at the contractor facility. A detailed study made by the contractor concluded that over a half million dollars is being saved annually. This action was a closely coordinated effort between classification management personnel at government and contractor level. To avoid the use of around-the-clock guards at one contractor guarding launch tubes, classification management suggested and approved the use of assembly and checkout covers. This action precluded the necessity for spending over one hundred thousand dollars annually for guards. Another example was the determination that compartmentalization of the production area at another contractor was not necessary for the production of reentry vehicles. Compartmentalization would have caused an estimated initial cost of eighty thousand dollars for machines plus an additional cost in extra personnel to operate the different machines. These machines are presently being operated by personnel moving from one area to another with the reentry vehicles. This avoided the hiring of an estimated fifty people at an annual cost of over half a million. As a result of upgrading of the classification of a program by higher headquarters, the prime contractor asked for over three hundred thousand dollars to effect the necessary actions. Classification management specialists working with pro-

gram personnel and contractor classification personnel substantiated a reduction that resulted in a savings of \$117,000.

In addition to documented savings, the greatest savings cannot be documented. In the area of manpower, as an example, the classification management office takes the place of one or more individuals for a program. Of course, the number of programs a command or contractor has determines the savings here. In some of the large commands and contractors the savings are immense.

Saving money is necessary, of course, but it certainly is not the most important function of classification management. The most important — experience teaches us — most valuable reason is the assurance of timely and accurate security classification guidance to all concerned. Again, a central control with a central record of security actions is mandatory for an efficient accurate classification management program for any command or contractor and is considered the only way to operate.

We have been discussing accomplishments that classification management personnel have made. Let's discuss for a moment what it takes to make a classification specialist. A classification specialist must know the mission, cost, time involved, etc., and must keep up with the changes in the program as they occur. He must have a security background, and I believe an investigative background is desirable; an inquisitive mind, an undeniable desire to ferret out the facts, as well as a hard-headed, undeniable desire to make classification

work. De Gaulle of France has the qualifications, but I understand that he is not looking for a job in the United States. We must end up with classification decisions that make sense and are workable. In addition to a security and investigative background, our classification specialist must have a complete file from which to work. His decisions on classification requirements of assigned programs can really be no better than the files he has to back him up.

Security classification is the product of judgment as to the protection of information that this information must have to prevent harm to the United States. There can be no other reason for classifying. We do not classify documents, hardware, or what-have-you. We classify information and only information—information contained in a document or information that can be derived from a piece of hardware. The final authority for classifying, regrading, and declassifying information must be subject to control from a central source. I believe this must be the job of classification management.

The SPO is responsible for his program including all aspects of security, but classification management is the commander's staff office to assure that the best possible classification decisions and actions are taken for all programs under his command. Higher headquarters provide guidelines; so-called captive contractors, such as Aerospace, Rand, etc., assist with recommended classifications. Contractors performing on classified contracts recommend classifications but the contracting command (user

agency) must make the decisions as to what must be classified and what level of classification is necessary. Again, I repeat, a classification specialist must know an awful lot about a program before he can intelligently perform his duties as a classification specialist for a program or project. Only with complete knowledge of the program can the classification specialist properly assist the program office and assure that the best possible classification decisions and guidance for his assigned programs are being made. Classification management must be involved from the start of a program to its end.

A security classification guide for each program or project should be prepared. This guide should be staffed, published, and controlled by the classification management office. The security classification guide for a program is the most important security document pertaining to the program. Classification determinations can differ because of different interpretations of the guide and may require resolution, but at least all concerned are working from the same document. The DD Form 254 is a contractual document furnishing classification guidance, but to be really effective it must be based on the classification guide or serve as a supplement to the guide while acting as a letter of transmittal for the guide from the user agency to the contractor. No matter how we look at it, a guide is the most important document pertaining to the security of a program. Therefore it is mandatory

that it be as accurate and timely as possible.

In the concept that classification requirements and guidance must be funneled and controlled by a central classification management office both in government and industry, let's examine how we work together to accomplish our mission. A dream added to hours of work by a brain brings forth an idea that eventually ends up as a directive to a command to prepare a plan. The proposed plan is prepared and includes a security classification guide. A Request for Proposal (RFP) goes out with the security requirements for the RFP in the form of a security classification guide. Classification management for each contractor involved gets into the act, looks over the guidance, agrees or does not agree, makes suggestions, and submits recommendations to the user agency classification management office. You may be thinking, "when do we ever have a guide at this period in the life of a program?" There are such ideal situations. Without classification management you certainly do not have a chance to correct poor classification guidance. As our program progresses, a contract is awarded. From now on, coordination between government and industry is mandatory and our central focal point of control is mandatory. Without it, information that needs protection at a specific level could be handled at different levels of protection, i.e., from unclassified to secret. I suppose even top secret is possible, although I don't know of any specific examples.

Let's examine what actions are re-

quired during the life of a program:

A. Produce a classification guide for the program. Contractor classification personnel expand this guidance as applicable for their personnel. Much controversy exists over what a guide should contain, how much detail it should contain, etc. I submit to you that if a guide covered every item that every one involved was interested in, it would not be published before the program was completed. Also, we in classification management would be out of a job because there would not be any interpretations to be made. All areas needing protection must be covered in a guide but too much detail is as bad as no guide. Room for interpretation as it applies to each of us must be available. With government and industry classification personnel working together, all areas in question can be resolved.

B. Continuous review and evaluation of security requirements for a program; processing requirements for additional security guidance and bringing to a conclusion necessary changes. I guess the most prevalent problem is in relation to the DD 254. A program security classification guide, if maintained up-to-date, should resolve this problem. However, the fact is that many 254s are issued that are inadequate, uncoordinated, untimely, are not revised at the proper time, do not furnish sufficient guidance for downgrading, and, in short, are inadequate. All of these deficiencies can and should be corrected by classification management at the user agency and if not the classification management per-



sonnel at the contractor involved should make appropriate recommendations for change. Most of the problems will not exist if classification management is so organized and operating that they are in a position to prevent it. I submit that it is classification management's responsibility at the user agency to see that proper guidance is furnished and in industry to complain if it is not. Some of the complaints are inadequate DD 254s received on prime contracts and requests for proposals which give no guidance at all in Block 13, the heart of the form. Another complaint is that statements do not make sense and are not complete in themselves, such as, "The classifications cited above represent maximum levels only and are intended for guidance. Lower levels of classification are permitted whenever they are suitable and whenever the interests of the government are better served." Who is to determine what the lower levels are to be, or how to determine when they are suitable, or when interests of the government are better served? Conflicts within the 254 that require different levels of classification of the same information is a problem. When guidance is inadequate or untimely, the contractor must elect to follow one of the following alternatives: do nothing until classification guidance is furnished by the government; jeopardize schedules by sending each document for which classification guidance is inadequate to the contracting command for determination; or assign a classification based on his own interpretation. This can be interpreted to be assuming the

position of original classification authority, which of course is not the contractor's. This is where coordination between government and contractor classification personnel is all-important. Probably the most dangerous avenue for a contractor to take is to assume that all information for which classification guidance is not available is unclassified. This position jeopardizes the national defense and nullifies much of the efforts to safeguard vital information. A common complaint, in many instances justified, is that guidance conflicts with guidance from other branches of the service. It is an important duty of classification management to assure that conflicts do not exist. One of the most costly and hardest to justify decisions is to classify a program, or certain information related to a program, after the information has been rather widely disseminated as unclassified. All classification management can do here is to present the best case possible that this is an unreasonable decision and will accomplish nothing. The complaints concerning 254s go on and on and now that we have a new form there is still no reason to believe they will stop. Classification management has a problem here that only it can correct. Coordination and cooperation between government and industry is imperative.

C. Determine necessity for special security requirements; assist in implementation of special requirements. This is a continuous effort by both government and industry classification offices. A good example of special requirements is known as Space

Technical Informatic Control Programs. Back in 1962, the Secretary of Defense directed that certain space programs would have special control requirements placed on them. They would be identified by numbers in place of names; access to certain information would be on a strict need-to-know basis and would be for the specific area of interest for each individual. Also, it established certain classifications by association. Common sense must be used in this area of classification by association. This is definitely where classification management can and must get in the picture. The argument is that classification by association is in direct conflict with the principle of classification of information on its own merits and the principle of classification according to content. It presumes that the person who determines the classification is an all-knowing individual who can weigh the effect of the information in question being placed with all other knowledge or information known to mankind. If the principle is carried to its logical conclusion it will result in the classification of all information — since it is the combining of enough words, numbers, etc. that results in classified information. However, the information that concerns the person applying the classification must be limited to what is in the document or material he is classifying. The problem here is that somewhere there is a person who does not know that he is prohibited from using the two associated words, sentences, or bits of information at the same time. The result is the unauthorized disclosure of the informa-

tion or a large amount of classified information which actually reveals nothing.

D. Continuous study of security requirements and changes necessary to maintain necessary security at a minimal cost. This, of course, is a continuing requirement of classification management at all levels. All sort of conflicts, regrading requirements, changes, additions, or deletions in security requirements arise during the life of a program and must be resolved. Classification management is not only the best way to control the security requirements of a program, but I submit to you the only workable way. Coordination between government and industry classification specialists is mandatory. Mutual respect and consideration of the problems faced in both areas will result in better security for our programs.

In summary, let us remember that the initial security classification decision for a program is the most important security consideration pertaining to a program. Classification management is responsible for monitoring the initial classification requirements of programs and projects; it must provide a central control of all classification matters, all decisions, all guidance, all changes in classification, and the resolution of classification problems as they arise; it must have qualified personnel; and it must be properly organized with the backing of the commander and/or management. Probably most important, CM must be completely familiar with all aspects of programs supported. Classification is a command

responsibility. Our job is to see that it is carried out in the most efficient way possible.

In conclusion, we can state without fear of contradiction that security is necessary. It is the keystone of our national defense. Security classification is the basis on which all security is predicated. Why classify? To prevent unauthorized persons (enemy) access to information or material that would aid his efforts and/or be injurious to the United States. This is an important mission and one we can be proud to perform. There are three professions that I consider the most important to man; they are the profession of law, the profession of medicine and the profession of arms. We in security classification management certainly belong to the profession of arms. Our concept of government is based on law. The health and welfare of our people is dependent on the medical profession. The very existence of our way of life, and, I believe, the very existence of

the United States, is dependent on the profession of arms.

**FRED DAIGLE:** I have a question here that you may not desire to answer. If not, I can understand. Recently I ran into something different. We got a 254 that referred to the PRD for classification reference. We got a blank 254, containing the PRD reference. Is this a trend, or an isolated incident? The PRD is a blue suit document, not necessarily an industrial document.

**THOMPSON:** This is a specific situation. It is not a trend. It was made for that one contract and was made because the contractor and the program office want it that way. That is about all I can tell you.

**DONALD WOODBRIDGE:** I don't exactly have a question, but I can't refrain from commenting. I wish Mr. Marshall had been here to hear you say it is a dangerous assumption to assume that information, just because it is not marked classified, should not be protected. I think he would be heartily in accord.

## **PANEL – CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT IN INDUSTRY**

**Kenneth E. Wilson, Sylvania Electronic Products, Inc., Moderator**

**A. A. CORREIA**  
**North American Rockwell**

My subject concerns classification guidance to subcontractors and vendors as a prime contractor.

As you all know, there is nothing more aggravating than to receive a DD Form 254 that pertains to a complete program or weapon system when you need a more definitized

"specification" for only your part of the program or project.

If proper communications and coordination are not established between company buyers and the classification management analyst, this is exactly what will happen. The prime contract DD Form 254 will be sent out with the RFQ or RFP package.

In a recent program effort within

Autonetics, we were able to avoid extensive costs through the timely review of the DD 254. This procurement was for radar hardware, and approximately 100 Item Identification Document (IID) specifications were, or would have been, classified confidential due to the nature of the part descriptions and the test criteria that would have to be met. These criteria are classified and did have to be provided each prospective vendor. This would have necessitated a very complicated procedure for issuing purchase orders and in excessive material procurement costs as well as increased parts costs. By deleting the test levels criteria and including them in a confidential requirements specification, only one document is classified instead of 100.

Distribution of Request for Quote for items of hardware was made to approximately forty-two prospective vendors who were cleared; however, only one classified document was required to be forwarded to these vendors, and the IIDs were all unclassified.

In the value study summary and cost analysis submitted by the procurement department, a total of \$180,000 cost avoidance was submitted, of which \$89,000 has been authenticated by auditing and the remainder is being evaluated. This procurement was for items of hardware for ninety-six radar systems.

In another instance the procurement was for hardware manufactured from special materials. The association of this material with certain programs or projects is classified secret. The best price was from a

vendor that was cleared for storage of documents but had no cleared manufacturing areas. When security was contacted and advised, a study was made and a decision made that the vendor would receive classified parts drawings and reissue the drawings as vendor drawings without any reference to program or project usage. This procedure avoided the additional cost of a guard service and establishing closed areas. In addition, manufacturing personnel did not have to be cleared. The end items of hardware were picked up as classified in the shipping area when they were identified to the contract and program. These personnel were properly cleared.

These cases are only a few of the numerous ones in which we, in industrial security at Autonetics, have been involved. It is of extreme importance to a company to advise their buyers of the availability of the security classification analyst services when making purchases for classified hardware.

Finally, I concur with Colonel Cobbs' concept of the requirement for a team effort in establishing security guidance. Thank you.

**GEORGE L. CHELIUS**  
**McDonnell Douglas Corporation**

The most important responsibility for personnel in classification management is to effectively communicate with members of the scientific and technical community. The classification specialist can no longer say that he does not understand the technology involved in a classified program. Our profession is rapidly changing

from the non technical responsibilities of disseminating and monitoring the implementation of security guidance to full participation in the decision-making process of whether an item of information should be classified in the interest of national defense.

I am reminded of a talk given in 1966, to NCMS, by Dr. E. T. Welmers of the Aerospace Corporation, wherein he indicated that on many occasions he would tell non-technical personnel that he was a mathematician. The response was almost unanimous. "Well," they would say, "that's one thing that I could never understand." It was Dr. Welmers' opinion then, and shared by me today, that it is becoming absolutely essential that the non-scientist begin to understand and communicate with the scientific and technical community around him. Hence the need for the classification specialist to take time out of his pressing schedule to understand the scientific principles involved in making that classification determination.

First, let us consider the scientist, his underlying philosophies, and examine his attitude toward the classification specialist. Throughout his education it has been stressed that in America he has academic freedom to develop scientific ideas. He is also encouraged to participate in conferences and symposia of a technical nature where he may relate to other members of his own profession a free exchange of opinions and ideas. To impose on the scientific community any regulation preventing this free exchange of ideas requires careful

evaluation of the benefits and liabilities. Where such restrictions are placed on scientific information the classification specialist must realize that it is in direct conflict with the basic philosophies of the scientist.

The scientist's reaction to the imposition of a security classification may be one of hostility where such information has been developed as a result of his independent research within the universities or colleges. This is especially true when the scientist is new to a corporate structure and finds that such information is classified because of its relationship to the military involvement of the corporation in defense contracts. Others may consider classification as but another administrative hurdle standing in the path of scientific breakthrough. Perhaps still others view classification as an attempt to restrict discussions of scientific ideas within the technical community.

The attitude of the scientist toward the classification specialist may vary as much as 180 degrees. One scientist may see the classification specialist much the same as a motorcycle officer, waiting behind a billboard for him to run a stop sign. Some members of the technical community adopt an attitude of wait and see, reserving judgment until the classification specialist becomes thoroughly familiar with the problem and subsequently renders a decision. While the scientist in this latter category may not agree with all decisions, he usually respects the logic used in arriving at the decision. Finally, some technical personnel feel the classification specialist is incapable of

understanding the problem and therefore it is useless, in his mind, to even approach the specialist to give him a chance to interact with his ideas.

The last observation of the scientific community that I would like to make is directed toward the scientist's relationship to his employer. The scientist's purpose is to develop, stimulate, and expand in technical horizons, thereby creating new business opportunities. It is important in fulfilling his primary role to the corporation that he does not forget the residual responsibilities of administration, financial management, and, of course, classification management.

The underlying philosophy of the classification specialist is substantially the same as that of the scientist with respect to their security responsibilities in the corporation. This is predicated on the interest of the corporation in the national defense as evidenced by the execution of the Security Agreement DD Form 441.

The value each apportions to his security responsibility may vary due to his employment objectives. The effort is that the scientist's security obligations are residual to and arise out of the generation of classified information while the classification specialist is specifically hired, and has the primary responsibility, to protect information in the interest of national defense. It should be noted that the classification specialist also has a duty to the corporation. This duty is fulfilled in the cooperation with and assistance to the technical directorates consistent with sound security policies.

The attitude of the classification

specialist toward the scientist is usually one of complete lack of understanding. First, he probably considers the scientist to be unacquainted with, and disinterested in, security requirements. He further cannot understand why the "good doctor" cannot understand the difference between RD, FRD, and Defense Information, and, if that is not enough, the classification specialist is sure that the scientist is working for a foreign power when he makes a value judgment that is inconsistent with established security guidance. The problem thus becomes one of reconciliation of the philosophies and attitudes of the scientist and the classification specialist.

It is obvious that we in classification management must take the first step toward understanding the scientific community. I will attempt to list some informal methods that may be used by the classification specialist to create an interest in his program with the scientific community, and then present a more formal approach used within Douglas Missile and Space Systems Division to implement the classification management program.

First, we should be willing to make personal contact with the project managers on all classified contracts informing them of our services and extracting from them a basic understanding of the technology involved in their contract.

Second, we should take more interest in the planning activities of the corporation, learning the direction of future business opportunities and obtaining security guidance which could be applicable to these activities. We

should also seek out and attend technical briefings given to management during their annual review to further familiarize ourselves with the advances in specific programs.

Third, the classification specialist should take an interest in the minor successes of the technical personnel. For example, where the classification specialist finds a minor test (classified or not) is being conducted and it is particularly important to the program, he should inquire of the program management as to the success or failure of the test. This will reinforce the trust you have established with the technical personnel.

Lastly, we should be available to the various management levels as well as to the scientific personnel assigned to these directorates. Primarily then, it is the exposure to the technical problems that builds the trust the classification specialist must have to operate effectively.

At McDonnell Douglas an effort is made to formalize and centralize the decision-making process in classification matters. Classification committees are established for each major contract or subcontract, to ensure uniform implementation of the security guidance furnished. The classification committee consists of the manager of security, as chairman; a contracts representative; and a member of the appropriate engineering projects office. The classification committee convenes at the request of any member of the committee, or every thirty days whichever is earlier.

The committee is responsible for the review and interpretation of the original DD Form 254, or revision

thereto, and establishes detailed security classification guidelines for the contract concerned. Where it is determined by the committee that clarification of DD Form 254 is indicated, the contractor's representative is responsible to negotiate with the appropriate government agency to obtain a revision or clarification. The manager of security maintains a liaison between his office and the user agency's classification management offices. This enables the classification specialist to understand the government's philosophy in classification, and also assist in maintaining consistency with other user agency programs or contracts. Upon the committee's approval of the Security Requirements Check List, the security office distributes the check list in accordance with an established distribution list.

In addition to major programs we receive a number of smaller research contracts for which it would be impractical to establish such a committee. In this situation the classification specialist and the technical personnel function as the classification committee. In regard to these contracts the technical personnel quite often call upon the specialist to provide classification guidance based upon our knowledge of other information known to be currently classified.

At Douglas we have taken additional precautions to establish a classification committee for all information generated under our Independent Research and Development programs. The committee consists of the deputy director of research and development and the security specialist. Each quar-

ter a judicious review is made of the 160 individual projects within the IRAD organization. This review often includes a discussion with the principal investigator of the project to ascertain his feelings concerning classification of the work in progress.

In other areas we have also found the need to establish classification committees. These directorates are basically responsible for supporting management planning. The personnel involved in gathering planning material are not always technically oriented and therefore occasionally desire classification assistance in making classification determination. These supporting organizations find it necessary to call upon their committee representatives to assist in classification determinations.

The classification committees also play an important role in review and reclassification of information upon receipt of a revised DD 254. After approval of the revised DD 254 the management of each functioning department, or engineering project office, designates an employee to be responsible for the review of the following types of classification material: engineering drawings, documents originated by an engineering project office or design section, or documents received or distributed by an engineering project office. In any case, when the reviewer or originator is unable to make a determination regarding reclassification of documents, assistance may be requested from the security classification chairman.

The use of classification committees provides the classification specialist the opportunity to meet and

become familiar with the scientific personnel as well as the technical areas of interest of the particular contract involved. It also provides a means of conducting an extensive security classification educational program directed toward the other members of the committee. Through these committees classification guidance may be reviewed in depth for consistency.

With the use of the classification committee, and supplemented by frequent personal contacts, the scientist begins to understand the interrelationship of classification management and technology. We have also found benefits of this interrelationship evidenced in other areas of our security program as the scientists increase their knowledge of proper security procedures.

#### KENNETH E. WILSON

When I first commenced preparation for these remarks, it was my intention to discuss the "translation," if you will, of the DD 254, as generally received, into a more useful format for technical distribution. I intended to discuss some of the areas or items of the DD 254 that most frequently require clarification — obtained through the combined efforts of the classification analyst and the technical manager. But the more I developed this presentation, the more I got the feeling that I had heard this song before — at previous seminars, at chapter meetings, and, in fact, at any assemblage of two or more industrial classification management people. And I was reminded of a Coast Guard admiral on whose staff



I have seen this a number of times for mixing metaphors. One of his gems was reserved for those times when he felt his staff had gotten overly enmeshed in the details of a problem. He would say "Gentlemen, you're curing symptoms again—let's back up and take a look at the forest." So I decided that it might be more appropriate for us to review the "forest" of classification management today, and to consider a couple of suggestions for encouraging its healthy growth.

I submit that the first step we need to take is to accept certain facts about classification guidance, to recognize the reasons for the existence of the facts and then to see if we can't design some remedial efforts. I further suggest that the basic facts we must concern ourselves with are only two in number: first, we will continue to receive guidance from the user agencies that is frequently inadequate, inconsistent, incomplete — or a combination thereof; second, it will be a rare instance when a firm provides sufficient staff to properly monitor the classification management effort of the company. The reasons behind these facts are fairly easy to discern, so let's take a look at them.

To begin with, if we ever receive a set of perfect classification guidance, it will have been generated by a man who has a Ph.D. in semantics, an M.S. in logic and a B.S. in engineering. And as "lovable ol' George" is wont to say, "They don't hardly make them kind no more." So our guidance will continue to be originated by men with varying degrees of com-

petence in the technique of communicating ideas. Unfortunately, since the essence of classification guidance is the clarity of definition and precision of description, this technique is not a simple art. Further, the completion of the DD 254 will probably also continue to be a secondary — and usually last minute — function, with the generator having neither the time nor the inclination to attempt perfection. The guidance, then, will usually display some characteristics of concern to the industrial classification analyst as it comes out of the user agency program office.

Now, most Air Force — and an increasing number of Navy — commands have established classification management offices in their security organization. I am certain that the classification specialists in these offices will do their best to review the guidance prior to issuance to the contractor and to correct as many problems as possible. But, like most security operations, in or out of the government, the staffing is less than adequate. Each such specialist is probably carrying at least a 1.5-man workload. He is further handicapped, in almost all cases, by having had no experience in industry. He hasn't had to make classification management work. This isn't meant to be derogatory to the individual; after all, I was in the same position myself a few years ago. But it is true that you have to be able to recognize problems before you can solve them. So I think it fair to assume that not all the difficulties appearing in 254s will be resolved by this review action.

The final point in the government

at which classification guidance can be subjected to any kind of quality control efforts is the classification management section of the DCASR industrial security office. Here again, however, we have the problem of understaffing. For this reason, the concentration seems to be on seeing that industry does receive guidance—be it good or bad. And one can hardly fault this course of action under the circumstances. Again, of course, the lack of industrial experience makes its effect felt.

The sum total of all this is, as I have stated, that the receipt of imperfect guidance must be expected and accepted. But this does not mean that industry is blameless for our failure to attain our common goal. Far from it.

Only a minority of contractors have yet considered, much less accepted, the potential for gain arising from a classification management program. Fewer yet have made the investment in profitability that is represented by a formal program, appropriately staffed. And even rarer are those contractors who have responded to the encouragement given by the government in paragraph 10.a. of the *ISM* and made an effort to improve classification guidance by contributing to it. These facts, and the financial reasons behind them, are new to none of us; and, certainly, changing this situation is one of the prime objectives of NCMS.

At this point, I am again reminded of the good admiral of whom I spoke. He had another saying that went like this: "Any damn fool can

now make a mousetrap. I want to hear about the better mousetrap." Now, I don't mean to be throwing rocks — and I am not sure that I can design that better mousetrap — but I do have some suggestions for your consideration.

First: If the user agencies have schools for prospective contracting officers or program managers, then I believe that a major effort of the directorate of security policy this coming year should be to arrange for inclusion in the curriculum courses on classification management, and, particularly, the preparation of classification guidance. Certainly the presentations of the Industrial Security School at Fort Holabird should emphasize the contribution that may be expected from this field of endeavor. The course content should be heavily oriented towards the practical side of the problems to be faced. In this regard, I was privileged to preview an article on the "Classification of Hardware" written by Don Garrett, who, as most of you know, is the Assistant Deputy Director of the Office of Classification Management in DOD. This paper exemplifies the commonsense approach to classification management, which all too often gets lost among the more esoteric considerations of the subject. I commend it to your attention, and only hope that it can be widely distributed to the government personnel who prepare guidance.†

My second suggestion has to do with the weakness in the program that stems from the lack of industrial experience on the part of those involved on the government side, which

I mentioned earlier. I am certain that there are many problems connected with their operations which are neither recognized nor understood by those of us in industry. The apparent inability of DOD to get the Army to join the Air Force and Navy in classification management is a case at point. On the other hand, the tendency of DCASR inspectors to insist that the contractors should harass their customers concerning inadequacies in compliance with industrial security regulations -- such as failure to properly mark documents -- demonstrates that this lack of understanding is not entirely one-sided. To help cure this difficulty, I suggest that the director of security policy give serious consideration to the precedent established by another agency of the government, which, like DOD, both writes and enforces regulations affecting a portion of industry. Despite review of proposed changes by contractors' trade associations and even public hearings, they too often found themselves embroiled in controversial issuances. A policy was established that no employee reach the level at which he generated such proposed changes until he had completed what is known as an industry training assignment. This involves the employee working for a period of time with at least two companies-- in positions connected with that area of operations directly concerned with the regulations issued by the agency. It costs the agency the loss of the employee for that period of time,

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‡ This article appears in the volume IV, No. 1 1968 issue of the Journal.—Ed.

but they feel that the benefits are more than compensatory.

The third suggestion that I submit to you is directed towards industry. Are you really convinced that classification management is an important -- indeed, a vital -- function of the industrial security program? If so, but you have been unable to sell this somewhat intangible concept to management well enough to obtain a staffing increase, have you considered going the hard route? Have you considered establishing the beginning of the program within your present staffing limits? Once the technical staff recognizes the contribution this service can make -- and that will take them a surprisingly short time if your approach is correct--you will find them supporting your efforts to increase the program beyond the token level. I know that this is a horrifying suggestion to people who are convinced that their staff is already overworked and underpaid. But unless you have made a *detailed* and *comprehensive* analysis of your operation within the last two years, you probably have the capability of at least starting a classification management program. It will mean making changes, but any management consultant will tell you that an administrative organization that can't respond to changing needs is a sick one. So I urge you to take a good look at this possibility.

In this talk, I have tried to convince you of three things:

First, that we should not spend too much time wringing our hands over the detailed deficiencies of the present classification management pro-

gram and the guidance emanating therefrom.

Second, that there are practical, but not necessarily easy, means of effecting improvement in the situation; and

Third, that we should — and indeed must — take such steps, if we are to maintain the vitality of the program.

I hope that I have succeeded. Thank you.

**JOHN SHUNNY**  
**Sandia Corporation**

Classification guides are not enough for an effective classification program. Guides have to be interpreted and, in a large organization, the technical people for whom they were written may not even know they exist.

The periodic training of technical people in classification helps insure:

a. Their knowledge of guides and of the latest revisions to guides.

b. Their awareness of the classification management office and what it does.

c. Awareness by classification people of new and old classification problems.

This last factor was an unexpected dividend from our classification education program. We learned that our educational sessions worked both ways, and we were alerted to classification problems we might not have been aware of.

Sandia employs some 8000 persons, all concerned with classification to a degree. We felt the principal educational need was with that comparatively small group who have the decision-making authority. Within

the AEC context, these are the people who are formally given the "authority to classify." They are usually supervisors. Also invited to the educational sessions are those nonsupervisory staff people who frequently do all the groundwork leading to the decision by the person authorized to classify. These two groups account for about 800 to 900 persons.

While our educational program is aimed primarily at these people, other programs have been developed for two other categories of employees. Since secretaries are in a good position to insure that the procedural aspects of classification are observed, we developed a short briefing for them, in which we show how they can help insure that there will be no classification foul-ups in their office. For example, if a staff member not authorized to classify attempts to classify some outgoing correspondence, the secretary can tactfully remind him that only the supervisor has this authority.

In addition, a program was developed for new staff hires. Under this program, each receives our brochure, "Introduction to Security Classification," on sign-in day, together with a note informing him he will be scheduled for a briefing. At this briefing, held a few weeks later, the new-hire is given a quiz whose chief purpose is to promote discussion — which it usually does.

A principal objective in the educational program for technical people is to get the student to participate. If he joins or initiates a discussion, the chances are the session will be fruitful for him.

We gain his involvement by keep-

ing the size of the sessions down to about a dozen, in addition, in any one session, all are scheduled from the same general work area so that discussions can be relevant and precise.

The physical arrangement is seminar-like, that is, a big table with everyone, including the classification person, sitting around it. Sessions are always scheduled in morning hours, well in advance, in a conference room away from the student's work area, to avoid interruptions.

The length of the program runs from one and one-half to two hours. A coffee break is held at the conference table, about halfway through the session.

After introducing himself, the classification person makes an initial presentation, lasting thirty to forty minutes, on general classification rules. For this purpose, our movie, "Introduction to Classification," is used, as well as flip charts and the blackboard. Appropriate guides are displayed and referred to.

The conclusion of this part of the session is usually a good time for a coffee break.

After the break, the session turns to classification guidance on specific hardware and areas of interest to the audience, e.g., radars, power supplies, testing, etc. Using a felt-tip pen and a 30- x 40-inch pad of paper, the classification person can make his own flip charts for this part of the session, writing on the charts beforehand the specific guidelines of interest to the audience. The blackboard is also used here for rough drawings.

This is the most important part of the educational session, and discussion

should be encouraged. Fortunately, most technical people have some strong feelings about classification rules, and even if these feelings are negative — which is likely — this is better than apathy, so discussion usually starts without difficulty. Of course, the classification person has to be ready to field all sorts of questions, and some of these questions can be sticky. When he gets a sticky question, the attitude of the classification person is perhaps more important than his actual answer. We avoid being defensive, dogmatic, or truculent, and try to be positive and sympathetic; if the question is beyond our competence, we admit it and promise to deliver the answer at a later date.

If possible, samples of the type of hardware in which the participants are interested should be used for illustrative purposes. If this is not possible, or if the hardware is too big to transport to the conference room, appropriate drawings are procured beforehand.

This part of the session lasts as long as the participants wish; usually, it concludes in an hour or so. The final item consists of answering the specific questions sent in beforehand on the questionnaire. These questionnaires help the classification person before the session in learning areas of chief concern to the participants.

In some six years of conducting this education program, our technical supervisors and staff people have received seminar training in classification two or three times. Initially, we surveyed "graduates" to get their opinion of the program and their

suggestions or improvements. Response was almost universally favorable, and we are confident that the

overall program of the IEEE at Sandia is better for our efforts in this direction.

## LUNCHEON ADDRESS

BARRY MILLER

*Aviation Week & Space Technology*

I'd like to apologize in advance, if I may, for the fact that I don't give a very well organized nor a very orthodox talk. I have decided to divide my talk today into three parts—a prologue, the main discussion, and the epilogue. My prologue is really in the form of a statement of belief. My epilogue is also a statement of belief. As a matter of fact, the prologue and the epilogue are identical. So I am going to start out by giving the beginning and the end of my talk. I am going to read this:

"I believe in withholding disclosure of certain information that jeopardizes the security of the nation. Any decision to withhold information, however, should be reviewed periodically by competent, properly constituted authorities desirous of satisfying the public's right and duty to know."

So that is my prologue, my epilogue, the first part of my talk and the third part of my talk. So in effect I have completed two thirds of my talk.

Several months ago, I gave a talk before the Orange County Section of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and, unbeknownst to me, they sent out what I thought was a very clever notice.

The notice starts by saying, "Section Correspondent, Orange County Section meeting notice," and then

they have a box enclosed in a black border. It says, "Warning! Be sure to get your *Aviation Week* secret clearance updated before the the meeting." They go on to say, "You can't subscribe to *Aviation Week* unless you have secret clearance," etc.

About a week before the meeting I received a phone call from a chap who identified himself as being with Hughes Aircraft Company. He said, "I want to attend this IEEE meeting. I want to know how to go about getting my *Aviation Week* clearance updated. I don't exactly understand what you mean. I talked to my security people and I have got their clearance but I don't know how to go about getting my *Aviation Week* clearance."

I thought he was pulling my leg but I soon realized he wasn't kidding me. Before the meeting, I received a second call from the chairman and he said two or three of the group had called him and said they did not know how to get *Aviation Week* clearance.

This is, as far as I am concerned, an example of how an outmoded, all-pervasive, and destructive security system warps and conditions us until we become victims of words and symbols. We become accustomed to believing, when we see a black border around a statement, that that is the

way it is and that is the way it's got to be.

What is this strange thing called *Aviation Week* — this thing that the IEEE, Orange County Section, suggests, with tongue in cheek, one has to update his secret clearance before he can subscribe to?

*Aviation Week* is a weekly publication that reports on topics of interest to the aero-space and defense industries. It is one of over forty magazines published by McGraw-Hill, a corporation with annual sales in excess of \$30 million dollars. It is a magazine with associates all over the world. Most of them are technically trained. All of them have skills, backgrounds, abilities and a sense of devotion and dedication enabling them to function with great effectiveness. By every yardstick, the magazine is a highly successful one. We have 100,000 subscribers in controlled circulation. By controlled I mean the publisher regulates who receives the magazine so that he can give assurance to the advertisers that their advertising is being carried to people who are in a position to buy their products.

We have at all times 2,000-3,000 people on a waiting list who want to subscribe to the magazine but who are not permitted to because the company imposes a restriction on the number of subscribers. The subscribers consist of military people, the airlines, the Defense Department people, among others. There are no dentists, no butchers, no housewives. We have no circulation promotion, no pleas to latent subscribers to resubscribe. We have no irate demands made upon us for refunds on cancellations.

We are a widely quoted magazine. We are constantly referred to, somewhat irreverently, as the Bible of the industry.

This all adds up to a very successful magazine and I always like to think of it in these terms: It is not a very good magazine, it is only the best of its kind in the world.

What makes *Aviation Week* successful? Well, I feel that one of the things is that we respect the industry and we respect the people in the industry; and we feel that without their reciprocal respect and confidence, we couldn't exist. We just couldn't function. And in order to get their respect, we have to earn it. We have to earn it by behaving responsibly. As a part of that, we have to protect our sources of information even when it isn't necessary because if you don't protect your source of information, even when it isn't necessary, then you get out of the habit of protecting information.

How successful we are, I think other people can judge. But our acceptance, as far as we are aware of it, is shown by the willingness of people to confide in us, and the willingness of people to accord us recognition as honorable people. I think this is a description somewhat of our success.

What value does *Aviation Week* have? First, I'd say it informs people of what is going on in industry and what is going on in the military. The fact that we serve such a purpose is evidenced in many, many ways. We reprint articles that are requested by branches of the military service, by the Air Commands, by congressmen, and others. We provide a source

for business opportunities for companies in the field. We provide opportunity for the government to get ideas and thereby save money.

I can recall a specific incident where I had worked on an article with a civilian technical man in the government and he told me that he knew that because of his peculiar situation that there was going to be a fuss kicked up about the article. My reaction was that if that was going to happen there was probably no point in even going through with it. But the information came out. There was a security violation filed against him, and apparently there was an investigation and it was determined there was no disclosure of classified material in the item. Subsequently I met him again and I told him I wouldn't have gone through with it had I known. He said, "I suspected this but as a result of the appearance of that article we were contacted by a little company, and they had a particular product that was applicable in the program, and as a result of that we feel we can save the government two million dollars." So in that sense that article was valuable.

The magazine, I think, helps to avoid re-inventing the wheel, which is a great tendency. Also, I feel we serve as a kind of a watchdog in the industry. I do not think this is exclusively true of *Aviation Week*. It is true of a number of people and papers that are constantly there to watch the government.

Now, *Aviation Week* has a policy with respect to security information, and it is that we do not — and I re-

peat — we do not publish classified information. We do, however, have a reputation to the contrary. That is, we have such a reputation in the sense that is frequently heard that *Aviation Week* leaks this or publishes that, et cetera.

All I can say is that I have been with the magazine eight years, and when I first came with the magazine I raised this question and I was told that the policy of the magazine is that we do not publish classified information. I was told that by the boss, and I have to accept it at face value. If I didn't, and I went ahead and deliberately wrote an article in which I disclosed information I knew beforehand was classified, I know I would be liable to discharge. So I accepted it, as I say, at face value and I pursue on my own a policy that I do not publish classified information.

But it is pretty much in the nature of security, it seems to me, that what may be classified to one person may not be classified to another. I will cite one example.

Hughes Aircraft Company has been building a technical communication satellite for SAMSO and back in October I talked to Hughes and asked about the possibility of doing an article on the system and they replied very carefully, "No, it's classified."

We later tried again to get some material released, but we couldn't do it. Well, in the January 15 issue of *Aviation Week*, there appeared an article on the Hughes technical communications satellite. So as far as the Hughes people are concerned, *Aviation Week* would publish classified information.



Now, what was the story on that? If you read the story, it develops that a chap in the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in Washington gave a paper on this Hughes satellite. The *Aviation Week* article was based on his paper. Presumably as far as the Department of Defense was concerned, it was not classified. So far as Hughes Aircraft was concerned, it was classified.

The Hughes people subsequently told me they had submitted a photograph of the satellite and in the photograph they had indicated the size — they had some antennas on top and they had indicated that the antennas were eight feet long — and SAMSO said, "Absolutely not, because we don't want to reveal the size of those antennas." Well, in our article we ran a picture released with the ODDR&E paper, which showed the satellite, and standing next to it was a shining-faced Air Force major and one would have to be quite dense not to be able to size the picture and see that the Air Force major was about six feet tall and the antennas were a couple of feet longer.

I had occasion last fall to write an article on the Phoenix missile system. I talked to the Navy people. I talked to the Hughes people. We had several sessions, and they were quite open. They gave me everything I wanted to know and at the end of the interview the Hughes project engineer said, "I answered all your questions you asked." I said, "I had a couple more but presume that the answers are probably classified."

He said, "What do you mean?"

I said, "For example, the ranges of

the Phoenix missile, the detection range of the radar, etc., are probably classified information."

He said, "It is just as well you didn't ask that, my DD-254 is clear on that question. That information is classified."

That was in the middle of the week. I went back and wrote my article and I mailed it back east, I think about Thursday or Friday. On Monday — that is before my article appeared in the next issue of the magazine — there appeared an article on the F-111B weapon system based on testimony given before a congressional committee by the Department of Defense which stated the range of the Phoenix and the detection range of the radar.

This is what I mean by contradictions and this is, as far as I am concerned, the basis for the charge sometimes made about *Aviation Week* that we publish classified information. We publish information that is in one place classified and in another place is not classified. I'll come back to the question of contradictions and the harm and foolishness of security.

Now, in addition to classification there are other considerations. For example, I have been told by our managing editor that the Department of Defense issued a request about a year ago that the press exercise a certain restraint in reporting about military matters because of the war in Vietnam. There are certain things that we, as individuals, and I, as an individual reporter, do. I have enough sense, I think, to recognize when I come upon certain types of information that is better off not published.

An example might be the payload of a weapon system. You have these feelings all the time and I figure that is something I am just not going to publish even though it may not be classified. We have a standing rule in the magazine on that. Every time we write anything on an area we know is sensitive, we are supposed to submit that article to the editor-in-chief with justification for writing it.

There is, I am sure everybody recognizes, a vast quantity of unclassified material that is protected and over-protected and it becomes a tool of some Air Force colonel or Navy captain sitting some place. It becomes an inter-service tool, and an intra-service tool, and it gains some points and makes some points along the line. I know of a particular piece of hardware that I was interested in writing an article about. It is not classified. But it was implied to me that some Air Force colonel back in the Pentagon doesn't like *Aviation Week* and he is just not going to permit talk about this material.

I regard this body of information — as I said this is not classified but the services have taken it upon their own to treat it as proprietary information — I regard this as fair game. I go after this with a great deal of relish. As a matter of fact, I don't think I am an exception and I don't think *Aviation Week* is an exception.

I want to cite an example. The *New York Times* — which also is not a very good newspaper, it is only the best there is — ran a front page story reporting a closed-door retirement speech given by a Marine Corps general about inter-service trouble be-

tween the Marine Corps and the Army. The speech was given before some 400 senior Marine officers. "The substance of his speech was obtained through an officer attending the closed-door meeting at Marine Corps headquarters," the *Times* said.

What the *Times* was saying in that section was, "This information contains no classified matter and we see no reason why it should not be published." And I subscribe to that.

I freely grant that there is a risk involved here, that we, by printing certain things, may inadvertently tip off a potential enemy. I don't want to minimize that risk, but we have to balance that risk against the value of publication, the right we have to publish it, and the right of the public to know.

I also contend that the enemy knows a lot more about us than we perhaps like to think. He monitors our equipment. He seizes our equipment. I have talked to many, many people — reporters on our own staff, reporters from other publications, military people, and our boys that have been to Vietnam — and they all say the same thing. It is a very short period from the time equipment arrives in Vietnam until it is in enemy hands.

The enemy has paid agents. He's got military attaches. We had in this country the case of the Swedish colonel who was the head of the military delegation to Washington for years and it developed that for many years he had been a spy for the Russians. There is a similar case pending now with the French.

The enemy has defectors. Kim

Philby, who was in charge of Intelligence for the British in matters relating to Russia was a double agent in the pay of the British and in the pay of the Russians for many years.

The enemy has trained agents. He has got satellites supposedly capable of distinguishing the stripes on the parking lot of the Lockheed Space Company in Sunnyvale from two hundred miles up.

The enemy knows more about our military posture at the present time than does our electorate.

Where does *Aviation Week* get its information? I don't want to stress this. I understand you had a speaker a couple of days ago who talked about this subject. But one point I would like to make is that leaks are really few and far between. The thought that the information that appears in the press is the result of leaks is considerably exaggerated. That does not allow for enterprise and initiative on the part of the reporter. It doesn't allow for digging and alertness.

It is very, very easy to get information on almost any subject in the United States. You may have to work for it but you can do it. There are a lot of ways. You may, for example, use press releases that come out of companies and the military service. And there are the annual financial statements. The executives of companies give speeches that at times I find very interesting. They talk about what they are doing and what they want to do with great exaggeration. It's true it is exaggeration, but there is a kernel of true detail regarding their capabilities.

There are company newspapers

and company magazines. Look at their classified ads. Look at their sales brochures. I read the business sections of the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times* every week and I find them a constant barometer of what is going on in industry. There are technical papers given in meetings all the time and you can find anything that you want, even though a word is deleted or an application is deleted. I think it is very presumptuous of a security man to think that you can classify only the application — that you can talk about the equipment but you can't talk about the application.

The congressional budgetary statements — that is where much of the information is. And there are contract awards, and advertising. You have to piece all these things together, but the information is available in many places and many ways.

Let me just cite one case about enterprise. In 1964, the Dalmo Victor Company, located down at Belmont, received a contract to build a radar component for the F-111. They were very pleased that they got the contract. It was announced by the company. Shortly after they received the contract, there appeared on the roof of their building a full scale model of the nose section of the F-111. You can see it from the freeway, and if you get within a couple of blocks from it, you could conduct a pattern measurement. You can ride down the Bayshore Freeway and see that model for quite a distance. I know one person who says he knows when he sees the model from the freeway that he is to take the next exit.

I had occasion to write an article on radar warning systems in 1966, which was two years after the model appeared on the roof of the Victor building, and I thought this was perfectly applicable. In fact, it was directly applicable. So I hired a photographer and I told him to go down to Belmont and take pictures of it. I made it very clear he was not to walk on the company property.

We blew the pictures up and ran them in the magazine and there was a big fuss. Well, I figured if I could see it, everybody else could see it, and it was up there for two years and was fair game.

Now, let's come back to the question of security. I think we all respect it. I subscribe to that. It is necessary to protect certain information. But usually when I give a talk like this, there is always someone that gets up in the back of the room and says to me, "You don't want to protect anything." I am in favor of protecting certain information but I think these things have to be regarded in the sense that information may have to be protected today but it doesn't have to be protected tomorrow; or it may have to be protected today and tomorrow, but not next week. In other words, it just has to be protected so long. Ultimately information or equipment is going to fall into hostile hands and is going to be observed, and it isn't necessary to protect everything indefinitely.

Again, a case in point: You probably saw, about a month ago in a Washington newspaper one of a series of articles based on the Army night-sighting device they are using in Viet-

nam now. Those night sights were first used two and a half years ago and I am told on pretty good authority that when they first went there those devices were classified. The way the Army handled them was that when the patrol went out at night, the individual soldiers would have to sign out for the night sights, which would be attached to the rifles, and when they came back in, the sights were collected. A week after they arrived in Vietnam, one of the sights was missing. One of the men was missing and they went out the next day and found the body, but the rifle and the sight were gone. In about a month, parts for that device were readily available on the Saigon market.

That was over two years ago, but up until two months ago, you couldn't get any photographs of that sight. You couldn't get any information at all about it, when obviously it was already in enemy hands. It costs money to protect information and information of that sort doesn't have to be protected.

I was looking through your own publication where Mr. Garrett had the facts and figures on what it costs to maintain security. It costs money to pay security personnel and it costs money for transportation, and for space in which to house all this vast amount of classified material. Frequently you run into people who say, "Well now, yes, that may be true. That was true last year, but you are citing cases and the things you cite just aren't true now."

Well, I decided to look around so I might give you some recent examples.

*Newsweek* had an item in a recent issue — I guess it was about the first week in June, entitled, "The Navy — the Silent Service?" It goes on to say that the Navy is using an old security label to restrict the flow of information not sensitive — not stamped "Confidential," or "Secret," or "Top Secret."

I recently learned about a talk, entitled, "The Navy's Navigation Satellite System." The speaker said he was sorry his talk would be a little disjointed, but certain sections of it were deleted for security reasons, and he hastened to add that those sections that had been deleted were already in the Navy Navigation Satellite brochure, 15,000 copies of which had been distributed throughout the world.

I could go on and on, but I know that you don't want to hear more about that subject.

Well, let me come to the punchline, and that is that as far as I am concerned security is an evil. It is a necessary evil, but an evil nonetheless. When I say evil, I don't mean it is a moral evil — though I am not really sure about that.

It is an evil because it restricts the free exchange of information. It interferes with genuine competition. It precludes the healthy competitive atmosphere that should really be the lifeblood of a free society. It is really a technique borrowed from the closed society that we are struggling against. I am sure the Russians are very appreciative of this because that is really what they believe. Not only do they believe it but they practice it and I don't believe in their system of

government. It is not only a question of belief, essentially it is a totalitarian system of government and it is inefficient.

That is one of the great weaknesses of Russia. It is really inefficient and they will always be inefficient as long as they have that form of government.

And similarly, I think the security system is inefficient. It is costly. You just don't get exposure to all the ideas you need. In addition, it provides a shield for laziness, for inefficiency, a shield for idiocy. It is just not under constant critical scrutiny as it should be. It provides a refuge for all the small and narrow minds.

My feeling is that the practitioners of security are really the greatest threat to what they are supposedly trying to protect. In fact, I say that the real leaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain since the end of World War II have come from the defection of security people — not from the press. I mean Kim Philby and all the other ones.

We have been a nation for almost two hundred years, and I think that all of the inadvertent leaks of military information that have appeared in the press in those years do not equate with one single major CIA or NSA blunder. They do not equate with one *Pueblo* incident. It was not the press who virtually turned over a U. S. floating intelligence ship to the Koreans.

Bid lists are restricted. Companies with new ideas can't very easily break into various facets of the business. All of these things cost the public money.

I cite a couple of cases.

Eight years ago, we published an article on a secret, or supposedly secret — well, the Navy claimed it was secret — ASW system, and in talking to some admiral in Washington, my boss became convinced it was not in the national interest to disclose information on one project. Right before the budget came before congress, the Navy decided to talk about this project.

Some time ago — this goes back six or eight years — I wrote an article on the Discoverer satellite program and I went to SAMSO and talked to some official. He went over the whole program and he said, "Well, do you have everything?"

I said I would like to get some pictures, if possible, or drawings, and he went to a file and pulled out some from a folder with a heavy orange border stamped "Secret."

He crossed out where it said "Secret" on some and wrote "Unclassified" and put down his name. So classification was, in this case, a completely capricious act so far as I was concerned.

It becomes really a political football.

Let's go back to 1964 when that guy from Arizona — I forget his name — was running for President of the United States. If you recall, he was a reserve Air Force general. Actually, he was interested in military matters and he began to make a point about how we were neglecting our air defense — we don't have a good interceptor et cetera, et cetera. And the guy at that time in the White House, who, I guess, figured he wanted to get

all the votes instead of most of the votes, he came out with the statement about a new aircraft, which was a pretty tightly held matter.

As a matter of fact, we knew about that aircraft. We were sure that when they were ready to talk about it they would let us know — or when the guy in the White House decided he wanted to win some more votes, he would advise us that we had, indeed, developed an interceptor. So it is quite obvious that security can be used as a political weapon.

Now I would like to discuss the folly that is sometimes involved in security. On one occasion — this goes back three or four years — I was interested in a particular piece of equipment that was going into the B-52 bomber. I was in contact with the company that made it and they told me there were some steps afoot to get it declassified. And it was declassified. We finally set up a meeting when the Air Force officer who was the project manager at Wright Field came down to Los Angeles. We all sat down and he wanted to know what I wanted with certain specifications and I told him I wanted to talk to the company engineers. I wanted it to be all unclassified.

We worked out an agreement whereby I would write down my questions about the equipment and submit them to the colonel and he was going to look them over and give them to the engineers for the answers. And that is what happened. And the article came out, and the company was delighted and the colonel was delighted and the people at Wright Field were delighted. Everything was

fine until somebody in Washington starting yelling, "Damn it, this stuff should have been classified!" So what do you know — they promptly proceeded to reclassify the equipment.

I am told that reclassification costs money. There was much documentation involved. And the company had an area in the assembly section that was wide open, where they had to erect a partition so they could have one classified section and an unclassified section. This caused a two-week delay in the project.

Now, I think that we have an obligation to ourselves and to our nation. We have to protect some information and we must protect it jealously. But I think that then the rest of it should be declassified and there really shouldn't be any hanky panky like "It is not classified but we don't want to release it at the present time." The industry in the country should know what is happening. We should, I think, encourage competition.

We are talking, really, I think, about attitude here. I contend that the guy who has the say over whether or not information or material should be released should be the guy who feels fundamentally that the government doesn't have any right, other than for public security, to classify material or to withhold releasing material once it has been clearly established that there is no longer any reason to withhold it. The information belongs to the taxpayers. It belongs to the people. The cornerstone of this nation — I feel it is beyond dispute — is an informed public. And I think the public is be-

ing cheated by a system that covers up its own mistakes and its own folly.

GENE SUTO: I take it that you do accept certain classified information as background for particular stories and you do respect this information. We heard earlier from a speaker here who said, "I make it a policy never to accept classified information."

MILLER: I just don't have any occasion to be exposed to that situation, where they say it is classified but I don't expect to use it. I don't. I just never have had that. It may have happened once or twice but more often than not someone says, "This is pretty sensitive. I'll let you know about it." But when they say it is sensitive, they may mean it is classified. I can remember one very specific case where I had to explain at some length, make it very clear, that I didn't have a security clearance. But it is the other man's job to protect that information. He is not supposed to be telling it if it's classified. I don't like to get trapped in that situation. If someone says it is sensitive or it is touchy, that could mean a lot of things, and that I listen to; but when somebody says explicitly it is classified, I say then let's not talk about it.

DICK BOBERG: You went to great lengths to explain some of the ways you obtained information — information that we might consider would be U. S. information. And yet we are aware that you publish information about, say, Russian aircraft and this sort of thing. I am interested in knowing how you get that type of information.

MILLER: I would say if we had a little better access to Russian information, we could stand them on their heads. I think we do a pretty fair job as it is. We have a man on our staff in Russia that was our correspondent for our company in Moscow three years. He studied Russian in college four years. He majored in Russian and he speaks well in a country that is very difficult to get around in. He does exceptionally well, and I think when our people have gone there, as they periodically do, for air shows, he has used a little bit of the ingenuity we use in the United States. For example, some years ago — I think it was 1961 — there was an air show in the summer in Russia and the Russians displayed a number of new aircraft. The story goes that General Twining at that time was being briefed by security people. Individuals were taking pictures at a great distance and the clarity was virtually lost. He said, "I have been better pictures of this in *Aviation Week*." And they came to us and asked — this is the Air

Force — and asked us if we could get some pictures. There was a freelance photographer coming over from London and it was explained to me they had a bus taking press people to the area where there were public stands for the show. And about a block away — and this is not an unusual occurrence in Russia — was the air show. The bus discharged its passengers for the stands and went on down to the flight line. Our photographer stayed with it. He climbed up to the roof of that bus and it was right under the approach path and he just took all the pictures he wanted. Those people who managed to get into the stands, they had to submit their pictures for clearance when they left. Our guy was never in the stands. There is another aspect to this, too. The boss told me that for quite a while the Russians were convinced that the *Aviation Week* was part of this country's security. They don't understand that we have free and independent institutions here and are not beholden to the military.